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Preface
This manual is based on Copyright and Cultural Institutions: Guidelines
for Digitisation by Emily Hudson and Andrew T. Kenyon. The Guidelines for
Digitisation were one of the products of a research project conducted by the
Centre for Media and Communications Law and the Intellectual Property
Research Institute of the Australia, both located at the University of Melbourne. The project examined the impact of copyright law on the digitization
practices of public museums, galleries, libraries, and archives in Australia.
The Australian Guidelines for Digitisation are available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=881699; updated Australian guidelines are due for release in 2010
and will be available via http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/cmcl.
While reading the guidelines, Peter Hirtle realized that a similar document, drawing on American law and practice, would be of great benefit to
administrators and curators in American cultural institutions, including
libraries, archives, and museums. Digitization continues to be of great
importance and interest to the cultural institution sector as a means of
facilitating the public interest missions of access, research, preservation, and
education. Yet there is also great uncertainty associated with the copyright
implications of digitization initiatives.
One reason for institutional concern about copyright is the difficulty
in understanding and interpreting the law: identifying the relevant legal
principles; analyzing the relevant provisions of copyright legislation; and
coming to grips with case law, little of which specifically addresses issues
surrounding digitization by nonprofit institutions. Drafting and implementing copyright procedures often reveals the uncertainties in the law
and demonstrates how difficult it can be to apply abstract legal principles
to specific circumstances.
Another reason for institutional concern is the practical difficulty of
complying with the law: the administrative costs associated with locating
and contacting copyright owners; the frequent long delays in seeking permission; the cost of licenses; and, particularly for smaller institutions, the
lack of specialist lawyers or copyright officers to assist in complying with
copyright law.
Hudson and Kenyon’s Guidelines were developed to inform Australian
cultural institutions and assist them with the legal and practical aspects
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of copyright compliance. With their permission and assistance, Hirtle has
prepared this manual to assist American cultural institutions in the same way.
The manual is intended to provide some basic information on copyright law
and offer a structure for considering copyright issues in digitization projects.
Beginning with the question of when an item is protected by copyright, it
moves on to explore strategies for dealing with copyright issues, including
licensing and the legal exemptions that may allow digitization without
obtaining permission. Two case studies are presented at the end of the
manual that apply the preceding analysis to (1) interviews and oral histories and (2) student dissertations, theses, and papers. These were selected
because they embody many of the principles and problems identified in
the earlier chapters and are topics on which Hirtle frequently is questioned.
Note that this manual is for informational use only and does not constitute nor should be construed as legal opinion or advice. Furthermore,
the law is in a constant state of evolution. Every effort has been made to
ensure that the information presented is accurate, but the law is subject to
change after publication. Cultural institutions should obtain the advice
of a lawyer in relation to any specific questions regarding their copyright
policies and practices.

A note on copyright ownership
of this manual
The intricacies of copyright ownership are discussed in some detail
in Chapter 2. This manual serves as a good example of some of the
principles discussed in that chapter.
Copyright in the original Guidelines for Digitisation belongs jointly
to Emily Hudson and Andrew Kenyon: it is a joint work. Hudson
and Kenyon published the guidelines with a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 2.1 Australian Licence
(see Chapter 7 for a discussion of Creative Commons licenses). Under
this license, users are allowed to make noncommercial use of the
original Guidelines so long as no changes are made to the work (“no
derivatives”) and Hudson and Kenyon receive credit as the authors
(“attribution”).
This manual is derived from Hudson and Kenyon’s work, and so
their permission was needed for its preparation. It is a joint work
coauthored by Hirtle, Hudson, and Kenyon, and so each owns a share
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of its copyright. This manual is also licensed under a Creative Commons license: the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No
Derivatives Works 3.0 United States License. In addition, Hudson and
Kenyon have granted Hirtle a nonexclusive license to use the original
Guidelines in any subsequent noncommercial editions or works that
are derived from this manual.

Many of the images used throughout the manual are in the public
domain, and are so indicated. Others are used under the terms of a Creative
Commons license. Still others are from ARTstor, and are used under its
“Images for Academic Publishing” program http://www.artstor.org/what-isartstor/w-html/services-publishing.shtml. A few are used under an assertion
of fair use. Copyright and licensing information is provided with each image.
This manual is licensed under the Creative Commons AttributionNoncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. To view a
copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
us/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San
Francisco, California, 94105, USA.

Bound copies of the guidelines are available for purchase through
Amazon.com.
The law discussed in this manual is current to May 2009.
Peter Hirtle
Ithaca, N.Y., U.S.A.
Emily Hudson and Andrew Kenyon
Melbourne, Australia
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Introduction
The development of new digital technologies has led to fundamental changes in the ways that copyright works are created, accessed, and
distributed.
These developments have enhanced the ability of libraries, archives,
museums, historical societies, and other cultural institutions to fulfill their
public interest missions of access, preservation, research, and education. For
instance, many institutions are developing publicly accessible Web sites in
which users can visit online exhibitions, search collection databases, access
images of collection items, and—in some cases—create their own digital
content. Many internal activities are also facilitated by digital technologies,
including collection management, preservation activities, exhibition planning, and record keeping for incoming and outgoing loans.
The increased use of digital technologies also raises many logistical
issues, including those related to copyright. Institutions are aware that
digitization raises the possibility of copyright infringement and are implementing systems to facilitate copyright compliance, such as centralized
copyright management offices; copyright instruction programs to ensure
that staff knowledge of copyright is current; and the use of new licensing
models, including requesting broader rather than purpose-specific licenses
and investigating new open licensing models.
These guidelines are intended to assist understanding and compliance
with copyright law. They aim to assist staff and volunteers of cultural institutions determine the following:

△△△△
△△

Whether an item is protected by copyright
Whether that copyright is current and who owns the copyright
What—if any—permission is required in order to digitize the item
The guidelines are broken down into the following chapters:

△△
△△△△

Chapter 2: Copyright Fundamentals (including the types of works
protected by copyright and the requirements for copyright protection)
Chapter 3: Duration and Ownership of Copyright
Chapter 4: Exclusive Rights and Infringement (that is, the acts that only
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△△△△
△△△△
△△
△△△△

the owner of copyright may perform, and the circumstances in which
a third party will infringe those rights)
Chapter 5: Fair Use and Other Exemptions
Chapter 6: The Libraries and Archives Exemptions
Chapter 7: Copyright Permissions and Licenses
Chapter 8: Locating Copyright Owners
Chapter 9: Other Types of Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Jurisdictional Issues
Chapter 10: Risk Management: How to Digitize Safely
Case studies on the digitization of oral histories and dissertations and
theses

In the United States, copyright is governed by the Copyright Act of 1976
as amended and incorporated in the United States Code as Title 17. The
Copyright Act is a lengthy and complex piece of legislation, and it can be
difficult to know where to start in determining whether a collection item
is protected by copyright and, if so, whether digitization will infringe that
copyright.
In order to help readers navigate through these guidelines—and, indeed,
the Copyright Act—we have produced a flowchart that sets out a series of
questions that will help identify whether digitization raises a copyright
issue (see Flowchart 1). Sometimes, these questions will be difficult to
answer, so we have included references to chapters in which each question
is discussed in detail.
This chapter also includes a brief overview of copyright law.

1.1 What is copyright?
The basis for copyright in the United States is found in Article I, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress to enact laws “To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” (The phrase “Science and useful Arts” should be read broadly;
to the authors of the Constitution, “science” meant all learning and “useful
arts” included all the inventions and practical devices now protected by patents.) The underlying purpose of copyright in the United States is therefore
to encourage progress and the development of knowledge.
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	Flowchart
1
m

m

Overview of copyright issues for digitization projects.
Was the object you wish to digitize
created through human effort?
See Chapter 2.

no

Copyright does not subsist in natural
objects. No copyright constraints on
digitization.

yes
Does the object fall within the subject
matter of copyright? See Chapter 2.

no

yes
Does copyright subsist in the object
with regard to its originality and fixity?
See Chapter 2.

But Note
no

yes
Is the copyright term still current? See
Chapter 3.

no

yes

Copyright may subsist in an underlying
work (e.g., a musical work in a sound
recording) or representation (e.g., a
design drawing). See discussion in
Chapters 2 and 4. There may also be
state (nonfederal) protection.
But Note
The work is no longer protected by
copyright. No copyright constraints on
digitization.

Who is the owner of copyright? See
Chapter 3.
Someone Else
Does digitization fall within an exception in the Copyright Act, e.g.,
• Fair use (see Chapter 5)
• Exemptions for certain acts by libraries and archives (see Chapter 6).

Copyright does not subsist in the
object. No copyright constraints on
digitization.

THE CULTURAL INSTITUTION
Yes

The cultural institution has the right to
digitize the work, but must still consider other rights that may apply.

No
Do you have the permission (“license”)
of the copyright owner to digitize the
protected material? See Chapter 7.
No
Digitization will infringe the rights of
the copyright owner. Options: obtain
a copyright license; do not digitize the
material; or digitize under risk-management strategy. See Chapter 7.

Yes

Some digitization and some specific
uses are permitted under the Copyright
Act. The protected material may be
digitized without the consent of, or
payment to, the copyright owner.

Digitization is permitted. You must
comply with any limitations in the
copyright license. Rights other than
copyright may apply.
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i What is copyright?
The Founders chose to advance knowledge by striking a deal with creators (i.e., “Authors”). To encourage the creation and distribution of new
works, copyright law grants to creators a set of exclusive rights for a limited
period of time, after which the work becomes free for everyone to use (i.e.,
it enters the “public domain”). By enabling them to benefit economically
from their creations, copyright provides authors with an incentive to create, publish, and disseminate creative and original works. As the Supreme
Court has explained:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance the public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in “Science and useful Arts.”1

Put another way, “the monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the
individual author in order to benefit the public.”2
Thus, although private interests are essential to the operation of the
copyright system, public interests (and not private profits) remain at the
heart of copyright. As the Supreme Court has noted:
The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution,
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an “author’s” creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. “The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly,” this Court has said, “lie in
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors.”3

Copyright law therefore creates a legal framework for the use and
management of a broad range of creative and intellectual works found
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in cultural institutions, including books, manuscripts, plays, computer
programs, works of art, maps, architectural plans, musical scores, sound
recordings, and films.
It does this by granting the owner of copyright in 17 U.S.C. § 106 the
exclusive right to perform certain acts in relation to the protected work,
including the right:

△△
△△
△△

to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords” (which
includes digitizing the work)
to “distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending” (which includes making a copy of the work available online)
for literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, to “display the copyrighted
work publicly” (which includes displaying the work on a computer
screen)

Rights in copyright are separate from ownership of the underlying physical work. For instance, the purchaser of a book or CD does not become the
owner of the copyright in his or her purchase. Instead, copyright is retained
by one or more of the composer, music publisher, performer, and record
company that produces and distributes the recording.
Copyright is relevant to cultural institutions because they commonly do
not own copyright in collection items. Cultural institutions must therefore

Image: Bristol Museum and
Art Gallery, Bristol, England
Photographer: Adrian
Pingstone
License: Public domain,
through gift of author
Source: http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Bristol_art.gallery.
interior.arp.jpg
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consider copyright law when they are digitizing works or putting digital
content on the Internet.

Question
Are there other rationales for copyright law?
In the United States, the primary justification for copyright is utilitarian: copyright law provides the incentives that some creators are
thought to need in order to produce and distribute works. Without
these incentives, many authors and creators would keep their works
to themselves. By limiting the ways in which users can deal with copyrighted works, copyright law is thought to benefit not only creators
but also society generally, through facilitating access to these works.
In many other countries, however, there are primarily noneconomic justifications for copyright law. For instance, many people
argue that creators have a “natural right” to enjoy and profit from the
“fruits of their labor,” including preventing others from “reaping where
they have not sowed.” Copyright is also supported by moral rights
arguments: that because copyrighted works represent the personality
of the creator, the creator therefore should be able to control uses by
other people.
The different justifications for copyright present real challenges to
ongoing efforts to harmonize international copyright laws. They can
also create problems for cultural institutions when dealing with works
created by authors from outside the United States who may have a
very different conception of the extent of their copyright rights.

1.2 The framework of copyright law
There are certain requirements that must be met in order for a work to be
protected by copyright:

△△
△△
△△

The work or subject matter must fall within a category of material protected by the Copyright Act (see Chapter 2)
Copyright must subsist in that particular work or subject matter, having
regard to its originality, authorship, and fixity (see Chapter 2)
Copyright must not have expired (see Chapter 3)
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Question
Do I need to register copyright?
No. Since 1 March 1989 there is no requirement in U.S. law to register
copyright with the Copyright Office. Nor is it necessary to include
the copyright notice on a work (© Author Name 2009) to obtain
copyright protection. Copyright exists in an original work from the
moment it is fixed in some tangible medium.

The Copyright Act contains a default rule that the “author” of protected
material is the owner of copyright. However, there are exceptions—for
instance, for works created by employees. It is also possible for the owner
to transfer their rights to another person. The rules regarding ownership
are discussed in Chapter 3.
The owner of copyright has the exclusive right to perform certain acts
in relation to the protected material. For instance, the owner of copyright
in a manuscript, play, or musical score has the exclusive right to reproduce,
distribute, publicly perform, and adapt it for new media, venues, and uses.
The nature of these exclusive acts is considered in Chapter 4.
Third parties who perform any of these exclusive acts risk infringing
copyright in the work. Copyright in a work is infringed when:

△△△△
△△

a person who is not the owner of copyright
performs any of the exclusive acts (or authorizes or enables someone
else to perform one of these acts)
without the permission (i.e., “license”) of the copyright owner.

This suggests that a cultural institution will infringe copyright if it digitizes a collection item for which it is not the copyright owner: see Chapter 4.
However, there will be no infringement when any of the following apply:

△△△△
△△

Any copyright has expired
The institution has permission from the copyright owner(s)
The act falls under an express exemption in the Copyright Act or is
allowed under a statutory license
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Key Point
The exclusive rights of the copyright owner include digitization and
online distribution of works. If a cultural institution performs either of
these acts in relation to a copyrighted work for which it does not own
copyright, in many instances, it will have infringed copyright.

Two sets of exemptions are particularly relevant for cultural institutions: fair use and the “libraries and archives” provisions. Both of these
allow cultural institutions and their users to perform otherwise infringing
acts without the permission of the copyright owner. Fair use is discussed
in Chapter 5, and the libraries and archives provisions are outlined in
Chapter 6.

Key Point
It is not an infringement of copyright to perform an exclusive act of
copyright with the permission (“license”) of the copyright owner. Nor
is it an infringement if the act is authorized by one of the exemptions found in the Copyright Act, such as fair use or the libraries and
archives provisions.

As noted above, there will be no infringement of copyright if the cultural
institution has the permission of the copyright owner. Permission and
licenses are considered in detail in Chapter 7. Locating copyright owners
in order to seek permission is discussed in Chapter 8.
All digitization involves some level of risk. For example, works that are
in the public domain in the United States may still be protected in other
countries; presumed copyright owners who grant permission for digitization may not actually have the authority to grant permission; overlapping
levels of copyright in any particular work may make it hard to identify all
potential copyright claimants; and many copyright owners are impossible
to locate, even after extensive searches. Furthermore, the easy accessibility
of the Web (and hence the potential for locating and identifying possible
infringements) increases the likelihood that technical infringements will
become known. Lastly, the belief of many individuals that Web publication
is an economic goldmine increases the likelihood that some will charge
infringement and seek compensation even when they have no reasonable
grounds for doing so.
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A cultural institution that undertakes a digitization project, therefore,
is going to assume some risk. Chapter 10 discusses strategies for managing
the risks associated with every digitization project.

Key Point
All digitization involves some risk. These guidelines are designed to
educate you about the potential risks and help you assess the threat
that they pose to your institution. Each institution must decide on
its own how much and what type of risks it is willing to assume. The
answer will vary from institution to institution.

Finally, although these guidelines are primarily about copyright, there
are other laws that can impinge on digitization efforts. Chief among these
are rights of privacy, publicity, and trademark. Contractual agreements
can also limit digitization, as can concerns over whose laws apply when
digitizing foreign works. All these topics are discussed briefly in Chapter 9.

1.3 Principles of copyright law
Before the substantive discussion of copyright in later chapters, it is useful
to explore four of its underlying principles: the copyright/property distinction, the “public domain”, the “idea/expression dichotomy,” and the causal
connections that are required under the Copyright Act.

Copyright/Property Distinction
Copyright is separate from ownership of the physical object in which copyright is embodied [17 U.S.C. § 202]. Consider a typical contract of sale for a
painting (one that transfers ownership of the physical work from the seller
to the purchaser). Since at least 1978, such a contract results in the purchaser
obtaining ownership of the painting, but not any copyright, which remains
with the artist or copyright owner.4 If the purchaser wants to obtain an
assignment of copyright (which transfers copyright to the purchaser) or a
license (which permits certain uses under the license terms), this must be
specifically negotiated for and (for assignments) agreed to in writing. (Note
that it is not essential for a license to be in writing to be legally binding, but
it is strongly encouraged: see Chapter 7.)
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Tip
When negotiating copyright licenses or assignments, it is important
to remember that the donor, seller, or depositor of an object may have
no rights in relation to copyright. In that case, any purported license
or assignment will be ineffective at law. The institution will need to
identify the copyright owner and enter into separate discussions with
him or her if it wishes to obtain a license or assignment.

The Public Domain
A second important principle is that copyright is a limited right of fixed
duration. Once copyright expires, works enter the public domain and may
be dealt with without obtaining any copyright permissions.
Some cultural institutions have targeted their digitization projects on
objects in the public domain, thereby avoiding the legal and practical difficulties of copyright compliance. The main copyright issue in those instances
is whether there is a new copyright in the digitized form of the item (see
Chapter 2). In addition, there may be jurisdictional disputes over material
in the public domain in the United States but not abroad (see Chapter 9).

Idea/Expression Dichotomy
A third principle is that copyright protects the expression of ideas, rather
than the ideas themselves. As detailed in the Copyright Act,
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work [17 U.S.C. § 102(b)].

The level of protection that is given to a work depends on its nature
and subject matter. The simpler the expression of an idea, the more likely
that a variation of that expression will not infringe copyright. For instance,
copyright can exist in a basic sketch of a commonplace item, such as a
spoon. However, copyright will only protect that particular version of the
commonplace idea of spoon drawing—and not the general idea of drawing

10

Copyright timeline

i 1.5

a picture of a spoon. This means that the owner of copyright may be given a
remedy only in relation to literal copying of the sketch, because otherwise
he or she would effectively enjoy a monopoly in relation to spoon drawing.

Independent creation
A plaintiff who brings an action alleging copyright infringement must
demonstrate that the allegedly infringing work was copied or derived
from his or her own work. This is normally done by demonstrating that
the alleged infringer had access to the plaintiff’s work and that there is a
“striking similarity” between the two works. There is no infringement when
a person independently creates his or her work without reference to the
plaintiff’s work.

1.4 Common law copyright
In the United States, there are two layers of copyright protection. The largest and most important is federal copyright protection, which is secured
under the provisions of the Copyright Act. If a work is eligible for protection
under the Copyright Act, then only the federal law applies; any state laws
are preempted by the federal law.
Certain types of work are not eligible for federal copyright protection.
They include works that are never fixed (such as a conversation between
two friends) and sound recordings made before 1972. Works that are not
protected by federal copyright laws may still be protected by what is often
called “common law copyright.” Common law copyright is a mishmash of
state-based law deriving in some cases from formal state copyright statutes,
in other cases from related laws (such as antibootlegging legislation), and
from judicial decisions. It can vary from state to state.
We believe that most of the material (except for sound recordings) that
cultural institutions are likely to wish to digitize will be protected by federal
law, and hence federal law will be the focus of these guidelines.

1.5 Copyright timeline
In the United States, copyright is governed by the Copyright Act of 1976.
This legislation came into force on 1 January 1978 and since that time has
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undergone regular amendment. There are times, however, when it is also
necessary to consult the terms of the previous law, the Copyright Act of 1909.
Most cultural institutions own or possess collection items that were created
well before the entry into force of the Copyright Act in 1978. The copyright
status, authorship, and ownership of these objects could be determined in
part by the previous law.

Title 17
The Copyright Act of 1976 and the subsequent amendments are
codified in Title 17 of the United States Code, a compilation of the
general and permanent federal laws of the United States. References
to relevant code sections are given in the body of this manual in standard legal format. For example, [17 U.S.C. § 107] refers to Section 107
(the Fair Use section) of Title 17 in the U.S. Code. In the narrative, this
would be shortened just to “Section 107.”

The timeline, Table 1.1, sets out important legislation and law reform
reports in the development of copyright law.

ii	Table 1.1
Copyright Timetable5
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1709

The first copyright act, the “Statute of Anne,” passes in England. It
grants copyright protection to the authors of books.

1787

U.S. Constitution in Article 1, Section 8, authorizes Congress to pass
copyright and patent legislation.

1790

First federal copyright statute passes. Protection is limited to maps,
charts, and books. Duration is for 14 years, with the possibility of a
14-year renewal term if the author is still living.

1831

Term extends to 28 years with the possibility of a 14-year extension.
Protection extends to published music, which is protected against
reproduction (but not performance, until 1891).

1856

Copyright protection for dramatic public performances is added.

1865

Photographs and negatives become eligible for copyright protection.
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1870

Protection for dramatic works, pantomimes, paintings, drawings, and
sculpture is added to the Copyright Act.

1886

Formulation of the first major international treaty in relation to copyright, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
The treaty has been revised 5 times since then. Currently, over 150 countries are members of the Berne Convention, including the United States
(which joined over a century later, in 1988).

1891

First U.S. copyright protection for foreign works. Prior to this, most
major American publishers were “pirates,” reprinting without permission the works of noted European authors such as Dickens and Dumas.

1909

Copyright law in the United States undergoes a major revision with the
Copyright Act of 1909. It broadens the definition of works of authorship
and extends terms to 28 years with the possibility of a 28-year renewal.
Amendments later in the century would extend the renewal term to 67
years (for a total of 95 years of protection).

1912

Movies are afforded copyright protection.

1955

United States becomes a signatory to the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC ), affording U.S. authors expanded protection abroad.

1972

Sound recordings receive federal copyright protection.

1976

Copyright Act of 1976, which went into effect in 1978, passes. It makes a
number of major revisions to U.S. copyright, including: granting federal
protection to unpublished items (which had been protected by state
common law); calculating copyright duration based on life of the author
plus 50 years (with no renewals) rather than on a fixed term with the
possibility of renewal; codifying the judicial doctrine of fair use; and
adding specific exemptions for libraries and archives in Section 108.

1988

The United States joins the Berne Convention. This leads to the eventual
dismantling of all formal requirements (notice, registration, renewal) for
copyright.

1990

Works of architecture receive federal copyright protection.

1992

Copyright renewal is made automatic. All works published from 1964 to
1978 are given an automatic 75-year term.

1994

Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) is convened to develop guidelines on
acceptable fair use of material (including digital use) in interlibrary loan,
electronic reserves, digital images, distance education, and multimedia.
No consensus could be reached in the final report in 1998.
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1996

Provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), which
implemented the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), go
into effect. Copyright in hundreds of thousands of foreign works in the
public domain is restored.

1998

Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act extends almost all copyrights by
another 20 years, so works of authorship now have a term of the life of
the author plus 70 years.

1998

Digital Millennium Copyright Act gives online service providers some
important safe harbors from copyright-infringement suits, but also adds
criminal sanctions to anyone bypassing certain technological protection
measures on digital content.

2002

Technology Education and Copyright Harmonization Act (TEACH Act)
authorizes the use of some digital resources in distance education
settings.

2005

The Copyright Office begins studying the “orphan works” problem and
issues a final report early in 2006.

2005

Section 108 Study Group is convened to examine the exemptions available to libraries and archives. Its report is issued in 2008.

2

Copyright Fundamentals

2.1 Introduction
This chapter helps you answer two questions:

△△△△

What types of work are protected by copyright?
What are the prerequisites for a work to be protected by copyright?

By answering these two questions, you will be able to identify the collection items in which copyright “subsists” (the term used in Title 17 to identify
works protected by copyright). Once you have identified these works, you
will need to consider, for each item, when copyright is due to expire and
who owns copyright. These questions will be considered in Chapter 3 of
these guidelines.
Federal copyright protection does not apply to objects that do not meet
the requirements set out in the Copyright Act, regardless of how deserving
of protection those objects are. Thus, categorizing an object as within or
outside the scope of material protected by the Copyright Act is extremely
important. However, as discussed in this chapter, the requirements for
protection are frequently easy to satisfy.

Tip
This chapter describes the step-by-step process for determining
whether an item is protected by copyright. However, in most cases,
it will be obvious that an item is copyrighted, and the appropriate
course of action is to ascertain whether copyright has expired and—
if it has not—implement a strategy for dealing with potential
infringement (e.g., identify the copyright owner(s), obtain a permission, rely on a statutory exemption, etc).

2.2 Types of work protected by copyright
There is no exhaustive list of the types of works that can receive protection.
The Copyright Act [17 U.S.C. § 102] offers these illustrative examples:
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△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△

Literary works
Musical works, including any accompanying words
Dramatic works, including any accompanying music
Pantomimes and choreographic works
Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
Motion pictures and other audiovisual works
Sound recordings
Architectural works

These categories should be viewed broadly. For example, computer
programs may be protected as “literary works,” and maps and architectural
plans may be protected as “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”
The following section examines in more detail each category of work and
subject matter identified as copyrightable in the Copyright Act. As noted
above, this is not a closed list; other subject matter can also be protected.
However, the list in the Copyright Act covers a large body of material.

Literary works
The phrase “literary works” sounds highbrow, but it is not. It covers nondramatic textual works, both with and without illustrations. The defining
feature of a literary work is that it presents information using words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols (as opposed to purely through
images). The format of the media on which those words and numbers are
stored does not matter. Literary works can exist as books, disks, tape, or
cards. Note that dramatic textual works, although seemingly “literary,” are
treated separately.
Examples of literary works frequently found in cultural collections
include:

△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△
16

Fiction
Nonfiction
Manuscripts
Poetry
Periodicals and journals
Dissertations and theses
Reports
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	Flowchart
2
m

m

Subsistence of copyright

yes

Was the object you wish to digitize
created through human effort?

Does the object embody
“original” expression, in the
sense that the author added
some minimal amount of
creativity and did not merely
copy from another work?

no

Copyright does not exist in
natural objects, such as plant
specimens and geological
formations. No copyright
constraints on digitization.
no

yes

Is the author someone other
than an officer or employee of
the U.S. federal government?

The work is not copyrighted.
However, there may be
copyright in items that served
as the basis for, or are used
in, the uncopyrighted work.
Using the uncopyrighted work
could infringe the included
copyrights.

no

yes

Was the work made or published in the United States,
or was the author a citizen or
resident of the United States
when the work was made or
published?
yes

no

no

Is the work unpublished?
yes

no

Was the work made or
published in, or authored by a
resident or citizen of a country
with which the United States
has copyright relations?
yes

The object is protected by copyright.
You should now consider whether copyright has expired and—should it still subsist—who
owns copyright. Permission may be required to digitize.
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△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△△△

Speeches
Bound or loose-leaf volumes
Pamphlets and brochures
Textbooks
Reference works
Directories
Catalogs
Advertising copy
Games
Automated databases
Computer programs
E-mail messages
Web sites and other online works

There is no requirement that a literary work have literary or aesthetic
merit. Indeed, courts have concluded that a broad range of highly mundane
items are encompassed in literary works for the purposes of copyright law,
including circus posters, descriptions of refrigeration supplies, and sunglass
display cards. The only requirement is that the literary work needs to have
some amount, however small, of “original” textual or numeric expression.
(The requirement of originality is discussed later in this chapter.)

Musical works, including any accompanying words
There is no explicit definition of “musical work” in the Copyright Act, but
the intended meaning is clear. It encompasses original compositions as well
as new arrangements of earlier compositions to which new copyrightable
authorship has been added. The term musical work can encapsulate a variety of styles, from classical music through to contemporary popular forms.
Copyright in a musical work is distinguished from copyright in the sound
recording of that work (discussed below). The owner of the copyright in the
musical work has an important right: the right to make or authorize the
first recording of that work. Once recorded and distributed to the public,
subsequent recordings of nondramatic musical works can be made under
the terms of a compulsory license [17 U.S.C. § 115].
Interesting questions arise as to the boundaries of musical works. John
Cage, for example, registered his composition 4′33″ as a textual work—even
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though the composition consists of 4½ minutes of silence. And his estate has
actively sought to enforce its copyright against other composers of silence.

Image: America’s pinch hit march [sheet music]
Composer: Bertha Stanfield Dempsey
Published: McMillan, 1919
Source: Library of Congress, Music Division,
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/loc.natlib.ihas.200033287/
License: In the public domain because copyright has
expired.

Dramatic works, including any accompanying music
Dramatic works are also not explicitly defined in the Copyright Act, but
they include such things as published and unpublished plays and scripts
for radio, television, and cinema: works, in other words, that are meant to
be performed. Dramatic works normally consist of spoken text, plot, and
directions for action.
As with musical works, a separate copyright can exist for a recording of
a performance of the dramatic work. If the dramatic work is derived from
a literary work, a separate copyright may exist for the original literary work.
Cultural institutions wishing to digitize a filmed performance of a play will
have to evaluate at a minimum the copyright status of the play itself, any
literary work on which that play was based, and the recording of the play.

Pantomimes and choreographic works
Choreography and pantomimes are also copyrightable dramatic works.
Choreography is the composition and arrangement of dance movements
and patterns usually intended to be accompanied by music. It can be
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differentiated from social dance steps and simple routines, which cannot
be protected by copyright. Pantomime is the art of imitating or acting out
situations, characters, or other events.
To be protected by copyright, pantomimes and choreography need not
tell a story or be presented before an audience. Each work, however, must
be fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which the work can be
performed, such as dance notation. (The general requirement for fixation
is discussed in more detail below.)

Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
The Copyright Act [17 U.S.C. § 101] defines “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works” to include two-dimensional and three-dimensional representations
of the following types of objects:

△△△△
△△△△
△△△△

Works of fine, graphic, and applied art
Photographs
Prints and art reproductions
Maps, charts, globes, and other cartographic works
Diagrams, models, and technical drawings
Architectural plans

Vincent van Gogh, Dutch, 1853–1890
La Berceuse (Woman Rocking a Cradle;
Augustine-Alix Pellicot Roulin, 1851–1930), 1889
The Metropolitan Museum of Art
Source of file: ArtStor
“Image © The Metropolitan Museum of Art”
License: Images for Academic Publishing
Initiative
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Many items are eligible for copyright protection under this provision.
According to the Copyright Office,1 the range of works eligible for copyright
protection under this provision includes:

△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△
△△△△
△△
△△

Advertisements, commercial prints, labels
Artificial flowers and plants
Artwork applied to clothing or to other useful articles
Bumper stickers, decals, stickers
Cartographic works, such as maps, globes, relief models
Cartoons, comic strips
Collages
Dolls, toys
Drawings, paintings, murals
Enamel works
Fabric, floor, and wall-covering designs
Games, puzzles
Greeting cards, postcards, stationery
Holograms, computer and laser artwork
Jewelry designs
Models
Mosaics
Needlework and craft kits
Original prints, such as engravings, etchings, serigraphs, silk screen
prints, woodblock prints
Patterns for sewing, knitting, crochet, needlework
Photographs, photomontages
Posters
Record jacket artwork or photography
Relief and intaglio prints
Reproductions, such as lithographs, collotypes
Sculpture, such as carvings, ceramics, figurines, maquettes, molds,
relief sculptures
Stained glass designs
Stencils, cut-outs
Technical drawings, architectural drawings or plans, blueprints, diagrams, mechanical drawings
Weaving designs, lace designs, tapestries
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As will be seen in the next section, there are, however, some limitations
on the scope of protection given to applied art and useful articles.
It is important to bear in mind that, as with literary works, items protected under the rubric of “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works” do not
require any artistic merit. As the legislative history notes, “there is no
implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic quality.”2
Thus, although works of fine art are granted some extra protections, as is
discussed in Chapter 4, any work of art will be afforded copyright protection,
so long as it is original and fixed.

Key Point
Originality, not aesthetic merit, is the basis for copyright protection.
Even banal images and writings are eligible for copyright protection,
so long as they meet the threshold requirements.

“Useful Articles” and “Applied Art”
Eligibility for copyright protection becomes complicated when an object
is both utilitarian in function and sculptural or decorative in execution.
This is because of concern that protecting the sculptural or decorative
components of such items may, inadvertently, also give rights to utilitarian
aspects (which would be inconsistent with the idea/expression dichotomy,
discussed in Chapter 1). Thus, copyright protection does not exist for the
intrinsic mechanical or utilitarian aspects of “useful articles” such as clothing, furniture, machinery, dinnerware, and lighting fixtures. (Such aspects
may, however, be protected by patents.) Nor does copyright protection
automatically exist for the shape or design of a utilitarian object, even if it
is aesthetically pleasing.
Copyright can only protect pictorial, graphic, or sculptural elements in
useful objects when those elements can be identified separately from the
utilitarian aspects of the object. Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane,
dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial product contains
some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable
from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design cannot be protected
by copyright. If the aesthetic element can be separated from the useful item,
then that separate element can be protected. For example, even though the
design of a chair may not be eligible for copyright protection, a carving on
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Fulper Pottery Company, 1814–1935
Table Lamp, 1910–15
The Metropolitan Museum of Art
Image © The Metropolitan Museum of Art
Image source: ARTstor
License: Images for Academic Publishing (AIP) initiative

the back of that chair could be protected by copyright. The general design
of a lamp may not be protected by copyright, but a sculpture incorporated
into a lamp could be protected by copyright (since in theory, it would be
possible to still have a lamp without necessarily including the sculpture).
The protection, however, applies only to the separated item, and not to the
underlying object as a whole.
Unfortunately, one can only determine on a fact-specific, case-by-case
basis whether pictorial, graphic, or (especially) sculptural features can be
separated from the design of the useful object and hence be eligible for
copyright protection. There are few general principles to guide us. Courts
have found that figures of humans can be artistic and copyrightable (as in a
sculpture), or primarily useful (and hence uncopyrightable) when expressed
as a mannequin. The body of a fish, however, when used in taxidermy,
may be copyrightable. (Apparently there is a difference between draping
clothing on a mannequin and attaching fish skin on an underlying form.)
Sometimes clothing and jewelry that incorporate sculptural elements have
been found to be protected by copyright; at other times the reverse has
been held. Similarly, flowers and floral arrangements at times have been
protected by copyright, and at other times have not. And in one case (Brandir
v. Cascade), a bicycle rack derived from a copyrighted sculpture was found
to be unprotected by copyright.
Here are other examples of works that have been found to be sculptures
and hence copyrightable—although some may not consider the works to
be sculptures in any ordinary sense of the word:
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△△
△△
△△△△
△△

A lamp base consisting of male and female figures dancing (Mazer v.
Stein)
Miniature hockey players in a hockey game (Innovative Concepts in
Entertainment, Inc. v. Entertainment Enterprises, Ltd.)
A doll of Zippy the chimpanzee (Rushton v. Vitale)
Western belt buckles (Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.)
Artificial Christmas trees (B. Wilmsen, Inc. v. Consolidated Novelty Co.)

Thus, the functional or utilitarian nature of an item does not automatically preclude it from being a sculpture. What is important is that the item
expresses the ideas of the sculptor in a three-dimensional form and that the
sculptor’s conception can be separated from the utilitarian object.
What about a depiction of a noncopyrightable useful article? Does creating a copyrightable representation of a useful article give one any rights
regarding the design of that article? The short answer is no [17 U.S.C. § 113(b)].
For example, a drawing or photograph of an automobile or a dress design
may be copyrighted, but that does not give the artist or photographer the
exclusive right to make automobiles or dresses of the same design.

Motion pictures and other audiovisual works
The Copyright Act defines audiovisual works as “works that consist of a
series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by
the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works
are embodied” [17 U.S.C. § 101]. Audiovisual works include filmstrips, slide
sets, and sets of transparencies. The key defining feature is that they are a
series of related images and that machines are needed to show them. In the
Copyright Act, showing images in any sequence is a performance; hence,
by definition, audiovisual works are performed.
Motion pictures are a specific type of audiovisual work. They are “audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images which, when shown
in succession, impart an impression of motion” [17 U.S.C. § 101]. There is
no requirement of dramatic content in a “motion picture,” and the term
therefore extends beyond feature films to cover things like commercials,
documentaries, raw footage, television programs, home movies, and multi-
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media works such as computer games. If images have accompanying sound,
that sound also becomes part of the motion picture.
In addition to the motion picture or audiovisual copyright, there may
also be a separate copyright in any literary, dramatic, or musical work that
is the basis for the audiovisual work (such as a script or original story).
Separate copyrights may also exist in different contributions to a motion
picture, such as the music used in the sound track. The copyright protection available to motion pictures and other audiovisual works relates only
to the visual images embodied in the film and any soundtrack created
specifically for the film.

Sound recordings
Since 15 February 1972, sound recordings have received federal copyright
protection [17 U.S.C. § 301(c)]. State laws and common law copyright govern
sound recordings created in the United States prior to this date.3
Sound recordings are defined in the Copyright Act as “works that result
from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . regardless
of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied” [17 U.S.C. § 101]. It is important to note
that sound recording copyright is separate from the media on which it is
stored (even though the word “recording” might make us think of tape or
CD). Just as the copyright in a text is separate from the physical manifestation in which it is found (such as a book), so, too, is the sound recording
copyright separate from the medium on which it is recorded.
The copyright in a sound recording protects the particular sounds
embodied in that recording. How the sounds get on a record often requires
judgment and originality; the Copyright Act seeks to protect these elements.
As with motion pictures, in addition to the sound recording copyright,
there may also be a separate copyright in any literary, dramatic, or musical
work that is recorded. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, the rights
of the owner of copyright in a sound recording revolve around copying
and communicating that recording, and it will not be an infringement of
copyright for another person to make a “soundalike” recording. However,
such a recording may infringe copyright in any underlying literary, dramatic,
or musical works.
Note that one special type of sound recording is excluded from the
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Image: Thomas Edison and his early phonograph, circa 1877.
Cropped from Library of Congress copy. Edited Version. Dust
removed by Arad.
Photographer: Levin C. Hardy
License: Public domain
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Edison_
and_phonograph_edit2.jpg

definition of sound recordings found in the Copyright Act: namely “the
sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work” [17 U.S.C.
§ 101]. These recordings are protected under the provisions for motion
pictures and other audiovisual works. This has implications for some of
the exemptions available in the Copyright Act. For example, one exemption allows a library or archives to make a copy of a portion of a spoken
sound recording (such as an oral history) at the request of a patron [17
U.S.C. § 108(d)]. That library or archives would not be able to make a copy
for a patron of the same portion of the interview if it had been videotaped
because the interview was initially made as an audiovisual and audiovisuals are excluded from this particular exemption [17 U.S.C. 108(h)]. This is
discussed further in Chapter 6.

Key Point
The copyright in a sound recording or film exists independently of any
literary, dramatic, or musical work that it embodies. This means that
multiple copyrights may subsist in relation to one object. For instance,
a sound recording of a song may embody the following separate
copyrighted works:

△△△△
△△

A literary work (assuming the lyrics were composed separately)
A musical work (the musical score)
A sound recording (the capture of a specific performance)

This can result in special issues when obtaining copyright licenses
in relation to audiovisual items, some of which are addressed in
Chapter 7.
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Architectural works
In 1990, Congress afforded copyright protection to architectural works. Prior
to that date, architectural plans could be protected as “pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works,” but the buildings constructed according to those plans
had no separate protection. Thus, if you liked the look of a building, you
could have your own architect reproduce it for you—just so long as she did
not consult or copy the original copyrighted plans, but only worked from
the building as constructed.
By adding a new category—architectural works—to the Copyright
Act, buildings themselves became copyrighted. An architectural work is
defined as:
. . . the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of
expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.
The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement
and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does
not include individual standard features [17 U.S.C. § 101].

Two important limitations were included when architectural works
were afforded copyright protection. First, the protection is not retroactive;
it only applies to buildings created on or after 1 December 1990 or built
before 31 December 2002 from unpublished plans created prior to 1990.
Second, as is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the copyright in a built
architectural work does not include the right to prevent anyone from making or distributing photographs or other depictions of the building if the
building can be seen from a public place [17 U.S.C. § 120].

Tricky Area
Government Works
One class of works expressly excluded from copyright protection,
even though exemplars of them are likely to fall in one of the categories listed above, are “works of the United States Government.”
These are defined as works “prepared by an officer or employee of
the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties”
[17 U.S.C. § 105].
On its face, this would seem to mean that works published by
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the Government Printing Office (GPO) or by a specific federal agency
are in the public domain and can be used freely. There are, however,
several important caveats to this generalization, and it should not be
assumed that all works emanating from the U.S. government necessarily fall within this exclusion. For example:

△△
△△

Works prepared by non-government employees working under
contract to the federal government would not be considered to
be a work of the federal government.
Not all staff working for government agencies are necessarily
“officers or employees” of the U.S. government. The Smithsonian
Institution, for example, hires many employees with non-government-supplied funds. Copyright in a photograph taken by one of
those employees as part of his or her official duties would belong
to the Smithsonian Institution (and government agencies are
allowed to own copyrights created by others).
As with any publisher, GPO or an agency might license the use
of a copyrighted item for inclusion in a government publication.
Publication by the government does not place that item in the
public domain, and replicating that publication could potentially
infringe the copyrights of the licensor.
This provision only applies to works of the Federal government;
publications by other governmental bodies at the state or local
level are likely to be copyrighted. That said, edicts of government,
such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents, are
normally not copyrightable for reasons of public policy, regardless
of the level of government that created them. Furthermore, state
law may stipulate that other state publica-tions are in the public
domain, but this would vary on a state-by-state basis.
U.S. government publications are protected by copyright abroad;
they are only in the public domain in the United States.

△△
△△

△△

For more information on copyright of government works,
see CENDI’s “Frequently Asked Questions About Copyright:
Issues Affecting the U.S. Government” at http://www.cendi.gov/
publications/04–8copyright.html.
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2.3 What are the prerequisites for an item to be protected

by copyright?

In addition to being a type of work that copyright protects (for instance,
because it falls within the nonexhaustive list of recognized works and subject matter in the Copyright Act), an item must meet four additional conditions in order to be afforded copyright protections. To be protected, works
must:

△△△△
△△△△

exist in a tangible form
be a work of authorship
be original, and
meet the requirements regarding the nationality of the author.

These conditions may seem onerous, but they are not difficult to satisfy.
For instance, the requirement of originality does not require that the work
contain novel ideas, but merely that it meets a minimal level of creativity
and was not copied.

Key Point
It is not necessary that material be published in order to gain copyright protection.

Tangible form
It would appear to go without saying that when a cultural institution wishes
to digitize an item from its collection, that item will already exist in a “tangible form.” However, for completeness, the requirement of tangibility is
discussed briefly.
Federal copyright protection only arises when a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. It is not necessary for the work to be humanly
perceptible, merely that it can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated. This can be done either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device [17 U.S.C. § 102]. A book printed on paper, a photograph captured
on film, and a manuscript saved in a computer’s memory are all fixed and
copyrighted from the moment of creation.
The requirement that a work must exist in a tangible form can mean
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that meritorious subject matter—such as improvised music and dance,
extemporaneous speeches, oral stories, and so forth—are ineligible for
federal copyright protection because they have never been committed to
material form. In many cases, however, state common law copyright protections may be able to protect unfixed expressions.4 For further discussion,
see Case Study 1, which relates to oral histories.

Tricky Area
Publication
When determining copyright status, duration of copyright, and the
applicability of various exemptions, it is often necessary to know
whether a work has been published. According to the Copyright
Act [17 U.S.C. § 101], works are “published” when the copyright
owner authorizes the distribution of copies of a work to the public.
The distribution can be by sale, rental, lease, or lending. Even just
offering to distribute copies can constitute publication. A public
performance or display of a work, however, does not of itself constitute publication. For this reason most television programs—at
least until the advent of VHS and DVD sale copies—were considered to be unpublished. They were performed when first broadcast,
but not sold, rented, or leased.
Subsequent case law suggests that the distribution offer must
be made to the general public. If circulation is restricted to a particular group of people, only “limited” publication has occurred. For
instance, some courts have concluded that Dr. Martin Luther King
Jr.’s famous “I have a dream” speech, delivered before more than
200,000 civil rights supporters at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., in 1963, was initially unpublished. The performance
itself, of course, did not constitute publication, but copies of the
speech were distributed to the press for its use. One court ruled
that this was only a limited, not general, publication, and that the
speech in effect remained unpublished (Estate of Martin Luther King,
Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc.). A month later Dr. King registered his copyright
with the Copyright Office, and his estate continues to enforce its
copyright.
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Question
Does donating material to a cultural heritage
institution constitute publication?
At first glance, one might answer “how could donation constitute
publication?” Donation of a work to a repository does not seem to
have anything to do with what we normally think of as publication.
But remember the definition of copyright in the law: the “distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” “Copies” in the copyright
law refers not only to reproductions that are made of a work but also
to the original work itself. One could, therefore, argue that if a copyright owner puts unpublished works into an archival repository where
those works can be consulted, this would constitute an offer to lend a
copy to the public and thus be (in copyright terms) publication.
This argument is found in Ralph Shaw’s Literary Property in the
United States.5 More recent commentators have also suggested it
may have relevance.6 If true, it would surprise copyright owners and
archivists alike. For much of the twentieth century, publication without adherence to copyright formalities injected a work into the public
domain. By depositing unpublished works with an archival repository,
a copyright owner theoretically could have “published” those works—
and relinquished all copyright in them.
A court case finally tested this theory in 1990. The district court
opinion in Wright v. Warner Books flatly rejected it, stating that “an
unpublished work’s presence in an academic library, on its own, is not
the same thing as publication.”7 Assuming other courts elect to follow
this decision, the likelihood that deposit of unpublished materials in a
repository constitutes publication would seem small.

Authorship
Copyright can only exist in original works of authorship, which implies that
they must have an author. The Copyright Office has long required, and some
case law has supported the idea, that the author of a work must be human.
Works created by natural forces, computer programs, or supernatural beings
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are not eligible for copyright protection—though the editing or compilation of works supposedly authored by supernatural beings usually has been
found to be copyrightable!

Key Point
The common element of protected works is that they have been created
through human effort. There are no copyright issues when digitizing
items from natural collections, such as fossils, plant or animal specimens, and geological formations. There may, however, be copyright in
photographs, recordings, or other depictions of natural objects.

Originality
The Copyright Act specifies that copyright only exists in “original works of
authorship” [17 U.S.C. § 102(a)]. The term “original” is not defined in the law.
However, case law provides some guidance as to its meaning.
In the United States, there is a very low threshold for when a work will
be considered original: it must only be the result of some minimal level of
creativity. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of
works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no
matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”8 Nor does originality
require novelty. So long as the similarity between two works is fortuitous,
and not the product of copying, copyright can exist.
Nevertheless, some creativity is a prerequisite for originality. Works that
are merely a product of labor (what is sometimes called “sweat of the brow”)
are not eligible for copyright protection. In the leading court case on the
subject, a telephone book was found to be unprotected by copyright because,
although it took real effort to compile it, the arrangement of information in
the book was unoriginal: merely a listing by last name. In other cases, only
the original items such as headnotes or summaries in legal databases have
been found to be protected by copyright; the bulk of the factual data in the
database remains in the public domain.9 American practice stands in sharp
contrast with other countries, many of which recognize a “sweat of the brow”
copyright, and some of which have also created special database protection
rights that afford limited protection to collections of facts.
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Tricky Area
Databases and Compilations
Databases are compilations, often of vast amounts of information,
stored in electronic format. Databases can be extremely valuable,
both in terms of their commercial value and their capacity to facilitate
public access to information. In cultural institutions, subscriptions
to individual, hard-copy periodicals increasingly are being replaced
by licenses to large commercial databases. Some cultural institutions
are also involved in generating their own databases, including large
databases of digitized images.
Databases can be protected under the Copyright Act as compilations. Compilations are works “formed by the collection and
assembling of pre-existing materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship” [17 U.S.C. §
101]. Copyright in the compilation can only exist if the selection or
arrangement meets the standards for originality discussed above.
The copyright in the compilation extends only to the selection,
coordination, and arrangement of the component parts, but not to
the underlying data. Copyright can prevent the wholesale duplication
of a database, but if the component parts are in the public domain,
it cannot stop anyone from extracting and using that public domain
material. To regulate such behavior, most database providers have
turned to licenses.
Issues in relation to negotiating licenses to access databases are
discussed in Chapter 7.

Case law suggests that the more commonplace a particular type of
work is, and the more it draws from preexisting materials, the greater the
burden on the person claiming copyright in the item to prove that original
copyrightable elements exist in it, should this be put in issue in court.
Nevertheless, it may not stop the producers of resources built on public
domain or factual material, be they transcribers of cemetery inscriptions
or publishers of microfilmed sets of public domain material, from asserting
a copyright claim and threatening a digitizer with legal action.
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Question
Are Copies of Public Domain Items Original?
We often say that anyone is free to use an object in the public domain,
but what is the copyright status of a photograph or other copy of a
public domain item? Can the copy have enough originality to warrant
its own separate copyright protection, or does it, like the original
object depicted in the copy, reside in the public domain?
The answer to this question has major implications for cultural
institutions. On one hand, if reproductions of public domain items are
themselves in the public domain, then libraries, archives, and museums might be free to digitize commercially produced microfilm sets of
public domain documents or slides and transparencies found in an art
library. On the other hand, cultural institutions would not be able to
use the Copyright Act to stop third parties from making unauthorized
use of the institution’s own digital reproductions of public domain
works.
Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel offers some indication of how a
court might rule on these questions.10 Bridgeman Art Library is a
British commercial stock photo agency that markets reproductions
of public domain works of art. It brought a copyright action against
Corel in which it alleged that Corel, a CD publisher, had marketed CDROMs containing unauthorized copies of Bridgeman’s reproductions
of public domain artworks. In order to succeed in its action, Bridgeman needed to demonstrate that its reproductions were original and
thus copyrightable.
The judge considered the application of the different tests for
originality used in both the United States and the United Kingdom
and held that the relevant works failed to satisfy either of them. He
noted that in copying two-dimensional works of art, Bridgeman
sought to replicate as closely as possible the original paintings. Labor
and skill may be necessary to produce what the judge called “slavish
copies,” but no distinguishable variation that would go beyond differences in technical skill is required. Nor does changing the medium
(from painting to transparencies or digital photographs) by itself
generate the originality needed for copyright protection.
The ruling may have been different if the issue concerned
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photographs of three-dimensional public domain works. Reproductions of three-dimensional objects require that many creative decisions be made on the composition, lighting, angle of filming, and so
on. The result is that an original representation of the public domain
work is often created, one that is likely to be protected by copyright.11
The decision in Bridgeman has been criticized on a number of
grounds, especially abroad. Some have argued that the American
judge misconstrued the test of originality that is preferred in the UK.12
Others have argued that fine art reproduction is not a mere skill, but
meets the low level of creativity required by copyright.13 Defenders
of Bridgeman note that it reflects perfectly the American requirement for originality in copyright and is consistent with previous court
decisions. For now, Bridgeman stands as an important bulwark for any
cultural institution interested in digitizing reproductions of twodimensional works in the public domain.
(It should be noted that where a photograph is taken of an artistic
work that is not in the public domain but is still protected by copyright, that photograph may infringe copyright in the artistic work.
The issue is considered in Chapter 4.)

Nationality
A further prerequisite for copyright protection relates to nationality: some
factor that connects the authorship or publication of the work to the United
States (or, as will be seen, other countries with whom the United States has
reciprocal arrangements under treaty).
In relation to unpublished works, the rule is that all such works are
provided federal copyright protection, regardless of the nationality of the
author [17 U.S.C. § 104(a)].
Published works will be afforded copyright protection if one of the
following is true:

△△△△

The author is a citizen of or living in the United States
The work is first published in the United States or a country that is a
signatory to one of several different copyright treaties, e.g., the Berne
Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, or the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
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Agreement). See the definition of “international agreement” in section
101, and further below.
The author is citizen of one of those treaty countries [17 U.S.C. § 104(b)]

△△

Foreign works that meet one of the above conditions are treated as if
they were published in the United States. This means that it is not always
necessary to master the copyright laws of foreign countries. So long as you
are limiting your use to the United States, you can treat a book published
in France or Australia according to U.S. copyright law.
A different approach may be necessary when your proposed use is
international, as will be the case with many online projects. This is because
courts may apply the law of the country in which a work on the Internet
was accessed, rather than the laws of the country from which it is served.
International jurisdictional issues are discussed further in Chapter 9.

Key Point
Copyright can exist in foreign works. If your use of the copyrighted
material occurs in the United State, U.S. law applies regardless of the
nationality of the author or place of publication of the original work.

The most important treaty for copyright purposes is the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, an international treaty
dealing with copyright law. The Berne Convention requires that member
states afford citizens of a foreign country the same protection they offer to
their own citizens. Consequently, copyright in works authored, made, or first
published overseas is recognized in the United States, and vice versa. Currently, over 150 countries are members of the Berne Convention. The United
States also provides reciprocal protection to signatories of the Universal
Copyright Convention (UCC); the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements; and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright
Treaty (WCT), and through direct bilateral treaties with other countries.14

2.4 Works made prior to 1978
The United States’ current copyright legislation, the Copyright Act of 1976,
came into force on 1 January 1978 (see Copyright Timeline in Chapter 1). It
replaced the existing copyright legislation in force in the United States, the
Copyright Act of 1909.
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The 1976 Act contained many important differences from the 1909 Act.
The 1976 Act, for example, for the first time provided federal copyright protection for unpublished works. Duration of copyright (which is discussed in
Chapter 3) changed from a fixed term with one possible renewal to a single
term based generally on the life of the author. Subsequent amendments
have provided protection for new subject matter (architectural works)
and eliminated the need for copyright notices or renewals. An important
question, therefore, is how the 1976 Act and subsequent amendments treat
material that pre-dates their entry into force.
Most provisions of the 1976 Act apply equally to all subject matter,
regardless of their date of creation or publication. Fair use [17 U.S.C. § 107]
is one such example: it applies to all copyrighted material, regardless of
when they came into existence. The same is true for the other exemptions
in copyright as well as the statutory provisions regarding infringement
and remedies.
In other areas, a distinction is made between works created before
and after entry into force of the 1976 Act (in 1978). Two are of particular
importance to digitization projects. First, the rules regarding duration of
copyright differ depending upon the date of creation. The copyright term
for published works created before 1978, for example, differs from the term
for works created after 1978. Sound recordings made before 1978 also have a
different duration than current recordings. Rules regarding copyright term
are discussed in Chapter 3. Second, authorship, and hence initial copyright
ownership, of works is determined by the law in effect at the time of the
work’s creation. Authorship of a work created before 1978 may be different than for similar works created since 1977 due to the possible differing
definitions of “work made for hire” in pre- and post-1978 copyright law, as
is discussed further in Chapter 3.
Some of the changes to copyright law since 1976 have only been partially
retroactive. For example, although some changes have extended the duration
of protection for copyrighted works, they generally have not revived copyright in a work for which copyright has already expired. Works that entered
the public domain under the 1909 Act, for instance, because of failure to
comply with copyright formalities (as is explained in Chapter 3), remain in
the public domain even though the need for formalities has been abolished.
(The one major exception to this has been the restoration of copyright in
foreign works that had earlier entered the public domain.)
It is important, then, for cultural institutions to understand some of
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the basic features of the 1909 Act, especially its insistence on formalities
to secure copyright protection, so that they can identify current copyright
owners and accurately assess the copyright status of collection items.
The elements of particular importance to contemporary cultural heritage
digitization projects are the former requirements for copyright notice,
registration, and renewal.

Key Point
Copyright rules and procedures have changed over time. It is often
necessary to know the law at the time of creation of a work as well as
the current law.

Notice
Most people are familiar with the copyright notice: the word “Copyright,”
the abbreviation “Copr.,” or the copyright symbol “©,” followed by the
date and the name of the copyright owner, placed prominently on the
work. Until 1 March 1989, use of the notice was mandatory on most textual
works; failure to include a copyright notice on a published work normally
led to the introduction of the work into the public domain. Including the
notice on a published work gave the copyright owner an automatic 28-year
copyright term.

Registration and renewal
Registration of the copyright with the Copyright Office has never been
required to secure copyright protection. Under the current law, as soon as an
original work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, it is copyrighted.
Under the 1909 Act, publication with notice secured federal copyright
protection. Registration, however, has always and continues to secure to
the copyright owner the fullest protections of the law, and prior to 1976, it
was a prerequisite for renewal.
Copyright renewal granted the copyright owner a second term of copyright. Initially set at 28 years, it was gradually extended by Congress to a
period of 67 years. When combined with the initial copyright term of 28
years, it creates a theoretical copyright term for works published before
1978 of 95 years. Failure to renew a copyright in the year prior to the 28th
anniversary of publication injected the work into the public domain.
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Duration and Ownership
of Copyright

3.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with two important issues:

△△△△

What is the duration of copyright?
Who is the owner of copyright?

Any analysis of ownership and duration must be performed on a caseby-case basis for each work.
If a work is not protected by copyright (i.e., all copyrights have expired,
leaving the work in the public domain), then there are no copyright constraints on digitization—although other laws may be relevant (see Chapter 9
with regard to non-copyright issues). If a work is still protected by copyright and someone other than the cultural institution owns that copyright,
then the institution risks infringing copyright if it digitizes the material
unless it has the permission of the copyright owner or is protected by an
exemption in the Copyright Act. Infringement and exemptions are discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of the guidelines; permission is discussed in
Chapter 7.
Deciding whether a work is still copyrighted and who owns that copyright requires information regarding the work, including:

△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△

What type of work it is
When it was created
Who was the author of the work
Whether and where it was first published or offered for sale
Whether any required copyright formalities were complied with
The circumstances under which it was created
Whether copyright has been transferred (for instance, by written assignment or as a bequest under a will)

Many institutions obtain information about the copyright status of
items as part of the acquisition process. If possible, this should include:
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△△
△△
△△

The current owner of copyright (not necessarily the person donating
the item)
If the item is unpublished, when it was made and the circumstances
of creation
If the item has been published, when and where it was first published

Obviously, it is not always possible to obtain complete copyright information even at the time of donation. For instance, the work may be anonymous
or the person donating the item may have no information as to its maker or
the copyright owner. This is discussed further in Chapter 7 in the section
on orphan works and copyright risk management.
The questions addressed in this chapter are summarized in Flowchart 3.1.

	Flowchart
3.1
m

m

Ownership and Duration of Copyright
Has copyright expired in the work?

yes

no

Who is the owner
of copyright?

Third
Party

The Cultural
Institution

The work is no longer protected by
copyright (that is, it is in the public
domain). No copyright constraints on
digitization.
Digitization will infringe copyright
unless the institution obtains the
permission of the copyright owner (see
Chapter 7) or if the action falls under
an exemption in the Copyright Act (see
Chapters 5 & 6).

The cultural institution has the right to reproduce
the work or subject matter under the Copyright
Act. No copyright constraints on digitization, but
other concerns, such as privacy or trademark,
may influence what you do (see Chapter 9)

3.2 What is the duration of copyright?
The duration of copyright varies according to factors including the type of
work, its publication status, and the place of first publication. There are five
main classes of works that we will consider:
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△△△△
△△△△
△△

Unpublished works
Works first published in the United States
Works first published abroad
Sound recordings
Architectural works

Within each category of work, the date of creation and/or publication, the circumstances of creation (including authorship), and the work’s
compliance with copyright formalities may all affect how long copyright
endures.
The end result is that it is often very difficult to remember all of the
different permutations that govern whether a work is still protected by
copyright. Peter Hirtle has prepared a chart,1 based on earlier work by
Laura Gasaway,2 as a guide to the various rules. The following discussion
builds on the information found in the chart to discuss each of the five
major categories of work.

3.2.1 Unpublished Works
Table 3.2.1 sets out the copyright term for works that, as of 1 January 1978,
had neither been published with the authority of the copyright owner nor
registered for copyright with the Copyright Office. (Note that unpublished
works registered with the Copyright Office are treated as if they were published on the date of registration.)
The rules for unpublished works are simpler than for published works.
They apply to all unpublished works that will be used in the United States,
regardless of the nationality of the owner or place of creation [17 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)].

Key Point
When determining whether a collection item has been published,
it is very important not to simply rely on that item’s format or
physical appearance, as it exists in the collection. For example, a
manuscript letter may have been printed with the authority of the
copyright owner, thus creating a statutory copyright. From the date
of publication, its copyright term is calculated as a published work—
even though the copy in the repository physically still looks like a
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manuscript item. This means that a manuscript letter from 1775 could
still theoretically be protected by copyright if it was published prior
to 2003 (see below). For more on the meaning of publication, see the
text boxes in Chapter 2.

ii	Table 3.2.1
Never Published, Never Registered, Works

Type of Work

Copyright Term

What was in the
public domain in
the United States as of
1 January 2009

Unpublished works

Life of the author +70
years

Works from authors who
died before 1939

Unpublished anonymous
and pseudonymous
works, and works made
for hire (corporate
authorship)

120 years from date of
creation

Works created before
1889

Unpublished works
Life of the author +70
created before 1978 that years or 31 December
were published after 1977 2047, whichever is greater
but before 2003

Nothing. The soonest
the works can enter the
public domain is 1 January
2048

Unpublished works
created before 1978 that
were published after 31
December 2002

Life of the author +70
years

Works of authors who
died before 1939

Unpublished works when 120 years from date of
the death date of the
creation
author is not known

Works created before
1889

The basic rule for unpublished works is that copyright endures for life
of the author plus 70 years [17 U.S.C. § 302(a), 303(b)]. All terms of copyright
run through the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise
expire [17 U.S.C. § 305]. That means that for an author who died on 15 March
1940, copyright has to last until at least 16 March 2010, but because terms
run through the calendar year, copyright will not expire until 1 January 2011.
A special rule applies for unpublished anonymous and pseudonymous
works, and for “works made for hire” (which is discussed later in this chapter,
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but is most commonly found when someone creates a work as part of his
or her employment). Copyright in these works expires 120 years from the
date of creation [17 U.S.C. § 302(c)].

Tip
All works created more than 120 years ago (currently, before 1888) that
have never been published with the authority of the copyright owner
have entered the public domain and can be used without copyright
restriction in the United States. They may still be protected, however,
in other countries.

Duration of published manuscripts
The copyright term for unpublished works, once they are published, is
normally the same as for other published works.
Thus for works created and published prior to 1 January 1978, the copyright
term is calculated by reference to the applicable rule for published works
of that era, as discussed in the next sessions. For example, an unpublished
work written in 1850 by an author who died in 1880 and first published in
1970 would receive up to a 95-year copyright term from publication date
(assuming it met all of the requirements regarding authorization, notice, etc.).
In contrast, if that same unpublished 1850 work were published today,
it would receive no copyright protection because its copyright would have
expired under the current “life +70 years” term [17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 303(a)].
That is, if copyright has already expired in a work, publication will not
cause it to “revive.”
The position is different for unpublished works that were created before
1978 and first published after 1 January 1978 but on or before 31 December,
2002. The Copyright Act stipulates that for those works, copyright shall not
expire before 31 December 2047 [17 U.S.C. § 303(a)]. That is, the copyright
term extends to 31 December 2047 or the life of the author plus 70 years—
whichever results in the longer term.
The source for this exception was the extension of federal copyright
protection to unpublished works with the Copyright Act of 1976. Prior to
the 1976 Act, unpublished works were afforded perpetual copyright protection. When unpublished works were published, they lost their common law
perpetual protection and became subject to the federal rules for published
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works. With the advent of copyright terms based on the life of the author
in 1978, the owners of copyright in unpublished works lost their exclusive
perpetual right to first publication; unpublished works became subject to
the same copyright term as published works (i.e., life of the author plus
50 years). Without further amendment, this would have placed many
unpublished items in the public domain (i.e., the works of authors who had
died more than 50 years before the entry into force of this provision). To
protect the interests of copyright owners and to encourage the publication
of unpublished works, Congress created a 25-year window, from 1978 to
2003, during which first publication of any work would ensure copyright
protection at least until 2047.

Did You Know?
Mark Twain may have died in 1910, but his copyrights live on. The
Mark Twain Papers & Project at the Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley, has been collecting copies of Twain’s
correspondence, which they have been editing and publishing in
scholarly volumes. In 2001, with the permission of the Mark Twain
Foundation, which owns all of the copyrights in Mark Twain’s writings,
they offered for sale a microfilm edition of all of the letters in their
possession that had not yet been published in letterpress. There is no
evidence that anyone bought a set—but by merely offering it for sale,
the project extended the copyright in the letters until 2048, or almost
140 years after Twain’s death.
The copyright protection would not extend to incoming correspondence (since neither the Project
nor the Foundation owned the copyright
in those letters), nor would it apply to
any Mark Twain letters discovered since
the publication of the microfilm edition.
Those works would have entered the
public domain.
Image: Mark Twain, America’s best humorist
J. Keppler; Mayer, Merkel & Ottman, lith. 1885.
License: Public domain because of copyright expiration.
Source: Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress.
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3g04294
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3.2.2 Works first published in the United States

ii	Table 3.2.2
Works first published in the United States
Date of Publication Conditions

Copyright Term

Before 1923

None

None: in the public
domain due to copyright
expiration3

1923 through 1977

Published without a copyright notice

None: in the public domain
due to failure to comply with
required formalities

1978 to 1 March 1989 Published without notice,
and without subsequent
registration

None: in the public domain
due to failure to comply with
required formalities

1978 to 1 March 1989 Published without notice,
but with subsequent
registration

70 years after the death of
author, or if work of corporate
authorship, 95 years from
publication

1923 through 1963

Published with notice but
copyright was not renewed

None: in the public domain
due to failure to comply with
required formalities

1923 through 1963

Published with notice and
the copyright was renewed

95 years after publication date

1964 through 1977

Published with notice

95 years after publication date

1978 to 1 March 1989 Published with notice

70 years after death of author,
or if work of corporate authorship, 95 years from publication

After 1 March 1989

70 years after death of author,
or if work of corporate authorship, 95 years from publication

None

For works first published in the United States, there are in effect three eras
of copyright duration that are of concern. The first and last are relatively
simple, but the middle one will require some explanation.
The first era for copyright duration is for works published before 1923.
Prior to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, works published in the
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United States had a fixed term of copyright. Under the 1909 Copyright Act,
this was 28 years with the possibility of a 28-year renewal term. Extensions by Congress lengthened the renewal period to 47 years, meaning
that published works could have at most a 75-year copyright term. In 1998,
with the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, all copyright terms
were increased by another 20 years, including the term for preexisting
copyrighted works. Those works, however, whose 75-year term had expired
before 1998 remained in the public domain. That means that all works
published before 1923 in the United States are freely available for use; they
have no copyright protection.
The last era for copyright protection is similarly simple. With the passage of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, the last of the
formalities in American law became optional. Works created since 1 March
1989 are copyrighted as soon as they are fixed; there is no need for notice,
registration, or other action on the part of the copyright owner. Copyright
endures for either the life of the author plus 70 years or, in the case of a
work made for hire, 95 years from publication [17 U.S.C. § 302].
The period between 1923 and 1989 is, however, fraught with difficulties
when trying to determine copyright status and applicable duration. Whether
a work entered the public domain or remained protected by copyright
depends on the subtle interaction of changing notice requirements and the
date of publication. We can consider each briefly in turn.

Copyright Notice
From 1923 to 1 March 1989, a constant in copyright was the requirement that
the volume contain a copyright notice. (See Chapter 2 for more on copyright
notice.) A work first published in the United States without a copyright
notice during this period usually automatically entered the public domain.

Renewal
Assuming it was published with notice, there was a further requirement
(until 1964) that the work had to have its copyright renewed. If a book published during this period had its copyright renewed, then it is protected for
a total copyright term of 95 years.
Why 1964? The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 made renewal optional
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for any work in its first term of copyright (i.e., published less than 28 years
before passage of the Act). Works published after 1963, therefore, automatically have a 95-year copyright term. Those published before 1963 will only
have the 95-year term if their copyright was renewed. If not, they are in
the public domain.

Tip
Investigating copyright renewals
Copyright renewal is very important for works published between
1922 and 1964. But how can you tell if copyright in a work published
during this time period was renewed? There are three options:

△△

Use the records at the Copyright Office
You can lookup items in the records yourself, or pay the Copyright
Office to investigate the status of the work.

△△

Use the Catalog of Copyright Entries (CCE)
These volumes, published by the Copyright Office, contain abbreviated records of registrations and renewals.

△△

Use online databases
▼▼ Works published after 1951: The Copyright Office has an online
searchable file of records since 1978, which includes renewal
records for works published since 1951, and some records for
works from 1950. See http://www.copyright.gov.
▼▼ Works published before 1951: Volunteer efforts have digitized
and proofread the CCE volumes and placed them online. See
http://collections.stanford.edu/copyrightrenewals/. Note
that this is for books only; for other formats, you need to
turn to the other options. Note, too, that although apparently accurate, it is an unofficial resource. Discovering a title
in the database is likely evidence that copyright was renewed
and the work is protected. The absence of a title, however, is
not necessarily proof that the book is in the public domain.
Depending on how risk averse you are, further research in
other sources may be warranted.
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Date of Publication
Let’s assume that the work you are investigating was published with notice
and renewed. The duration of the copyright will depend on the date of
publication:

△△
△△

Prior to 1978
Copyrighted works published prior to 1978 are protected for 95 years
from publication.
Since 1978
Copyrighted works published since 1978 are protected for a period of
life of the author plus 70 years or, if a work made for hire, 95 years from
publication.

Flowchart 3.2 represents one method for investigating the copyright
status of works published between 1923 and 1989.

	Flowchart
3.2
m

m

Copyright status of U.S. works published between
1923 and 1989
Published with a © notice?

no

Yes

In the public domain (unless
subsequently registered)

In the public domain

Yes

Published before 1964?

no
Was copyright renewed?
Yes

no

no

Protected for 95 years from
publication

Published after 1977?
Yes
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3.2.3 Published foreign works
Published foreign works include a variety of works:

△△△△

Works by non-U.S. citizens published only outside the United States
Works by non-U.S. citizens published both inside and outside the United
States. Note that to fall within this category, U.S. publication must have
occurred more than 30 days after foreign publication, and there could
not be a subsequent registration in the United States. (If publication
occurred within 30 days, or if there was subsequent U.S. registration
and renewal, the work is treated as if it was an American work.)
Works by U.S. citizens living outside the United States, published only
outside the United States

△△

The rules on copyright duration for foreign works are simpler than for
U.S. works. Close examination of Table 3.3 will reveal that almost all foreign
works published since 1923 are protected by copyright.

ii	Table 3.3
Works First Published Outside the United States
by Foreign Nationals or U.S. Citizens Living Abroad
Date of
Publication

Conditions

Copyright Term
in the United States

Before 1923

None

In the public domain

Works Published Abroad Before 1978
1923 through 1977

Published in compliance with all U.S.
formalities (i.e., notice, renewal)

95 years after publication date

1923 through 1977

Published without compliance with
U.S. formalities, and in the public
domain in its home country as of 1
January 1996

In the public domain

1923 through 1977

Solely published abroad, without
compliance with U.S. formalities or
republication in the United States,
and not in the public domain in its
home country as of 1 January 1996.

95 years after publication date
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Date of
Publication

Conditions

Copyright Term
in the United States

1923 through 1977

Published in the United States less
Use the U.S. publicathan 30 days after publication abroad tion chart to determine duration

1923 through 1977

Published in the United States
95 years after publicamore than 30 days after publication
tion date
abroad, without compliance with
U.S. formalities, and not in the public
domain in its home country as of 1
January 1996.

Works Published Abroad After 1 January 1978
After 1 January 1978 Published without copyright notice,
and in the public domain in its home
country as of 1 January 1996

In the public domain

After 1 January 1978 Published either with or without
70 years after death of
copyright notice, and not in the
author, or if work of
public domain in its home country as corporate authorof 1 January 1996
ship, 95 years from
publication
Special Cases
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1 July 1909
through 1978

In Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, The same as for an
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
unpublished work
Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands ONLY. Published
in a language other than English, and
without subsequent republication
with a copyright notice.

Anytime

Created by a resident of Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, San
Marino, and possibly Yemen, and
published in one of these countries

Not protected by U.S.
copyright law because
they are not party to
international copyright agreements

Anytime

Works whose copyright was once
owned or administered by the Alien
Property Custodian, and whose
copyright, if restored, would as
of January 1, 1996, be owned by a
government

Not protected by U.S.
copyright law

Published foreign works

Date of
Publication
Anytime

Conditions

i 3.2.3

Copyright Term
in the United States

Countries that joined Berne or signed Date for determining
a copyright treaty after 1 Jan. 1996.
public-domain status
is the date of adherence to a treaty, not
1 Jan. 1996

Until 1955, to receive protection in the United States, foreign works
had to comply with United States requirements for notice, manufacture,
obligatory deposit, and renewal. In 1955 the Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.) dropped the requirements for U.S. manufacture and deposit
of copies of foreign books, and the copyright notice requirement could be
met by the more lenient U.C.C. standard. Copyright renewal in the United
States was still required to achieve the maximum term of copyright protection, however.
In 1994, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) removed the
requirement that foreign works had to comply with United States formalities.
Furthermore, its provisions were retroactive. Works that had never been
protected in the United States suddenly received protection, and works by
foreign authors that had fallen into the public domain in the United States
(because the copyright had originally been registered but not renewed) had
their copyright restored. For the first time in U.S. history, works that had
been in the public domain fell back under copyright protection.

Tip
It can often be difficult to determine if a work was first published in
the United States or abroad. Many works published in the United
States by American publishers had actually first appeared overseas—
and there is no indication in the book to indicate this. Digitizing this
book, even if its American copyright has expired, could be an infringement of its foreign copyright.4

Watch This Space
The constitutionality of restoration of copyright in foreign works is
currently being challenged in a suit entitled Golan v. Holder. In 2009, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado ruled that the restoration
provisions are unconstitutional under the First Amendment, at least as
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far as they impact “reliance parties” (people who were exploiting public
domain works prior to copyright restoration). An appeal is likely. Institutions that own foreign works should follow this case closely; see http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/case/golan-v-gonzales for updates.

Duration for most works first published abroad is very simple. They
receive the copyright term they would have had if they had followed all U.S.
formalities at the time of publication. For works published before 1978, that
means 95 years from publication. For works published since 1978, it is life of
the author plus 70 years or 95 years for an anonymous and pseudonymous
works and works made for hire.

Key Point
United States and foreign countries may have different
terms for the same work
The copyright terms for foreign works in the United States are set by
U.S. law. However, the copyright term in a work’s country of origin
may differ from the protection that the United States affords. For
example, Australian photographs made before 1955 are in the public
domain in Australia,5 but would still be protected by copyright in the
United States.
The Naxos record label found this out when they tried to reissue
in the United States sound recordings made in England. The recordings had entered the public domain in England before 1 January 1996
because those recordings had a 50-year copyright term. A New York
court, however, concluded that the recordings were still protected in
the United States because of the differing laws in the United States
regarding sound recordings (Capitol Records v. Naxos). In order to distribute the recordings in New York, Naxos needed the permission of
Capitol Records, the owner of the American rights in the recordings.

Tricky Area
Foreign works in western states
The discussion about the copyright status of foreign works in the
United States is accurate for most of the country, but a special situation prevails in states governed by the 9th Judicial Circuit (Alaska,
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Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands). In the 1966
case of Twin Books v. Walt Disney Co., the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that different rules applied to works published outside the
United States in a foreign language and without a copyright notice.
The court concluded, “publication without a copyright notice in a foreign country did not put the work in the public domain in the United
States.” These foreign-language publications were instead in effect
“unpublished” in the United States, and hence had the same copyright
term as unpublished works. For example, in a 2006 decision in Arizona,
the court found that sculptures by Jean Renoir published in France in
1917 were still protected by copyright in the United States (even though
we normally assume that works published before 1923 are in the public
domain) (Société Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Beseder).
The 9th Circuit decision has been harshly criticized in Nimmer
on Copyright, a leading treatise on copyright, as being incompatible
with previous decisions and the intent of Congress when it restored
foreign copyrights.6 The Copyright Office also ignores the Twin Books
decision in its circular on restored copyrights.7 It is possible that in
subsequent cases, the 9th Circuit will reverse its opinion. Nevertheless, any cultural institution in one of the states governed by this
court needs to be aware that they may end up in court if they digitize
non-English foreign publications. It will have to determine if it is willing to run the risk.

3.2.4 Sound recordings
The duration of sound recording copyright is both simple and complex. The
bottom line is that almost all sound recordings, regardless of when they
were made, are protected to some extent.
Published and unpublished U.S. sound recordings and unpublished
foreign sound recordings made before 15 February 1972 are protected by
state common law copyright. At least one state (California) has a law that
specifies that sound recordings will begin to enter the public domain in the
state in 2047. Most states, however, have a combination of antipiracy and
antibootlegging legislation that, in addition to case law, serves as the basis
of protection for the recording. These protections run at least until 2067,
when all pre-1972 recordings will enter the public domain.
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Recordings made between 1972 and 1989 were subject to the same
copyright formalities as published works. American published recordings that failed to include a copyright notice on the recording entered the
public domain. Sound recordings published with notice received the same
copyright term as any other published work: 95 years from publication for
works before 1978, and life of the author plus 70 years for works made since
1978.8
Published foreign sound recordings have more federal protection than
do American works. Sound recordings published abroad before 1972 receive
federal copyright protection for a period of 95 years after publication.
(Remember that U.S. recordings only receive state common law protection.)
If the foreign work had entered the public domain in its home country by 1
January 1996, it is not eligible for federal copyright protection but can still
be protected by state common law copyrights.

Key Point
Most sound recordings are copyrighted
The only sound recordings that have entered the public domain
through expiration of copyright are U.S. recordings published
between 1972 and 1989 without proper notice of copyright. All other
sound recordings are protected.

3.2.5 Architectural works
It is unlikely that a cultural heritage institution would want to digitize a
building as constructed, but for the sake of completeness it is worth noting that only buildings constructed since 1990 are protected by copyright.
Duration is the same as for published works: life of the author plus 70 years
or 95 years for works made for hire.
It is more likely that institutions might wish to digitize the plans or
representations of buildings. The plans and drawings of pre-1990 buildings
can be protected by copyright. The photographer of photographs of pre- and
post-1990 buildings may also have a copyright in their photographs. For
post-1990 buildings, the copyright owner of the building may also have a
copyright interest in a photograph, but only if it was not taken from a public
space (see Chapter 5).
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3.3 Who is the owner of copyright?
The default rule contained in the Copyright Act is that the “author” of a
work is the initial owner of copyright [17 U.S.C. § 201(a)]. As will be seen,
the copyright understanding of authorship differs significantly from the
way the term is normally used, and in one important concept—work for
hire—there is a radical shift in definition. It is also possible for copyright
ownership to be transferred by written agreement, bequest, or operation
of law [17 U.S.C. § 201(d)].
The following sections consider these questions:
1. Who is the “author” or “maker” of a work?
2. What happens when there is more than one author?
3. Who owns copyright in material produced by employees, contractors,
and volunteers?
4. How is copyright transferred to third parties?

Tip
Given that copyright can be transferred and inherited, it is possible
that copyright has been transmitted—possibly multiple times—from
the original owner. As such, when assessing who owns copyright, it
should not be assumed that the author of the work retains ownership of
copyright.

Who is the “author” of a work?
In general, the author of a copyrighted work is the person who wrote or
produced the relevant expression: “the person who translates an idea into
a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection” (CCNV v. Reid).
Thus, where one person supplies the ideas (such as a celebrity) and
another expresses those ideas in writing (such as a ghostwriter), it is the
latter who is the author of the resulting literary work and would own its
copyright, regardless of what the title page might say. (For this reason,
ghostwriting contracts normally include a provision that all copyrights are
to be transferred to the presumptive author and/or publisher.) But what
happens when material dictated by someone else is transcribed? This will
be considered in Case Study 1 on oral histories.
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Authorship of sound recordings is slightly different than authorship of
other materials. There are a number of possible “authors” of such items,
namely the people making the sounds being recorded, as well as the people
responsible for capturing those sounds. Ownership of copyright will depend
on the relative contributions of these people. For instance, a, performer
whose performance is captured in a recording is generally considered to be
an author of the recording. The Beatles, for example, would be considered
to be an author of a performance of “She Loves You.” But the creation of a
sound recording is also likely to involve authorship “on the part of the record
producer responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and
electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to
make the final sound recording.”9 George Martin, the producer of the Beatles
recording of “Please Please Me,” is likely therefore to share ownership with
the Beatles of the sound recording copyright in that specific recording—at
least in the United States. (For reasons discussed under the “work made for
hire” section below, Martin’s employer at that time, EMI, would actually
own the copyright. He would not gain his ownership of part of the recording
until he became an independent contractor.)
In some cases, the role of the recording engineer may be so minimal
that the performance is the only copyrightable element in the work. Think,
for example, of an oral history interview at which a tape recorder is placed
between the participants and turned on. In other cases, such as with recordings of birdsongs, only the record producer’s contribution is copyrightable.
And in some cases, there may be no performers and the role of the record
producer is minimal; think of a microphone turned on in the middle of a
demonstration, with no subsequent editorial work on the recording. In
such a case, where the sounds are fixed by some purely mechanical means
without originality of any kind, there would be no sound recording copyright.
For discussion of the issues surrounding ownership of copyright in
sound recordings, see Case Study 1.

Joint authorship
Some works have more than one author. Works with more than one author
under the Copyright Act can either be “joint works of authorship,” compilations, or derivative works. The copyright ownership implications of each
are quite different.
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A joint work “is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole” [17 U.S.C. § 101]. The authors might have collaborated with each other, or they could have prepared their contributions separately, but with the intent that their contributions be merged into a single
work. The key element in identifying a joint work is the intention, at the
time the expression is fixed, “that the parts be absorbed or combined into an
integrated unit, although the parts themselves may be either “inseparable”
(as the case of a novel or painting) or “interdependent” (as in the case of a
motion picture, opera, or the words and music of a song).”10
A joint work can be distinguished from a collective work, which is a
specific kind of compilation. A collective work, such as a periodical issue,
encyclopedia, or festschrift, consists of contributions from multiple authors.
But the contributions to collective works are gathered; there is not the sense
of merger or unity to them. For example, when two people cowrite a script,
they will be joint authors of the script. But the inclusion of that script in a
compilation of “the year’s best plays” does not make the playwrights joint
authors of the compilation. The playwrights are the authors and copyright
owners of their original play, whereas the compiler of the anthology is the
owner of the copyright in the selection.
When one copyrighted work serves as the basis for another work, the
second work is identified not as a joint work but rather as a derivative work.
The copyright in any new expression that the author of the derivative work
creates belongs solely to that author. The author of the original work may
not use the derivative work without the permission of the second author.
At the same time, no use of the derivative work can be made without the
permission of the original author, since any use might infringe on his or her
original copyright. Imagine a book that is transformed (with permission) by
a playwright into a play. A movie studio then seeks to make a film version
of the play. It needs the permission of both the playwright, since it wants
to use his or her copyrighted additions, and the original author.
The copyright in a work of joint authorship is co-owned by the authors
of that work as tenants in common. Each author can exercise in full any
of the rights granted to a copyright owner. He or she has no obligation to
seek the consent of the other copyright owners. The only requirement is
that the copyright owner must share with the other co-owners any profits
derived from the use of the work.11
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The principles of tenancy in common that govern copyright ownership of
a joint work of copyright also apply when multiple heirs inherit a copyright.
Consider the situation when four siblings inherit a copyright. Each sibling
now owns one quarter of the copyright. Any sibling could grant permission
for the institution to digitize the work; there is no need to seek permission
from the others. Furthermore, if that sibling transferred his or her ownership share to a cultural institution, that institution would now be the owner
of the quarter share. If the institution decided to sell reproductions of the
copyrighted work, it would be required to account to the other siblings for
any profits earned on the reproductions. It would not, however, need to
seek the permission of the other co-owners to digitize the work. (For further
discussion on permission, see Chapter 7.)

Tip
Any co-owner of copyright can grant nonexclusive permission for the
reproduction, distribution, or performance of a work. It is not necessary to secure the permission of all of the co-owners.

Work made for hire:
material produced by employees, contractors, and volunteers
We have said that the author is normally the initial owner of copyright and
that the author is “the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
expression entitled to copyright protection” (CCNV v. Reid). If that person is
an employee, however, and if the fixation is part of that person’s employment
duties, then the employer, not the person, is considered to be the author
and, as such, owns the copyright in the work. The work itself is considered
to be a “work made for hire” [17 U.S.C. § 201(b)]. When, for example, a staff
member of a cultural institution writes that institution’s annual report,
the institution, and not the employee, is considered to be the author of
the report—even if the report states that it is authored by that employee.
In certain fields, most notably academic institutions, employment contracts may alter the default position found in copyright law. For example, it
is common for universities to allow faculty members to assert authorship
and copyright ownership of scholarly books and articles that they produce,
even though faculty are normally required to write as part of their employment contracts. The situation regarding authorship and ownership of course
materials such as syllabi and lectures is much less clear.12
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Key Point
When an employee produces a work as part of his or her duties, the
employer, and not the person who created the work, is considered to
be the author and copyright owner.

Determining whether a work was created independently or as part of
employment is important for two reasons.13 First, it determines who actually owns the copyright. Second, it determines how long that copyright
lasts. If a work is created independently, copyright will endure for 70 years
after the death of the author (assuming it was made after 1977) [17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a)]. If it was done as part of employment and the employer is the
author, copyright will endure for 95 years from publication or 120 years
from creation [17 U.S.C. § 302(c)].

Tip
When acquiring material from individuals, try to identify which works
were produced in that person’s individual capacity and which were
produced as part of his or her employment. Remember that a copyright transfer agreement cannot apply to works for which the person
does not hold the copyright. It may be necessary to secure a copyright
transfer agreement from an employer as well.

Many assume that the “work made for hire” doctrine would also
apply to works produced by independent contractors hired to produce
them. The definition of work made for hire in Section 101 of the Copyright Act does include some very precise situations in which contracted
work can be considered to be work made for hire. Works made for
hire are specially ordered or commissioned works that are one of the
following:

△△△△
△△△△

A contribution to a collective work
Part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work
A translation
A supplementary work (i.e., “a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing,
concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or
assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords,
pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical
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arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes,
and indexes” [17 U.S.C. § 101])
A compilation
An instructional text (i.e., “a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared
for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional
activities” [17 U.S.C. § 101])
A test or answer material for a test
An atlas

△△△△
△△△△

In addition to falling into one of these categories, the parties must
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work is a
work made for hire [17 U.S.C. § 101]. If you hire someone to translate a work
but do not agree in writing in advance that the work is to be considered to
be a work made for hire, then the copyright in the translation would belong
to the translator, not you.
Note that these categories are exceptionally limited. Motion pictures,
for example, are normally produced as work made for hire, and the studio
would own the copyright of any contractors working on the movie. Photographs taken by a contract photographer, however, hired to take stills on the
movie set, most likely would not be work made for hire and so the copyright
could belong to the photographer and not the studio. Similarly, copyright in
photographs taken by employees of a cultural institution would belong to
the institution, but copyright in photographs taken by independent contractors hired by the institution would belong to the photographer—unless the
photographs were for a collective work or compilation, and unless there was
an agreement in writing that they were to be considered to be work made
for hire. If the work is not a work made for hire, then the contract with the
photographer should state that he or she will transfer all copyrights in the
photographs to the institution.

Key Point
Except in certain very limited circumstances, copyright in the work of
independent contractors belongs to the contractor, not to the agency
that hired them. When hiring someone to do work, you should consider whether an assignment or license is required and, if appropriate,
include in the contract terms a provision that assigns or licenses to
you the rights you need.
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What about volunteers? Volunteers are normally not considered to be
employees, and unless their work falls under one of the precise categories
for independent contractors listed above, their work would not normally be
considered to be work made for hire. The courts, however, have tempered
the exact language of the copyright law by introducing the concept of agency.
Under agency law, an individual can be considered to be an employee by
weighing a number of factors. The court in Aymes v. Bonelli, building on the
Supreme Court’s decision in CCNV v. Reid, articulated five that are almost
always likely to be significant:

△△△△
△△△△
△△

The hiring party’s right to control the manner and means of creation
The skill required
The provision of employee benefits
The tax treatment of the hired party
Whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party

The closer a relationship comes to regular, salaried employment, the
more likely it is that a work-made-for-hire situation exists. Using the principles of agency law, at least one court has found a volunteer to be an
employee. In Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, a volunteer member of the
executive board of an organization was found not to be the copyright owner
of a manual he largely wrote on behalf of the board.

Tip
Although it may be theoretically possible to view volunteers as
employees, clearly the safest thing to do is to assume that work produced by volunteers is not work made for hire. You should consider
whether an assignment or license is appropriate and require that all
volunteers sign agreements that transfer or license the copyright in
any work that they produce for you to your institution. There is no
particular wording that must be used; just make sure that the language makes the intention of the parties clear.
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Pre-1978 Work Made for Hire
The preceding discussion of works made for hire is based on the 1976 Copyright Act and describes the doctrine as it exists today. Prior to 1978, a different definition of work made for hire prevailed. The operative presumption
was that, in the absence of express contractual reservations to the contrary,
copyright belonged to the person at whose initiative and expense the work
was done. In other words, it was assumed that copyright in work produced
by independent contractors belonged to the person or organization that
hired them unless written agreements or professional norms said otherwise.
As a result of these differing interpretations, one must consider the date
of creation when determining the initial copyright ownership of a work.
(Remember, however, that the initial copyright owner can always transfer or
license the copyright to others.) Consider the following different situations
and see how the date of creation affects copyright ownership:

△△
△△
△△

Professional photographer makes a portrait photo at the request of a
customer
Pre-1978: copyright likely belongs to customer (Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole)
▾▾ Post-1978: copyright likely belongs to photographer (Granse v. Brown
Photo)
Professional photographer prepares portrait photograph at her initiative and expense
▾▾ Pre-1978: copyright likely belongs to photographer
▾▾ Post-1978: copyright belongs to photographer
Artist commissioned to create artwork for a building
▾▾ Pre-1978: copyright belongs to builder (Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin)
▾▾ Post-1978: copyright belongs to sculptor (CCNV v. Reid)

△△

Tricky Point
An agreement to the contrary can always trump the default presumptions of the works-made-for-hire doctrine. For example, copyright
ownership of a portrait photo taken before 1978 would normally
belong to the person who commissioned the work—unless there was a
contract to the contrary. Many famous portrait photographers (including Bachrach and Karsh) routinely retained copyright in their work. Unfortunately, with older works, it is often difficult to determine whether
there was a contract in effect that governed copyright ownership.
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3.4 How is copyright transferred to others?
The Copyright Act provides that copyright can be transferred by the copyright owner. Transfer can be absolute (all copyright rights are transferred)
or limited (individual rights are assigned, or only for a certain duration or
territory). For example, it would be possible to transfer to another the right
to reproduce a work in which you hold the copyright, but retain the right
to make derivative works from that work.
Transfer can take place in a number of ways, including by assignment,
will, and operation of law [17 U.S.C. § 201(d)]. For the purpose of these
guidelines, it is worth discussing transfer by assignment and will. Transfer
by operation of law includes transfer as a result of bankruptcy or court
order, and is not discussed further. Copyright also can be licensed, which
is discussed in Chapter 7.

Transfers by assignments, mortgages,
and exclusive license
The Copyright Act allows the transfer of copyright by assignment: the
designation that someone else will own the right. It also equates mortgages
and exclusive licenses with transfer of ownership. When copyright is transferred, the recipient enjoys all relevant rights in copyright. The recipient can
enforce these rights even to the exclusion of the former copyright owner.
In essence, transfer results in a new owner of copyright.
In order to take effect, a transfer of ownership of copyright must be:

△△△△

in writing, and
signed “by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly
authorized agent” [17 U.S.C. § 204(a)]

Rights can be divided and assigned to different people. Hence, an owner
of the copyright in a book could assign its rights of reproduction to one
person and rights of adaptation to another. Similarly, assignment can be
limited according to territory (such as U.S. rights) or limited according to
time (such as an assignment for five years).
Courts have ruled that a person may also assign copyright in material that
does not yet exist, although this is not explicitly mentioned in the Copyright
Act,14 This means an assignment may be obtained from a volunteer at the
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start of duties, or a commercial designer at the beginning of a contract, to
cover material produced in the future.

Transfer of copyright by will
When a person dies, any copyrights they own become part of their estate
and are bequeathed just like any other personal property. The copyrights
may be expressly mentioned in a will, or they may be assigned as part of the
remainder of an estate. If there is no will, then the relevant state probate
laws would govern the disposition of the intellectual property.

Transfer of copyright by sale
Section 202 of the 1976 Copyright Act states: “Transfer of ownership of
any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work
is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work
embodied in the object.” The addition of this section to the copyright law
in 1976 was a conscious decision to reverse what had been known as the
“Pushman presumption”: a common law doctrine that authors or artists were
presumed to have transferred common law literary property rights when
they sold a work of art, unless those rights were specifically reserved.15 The
doctrine was named after Pushman v. New York Graphic Society in which
the court concluded that the total and unconditional transfer of a work of
art conveyed with it all copyrights.
In a subsequent case, Grandma Moses v. This Week Magazine, the court,
building in part on Pushman, reaffirmed its belief that the unrestricted
general sale of an unpublished painting constituted “publication” and, in
the absence of the proper formalities, concluded the work had entered the
public domain.
The Pushman presumption was overturned through legislation in many
states, including New York in 1966, before the 1976 Act overturned it completely. Yet for a certain period, the unconditional sale of a painting by a
copyright owner could either transfer ownership to the recipient or place
the item in the public domain. Museums may wish to investigate and document the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of their holdings for
they may, without realizing it, have acquired copyright ownership of many
works of art prior to the repeal of the Pushman presumption.
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3.5 Conclusion
As this chapter has made clear, the issues surrounding authorship, duration,
and current ownership of copyright are complex and intertwined. Whether
a work was created independently or as a product of employment can affect
both the initial ownership and duration of the copyright. The complex issue
of whether a work has been published will also determine whether it may
have entered the public domain. And transfers in ownership may make it
difficult to identify and locate current copyright owners in order to seek
any needed permissions for digitization.
In spite of its difficulty, however, it is imperative that participants in
digitization projects master the intricacies of copyright ownership and
duration if they wish to minimize the risk of infringement. Many project
managers assert that they will only digitize material in the public domain;
it is only with a deep understanding of what the public domain is and how
works enter the public domain that this risk-avoidance strategy can be
properly implemented.
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Exclusive Rights
and Infringement

4.1 Introduction
The Copyright Act grants to the owner of a copyrighted work certain exclusive rights. Anyone who violates any of these exclusive rights is a potential
infringer, and the owner of that right is allowed to bring suit against the
infringer for the violation of that right. In addition, certain commercial
dealings with infringing articles (such as importing bootleg CDs or DVDs)
also constitute infringements of copyright [17 U.S.C. § 501].
There are several different types of infringement. Direct infringement,
which is specified in the Copyright Act, occurs when someone’s actions
immediately violate one of the exclusive rights. For example, making an
unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work would be a direct infringement of copyright. The courts have also identified two forms of indirect
infringement: contributory infringement and vicarious liability. Put crudely,
a person may indirectly infringe copyright where they encourage or assist
a direct infringement undertaken by someone else. As will be seen, there
are principles to determine the requisite level of participation for indirect
liability to arise. Given that direct infringement is far more relevant to
digitization projects than indirect infringement, it will be the main focus
of this chapter.
In addition to the exclusive rights of the copyright owner specified in
the Copyright Act, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) created
a new, de facto right to control, through technological measures, access to,
and some copying of, a work. Although they are not limited to copyright
owners, its provisions form part of the Copyright Act.
This chapter deals with three questions:

△△
△△△△

What are the exclusive rights of the copyright owner (including moral
rights and DMCA protections)?
In what circumstances will a person directly infringe those rights?
What remedies can a court award in relation to that infringement?
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The chapter presupposes that one of the exclusive rights has been
infringed beyond what is permitted by one of the exemptions to copyright
(see Chapters 5 and 6). An exempted activity, such as a fair-use reproduction of a work, is not an infringement of the copyright owner’s exclusive
right of reproduction.

4.2 Exclusive rights
The copyright owner is granted six main groups of exclusive rights in Section 106 of the Copyright Act. They are the rights to do, or authorize the
doing of, any of the following acts:

△△△△
△△△△
△△
△△

Reproduction
Preparation of derivative works (such as adaptations)
Distribution
Public performance (for literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, motion pictures, and other audiovisuals)
Public display (for literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work)
Public performance of sound recordings via digital audio transmission

In addition, Section 106(a) establishes certain moral rights for works of
visual art. They are discussed later in this chapter.
As seen from the list above, the exclusive rights of copyright differ for
various types of work protected by the Copyright Act. The reproduction, public distribution, and derivative works rights apply to all copyrighted works. In
contrast, the performance and display rights only apply to particular types
of copyright subject matter. In the case of the public performance rights for
sound recordings, that right is limited to digital transmission. It is not an
infringement of the sound recording copyright to play such a work aloud
or broadcast it via analog radio waves (although it may be an infringement
of the rights of the copyright owner of the underlying musical work, if any).
The exclusive rights in Section 106 are said to be “subject to sections
107 through 122.” These provisions identify activities that are deemed not
to constitute an infringement of copyright (limitations on or exemptions
to copyright infringement). Some of these limitations are unremunerated
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(e.g., fair use, the libraries and archives provisions), and others require payment of a fee (i.e., are “statutory” or “compulsory” licenses). Thus, where
an activity falls within an exemption or limitation, it is not necessary to
obtain a license or transfer of rights from the copyright owner. The content
of limitations most relevant to cultural institutions is discussed in detail
in Chapters 5 and 6.

Key Point
Many of the activities undertaken by cultural institutions, including
digitization, may run afoul of one of the exclusive rights granted by
copyright. For example:

△△
△△
△△

Digitizing an analog print-based or artistic work reproduces the
work.
Making digitized content available online, for instance on publicly
accessible Web sites, may constitute distribution of the item.
If the work presented in digital form is an audiovisual work, making it available online may infringe on the right to perform a work

Each of the exclusive rights is briefly discussed in the following section.

Reproduction
Section 106(1) gives the owner of copyright the exclusive right to “reproduce
the copyrighted work in copies or phonocopies.”
The reproduction right should be construed broadly. For instance, a
House Report prepared during passage of the 1976 Act explained that
the right to reproduce a copyrighted work means “the right to produce a
material object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or
simulated in a fixed form from which it can be ‘perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.’”1 This form of words is reflected in the definitions of “copies” and
“phonorecords” in Section 101.
Imagine the different ways that one could reprint a book: by setting new
type of the text, photocopying the original, or digitizing the text to create
a machine-readable version. All would infringe on the exclusive right of
reproduction. Imitating the appearance of a painting could also infringe
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on that right, as could turning a photograph into a sculpture (Rogers v.
Koons). As long as there is substantial similarity between the two works,
copying is presumed to have taken place. The key issue with reproduction
is that the author’s “expression”—the author’s original contribution to the
work—has been taken.
The reproduction right for sound recordings is somewhat more limited
than for other copyrighted materials. The owner of the sound recording
copyright only has the exclusive right to reproduce the actual sounds fixed
on that particular sound recording [17 U.S.C. § 114(b)]. But anyone else can
record a “sound alike” performance intended to duplicate the sound on a
sound recording without infringing on the rights of the copyright owner
of that recording (though if there is a copyright owner of the underlying
musical work, it may infringe on his or her rights. It could also infringe on
publicity rights: see Chapter 9). This limitation on exclusive rights only
exists for sound recordings, however, and not for audiovisual works.

Derivative works
Section 106(2) grants the copyright owner the exclusive right “to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” Derivative works are
therefore adaptations of the copyrighted work. The following are examples
derivative works listed in Section 101 of the Copyright Act:

David Koller of the Institute
for Advanced Technology in
the Humanities makes a 3D
scan of the Laocoon statue in
the Vatican Museums. Though
found on a government website (http://www.lbl.gov/cs/
Archive/news122208b.html),
which would suggest that the
image is in the public domain,
it is actually an uncredited
photo by Chad Keller of IATH.
Photo Credit: Chad Keller and the
Institute for Advanced Technology in
the Humanities at the University of
Virginia.
License: Used with permission.
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△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△

Translations
Musical arrangements
Dramatizations
Fictionalizations
Motion picture versions
Sound recordings
Art reproductions
Abridgments
Condensations
Any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted

Tricky Question
Does reformatting a work create a derivative work?
Many institutions want to convert items from one format to another
for preservation or to increase access to the original. For example, an
institution might want to convert a ¾" analog videotape to MPEG 4
format or convert e-mail in Microsoft Outlook’s .pst mailboxes into
a generic XML format. In some cases, the institution may hope to
claim copyright protection in the new work. Is the reformatted item a
derivative work?
The answer to this difficult question hinges on the amount of
originality required to produce the derivative work. If the modifications are primarily mechanical, then the work would be primarily
a reproduction, not a derivative work. If in creating the new work,
however, the modifications are such that one could argue that original works of authorship have been added, then a derivative work has
been created.
In many ways, the issue is moot. Regardless of whether it is a
reproduction or a derivative work, a reformatted copy would infringe
on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner—unless an exemption
applies.

Distribution
The right of distribution gives copyright owners the exclusive right to distribute copies of copyrighted works to the public “by sale or other transfer
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of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending” [17 U.S.C. § 106(3)]. Distribution
could therefore occur by publishing the copyrighted work and distributing
the copies. It could also possibly occur by making the work available for
downloading on a Web site or through a file-sharing program. In at least
one case, distribution was said to have occurred merely by including records
for illegal copies in the catalog of a library, with no evidence the items were
ever borrowed (Hotaling v. LDS).
The courts have extended the right of distribution to encompass a
general right of first publication. Under this concept, the copyright owner
not only has the exclusive right to control how a work will be distributed
but also the right to determine whether and when a particular work will
be made available to the public. The copyright owner has, under ordinary circumstances, the right to control the first public appearance of his
or her undisseminated expression (Harper & Row v. Nation). Digitizing
unpublished manuscripts and making them publicly accessible via the
Internet is likely to be an infringement of the copyright owner’s distribution
right.
The exclusive right of distribution is tempered by an important limitation on this right found in Section 109. The “first sale” doctrine stipulates
that some of the copyright owner’s rights over a specific copy of a work end
once his or her ownership of that copy ends. The copyright owner cannot,
for example, stop a library from lending a legally acquired copy of a work,
nor can he or she stop someone from selling a legally acquired copy in a
used-book store. Nor can the copyright owner prevent a purchaser from
displaying the work in public, which allows museums and libraries to exhibit
copies of their works.

Did You Know?
In 2004, the Irish National Library wanted to exhibit some of James
Joyce’s manuscripts in order to commemorate the centenary of
Bloomsday, the day on which Ulysses is set. The copyright owner of
the manuscripts, Joyce’s grandson, objected to the display. Because
Ireland does not have a law comparable to Section 109 that allows
the display of legally acquired copies, the Irish Parliament had to
rush through emergency legislation to allow the exhibition to go
forward.2
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Public performance
The public performance right in Section 106(4) applies to literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works.
A public performance can include reading a work aloud, staging a play,
singing or playing music, and dancing a ballet or other choreographic work.
A public performance may have multiple iterations. For example, when a
theater troupe stages a play, it is performing. When a network transmits that
performance to its local affiliates, it is also performing the play, regardless
of whether they are broadcasting live or on tape. When the local television affiliate broadcasts the play over the air and through cable systems, it
is performing. Putting a digital copy of the performance on a server from
which it can be viewed or downloaded would also constitute a performance.
When an individual watches the performance by turning on the television
or computer, that individual is performing (in copyright terms) the play.
Both the performance and display rights are limited to “public” expressions of the work. To perform or display a work publicly means to perform
or display it anywhere that is open to the public or anywhere that a “substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered” [17 U.S.C. § 101]. Semipublic places such
as clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps, and schools are all considered
“public” for purposes of copyright. Transmitting the performance or display
to such a place also makes it public.

Public Display
Section 106(5) grants a right of public display to copyright owners of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work.
Public display applies to the showing of any copy of the work, including
the original work itself. As written, the right would prohibit museums from
displaying artwork or archives from exhibiting manuscripts without the
permission of the copyright owner. Section 109(c), however, contains an
important exemption that allows the owner of a particular copy (or someone
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authorized by the owner) to display that work publicly either directly or by
projection at the place where the work is located. Thus, exhibiting a painting
from a cultural institution’s collection would not infringe the display right,
but putting a reproduction on the institution’s Web site might.

Public performance of sound recordings
The copyright owner has the exclusive right to perform sound recordings via
digital (but not analog) transmissions [17 U.S.C. § 106(6)]. Some digital public
performances are subject to a compulsory license; others, because they are
viewed as being of higher risk to the copyright owner, must be negotiated in
advance. Most digitization projects of cultural heritage institutions would
fall into this later grouping.

4.3 Moral rights
In addition to the exclusive rights described above, Section 106A of the
Copyright Act provides for moral rights for certain works of art. Although
they are included in the Berne Convention and common in European copyright law, moral rights in the United States have traditionally been protected
outside copyright via laws regarding slander, libel, and misappropriation.
This practice changed slightly in 1990 with the passage of the Visual Artist Rights Act (VARA), which added Section 106A to the Copyright Act. It
granted some artists rights relating to attribution and the integrity of works.
The right of attribution is intended to ensure that authors are only
identified with works that they have created. Specifically, the author has:

△△△△
△△

The right to be identified as author of a work he or she has created
The right not to be identified as the author of a work that he or she did
not create
The right not to be identified as the author of a work he or she has created
when distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work would
be prejudicial to his or her reputation [17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)]

The right of integrity is intended to protect the work against treatment
that would be prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation [17 U.S.C. §
106A(a)]. Thus, under VARA, the author of a visual work of art has the right
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to prevent any prejudicial distortions to or mutilations of his or her work,
even after the work has been given or sold to a third party. In addition, if
the work is of “recognized stature,” its author can prevent its destruction.
It is unlikely that VARA will pose much of burden to cultural institutions
interested in digitizing works from their collections. First, the moral rights
created in VARA apply only to a very limited number of types of works:
paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and still photographs. Section 101
specifies further restrictions on eligibility for each type:
Paintings, drawings, and prints must:
exist in a single copy, or
exist in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author.

△△△△

Sculptures must:
exist in a single copy, or
exist in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer
that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature
or other identifying mark of the author.

△△△△

Still photographs must:
be produced for exhibition purposes only, and
exist in a single copy that is signed by the author, or
exist in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the photographer.

△△△△
△△

More importantly, moral rights do not apply to certain uses, including
most reproductions. The purpose of VARA is to protect the rights of the
author with regard to the original work of art and to protect that work; they
do not extend to any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a
work in “any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication,” or “any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container”
[17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3) and § 101]. This exclusion should encompass most
digitization activities of cultural institutions.
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Cultural institutions that own works of fine art need to know about their
obligations regarding attribution and the integrity of works. Moral-rights
issues, however, need not impinge on their digitization initiatives.

4.4 The right to control access to digital works
With the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998,
a new kind of implicit right was created. One of the sections of this wideranging act creates civil and criminal penalties for bypassing technological
methods used to control or limit access to certain works. In effect, it gives
the publisher of the work a new exclusive right of access. This right belongs
not to the author or copyright owner, but rather to anyone who publishes
a work containing a technological protection measure.
The DMCA has provisions to control both the access to and copying of
protected works. Regarding access, the law prohibits two things:

△△
△△

The actual act of circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a copyrighted work [17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A)]
The manufacture or distribution of hardware and software designed
primarily to enable people to carry out the act of circumvention [17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)]

In other words, the law prohibits both the act of circumventing an
access control as well as the tools that would enable one to carry out such
an act.
What is a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work? Passwords are one form of access control; encrypting (or scrambling)
a file is another. A very common form of access control is the Content
Scrambling System (CSS) encryption required by the DVD Manufacturers Association on commercial DVDs. One of the most remarkable things
about the DMCA is that the prohibition against circumvention applies even
if the intended use is otherwise lawful and noninfringing. Another is that
manufacturers have argued that the anticircumvention provision applies to
a wide variety of works not normally associated with copyright, including
ink jet printer cartridges and garage door openers!
Recognizing that this provision might unduly affect the rights of users,
Congress directed that every three years the Librarian of Congress should
determine whether the implementation of access-control measures is
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diminishing the ability of individuals to use copyrighted works in ways that
are otherwise lawful. The focus of the rulemaking is on whether there are
specific classes of copyrighted works the use of which is, or in the next three
years is likely to be, adversely affected by the prohibition against bypassing
access-control mechanisms. For those classes of works, the Librarian can
determine that bypassing the access-control mechanism would not be an
infringement.
To date, the approved exceptions have been limited in number and
scope. Two were identified in 2000; they grew to four in 2003; and the 2006
rulemaking had six. None of the provisions to date could be interpreted to
allow a cultural institution to bypass an access-control mechanism in order
to make a digital object widely accessible via the Internet. Nor is there any
similar rulemaking regarding the tools used to bypass access controls. The
assumption seems to be that an organization given the right to bypass an
access control will also have to figure out how technically to do this on their
own; they are forbidden from sharing their findings with others.3
The DMCA also addresses reproduction and the other exclusive rights
of the copyright owner. Unlike the situation with access controls, the actual
act of copying a protected work is not banned (though it may be prohibited
by other sections of the Copyright Act). The manufacturing or importation
of hardware and software to assist with such copying is prohibited, however
[17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)]. A cultural institution can, therefore, bypass copy (as
opposed to access) controls on a work protected by technological protection
measures—but it has to figure out how technically to do this, and it cannot
share its solution with other institutions.
The DMCA prohibitions present an immense stumbling block to cultural institutions that wish to preserve and make available information
that has been encrypted or otherwise controlled. Currently it is primarily
commercially produced works that have such protections on them. More
and more desktop software, however, is incorporating password and other
access controls. Many times access controls are imposed on documents
unintentionally. It is quite easy, for example, to create a PDF document
that has security settings that forbid copying or text extraction. New versions of Microsoft Office include access controls and settings that can
cause a document to disappear after a certain amount of time. Because
of the DMCA, libraries, archives, and museums that receive documents
incorporating technological protection measures will be hard-pressed to
preserve them over time.4
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4.5 Infringement
Direct Infringement
Third parties who perform any of the exclusive acts set out above risk directly
infringing copyright. Copyright is directly infringed when:

△△△△
△△△△
△△△△

a person who is not the owner of copyright
with access to the copyrighted work
violates any of the exclusive rights
in a material and substantial manner
beyond what is permitted by the statutory exemptions
without the permission of the copyright owner.
Each of these factors is considered in turn.

Not the owner of copyright
As noted in Chapter 1, copyright and physical property are separate; a cultural institution may own a collection item without owning the copyright
that subsists in the item.
One option is for cultural institutions to obtain an assignment of copyright from the copyright owner. Such an assignment transfers ownership of
copyright to the cultural institution. This approach has the benefit of giving
the cultural institution maximum flexibility in dealing with copyrighted
works (although it may still need to consider other issues, such as moral
rights and privacy, trademark, and publicity rights as discussed in Chapter 9).
That said, many institutions only obtain copyright assignments sparingly. This may be because the plethora of copyright owners in a modern
manuscript collection or compound work makes it impossible to secure a
significant number of permissions. And it may be because of the concern
that assignments divest creators of potential income streams. This is particularly true for people such as visual artists, authors, and filmmakers who
make a living from the intellectual property that they create. Thus, in many
cases, a nonexclusive license is preferable as it can grant reproduction and
distribution rights to the cultural institution on terms acceptable to both
parties, while leaving ownership of copyright with the creator.

78

Infringement

i 4.5

With access to the copyrighted work
For a person to infringe copyright, he or she must have access to the copyrighted work. It is not an infringement of copyright to create a work that is
very similar to someone else’s copyright work independently, without any
knowledge of or access to the other copyrighted work.

Violates any of the exclusive rights
The liability for direct infringement is strict. One can be guilty of copyright
infringement regardless of whether one knows that the act constituted
infringement or even that the work was copyrighted.
Liability for infringement is found when, in addition to proof that the
alleged infringer had access to the work, a substantial similarity exists
between the two works. Taken together, access and substantial similarity
prove that a violation of one of the exclusive rights has occurred.
The requirements of objective similarity and causal connection will be
met in most instances of digitization, such as:

△△△△
△△

scanning some pages from a book or manuscript
taking a photograph of a painting
making a copy of a sound recording.

In a material and substantial manner
The infringement must be real; to date, contemplating copyright infringement without doing it has not been a crime.5 And the infringement must be
of some substantial amount rather than de minimis. In other words, some
significant portion of the original copyrighted expression must be taken to
warrant a finding of infringement. There is no hard-and-fast rule on how
little one can take, however. Thumbnails of images, for example, are not
automatically considered to be de minimis and hence acceptable.
In most cases, a cultural institution will wish to digitize an entire work.
They will do this by creating a new, material reproduction. And even when
only part of a work is digitized, that part is likely to be significant or representative of the entire work. Thus most digitization initiatives are likely to
surpass the minimum requirements for prima facie violation of this factor.
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Key Point
A cultural institution may infringe copyright even if it only digitizes
part of a work.

Beyond what is permitted by the statutory exemptions
The statutory exemptions most relevant to cultural institutions are discussed
in Chapters 5 and 6.

Without the permission of the copyright owner
Copyright is not infringed where the cultural institution has the copyright
owner’s permission to perform the relevant act. Permission is discussed
in Chapter 7.

Indirect infringement
In addition to direct infringement, one can also indirectly infringe copyright.
There are two types of indirect infringement: contributory infringement and
vicarious liability. To be guilty of contributory infringement, an institution
would have to know that direct infringement was taking place. (Note that this
is different from direct infringement, which can occur regardless of whether
the infringer knew a work was copyrighted). In addition, the contributory
infringer must induce, cause, or materially contribute to the infringement.
Creating software that enables people to download music illegally has
been found to be a contributory infringement (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
Grokster). Knowingly facilitating infringing digitization by a third party of
copyrighted works in an institution’s collection would also be contributory
infringement. The third party may have done the actual infringement, but
the facilitating institution would be just as liable.
Could a library be found liable for contributory infringement for patron
use of photocopiers located in the library? Possibly. By providing the copiers
on which the infringing acts occur, the library could be viewed as materially contributing to the infringement. If the library knew or should have
known that patrons were copying more than was permitted under fair use,
they could be found liable.
It is possible that the library could also be found liable under the second
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form of indirect infringement: vicarious liability. In order to find an institution vicariously liable for the actions of a direct infringer, the institution must
have the right and ability to control the infringer’s acts and receive direct
financial benefit from the infringement. Unlike contributory infringement,
knowledge is not an element of vicarious liability. If the library received a
profit from the photocopying, or even if the act saved wear and tear on its
volumes or obviated the need to purchase additional copies, the argument
could be made that the library was receiving direct financial benefit from
the acts of infringers that the library could theoretically control.
Fortunately Section 108, which is discussed in Chapter 6, contains an
explicit exemption from liability for libraries and archives for any infringing acts performed by patrons on library-owned reproduction equipment.
As long as the proper signage is included on the machines, the library or
archives is immune from indirect copyright liability.

Tip
Many cultural institutions permit the unsupervised use by patrons of
machines (including photocopiers, videotape and DVD players, and
computers) that can be used to copy copyrighted works. A warning notice should be attached to each machine in order to gain the
protection of Section 108 and remove any liability the institution has
for patron use. The text of the notice is not specified in law, but the
following should work:
Notice: The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, U.S.
Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The person using this equipment is liable for any infringement.

Question
Am I liable for patrons’ use of their cameras?
Some cultural institutions have reported patrons using personal
copying equipment (such as digital cameras) to photograph or scan
collection items. Assuming that patrons use that equipment in a way
that infringes copyright, could the cultural institution also be liable
for copyright infringement?
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There are no judgments directly on point, so we cannot say for
sure. We can, however, consider the factors that determine contributory and vicarious infringement:

△△
△△

The copying equipment was not provided by the cultural institution (minimizing the degree to which the institution could be
said to “materially contribute” to the infringement).
Cultural institutions frequently have no significant relationship
with their individual patrons. In general, institutions do not
monitor or direct patrons’ activity while on their premises. Thus,
the cultural institution may not have the actual knowledge
of infringement that is required for a finding of contributory
infringement.
Institutions may not have the ability to control infringing acts
of patrons, which is required for a finding of vicarious copyright infringement. The more institutions exercise supervision
of the copying done by patrons, the more liable they may be.
For example, requiring patrons to request permission before
copying any individual document could increase an institution’s
theoretical liability.
Cultural institutions do not normally charge for reproductions
made by patrons using their own equipment. The institutions
therefore are probably not receiving the direct financial benefit
required for a finding of vicarious copyright infringement.

△△
△△

Facilitating access to information has emerged as one of the
primary functions of cultural institutions. This role may be compromised if they are required to adopt intrusive procedures to
police copyright law. However, it would be reasonable to post
warnings about copyright in reading rooms and on any forms
given to patrons prior to allowing them to bring equipment into
the library (mirroring the procedure followed with library-supplied
equipment).
Title: The British Museum Reading Room
Photographer: David Iliff
License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.5
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:British_Museum_Reading_Room_Panorama_Feb_2006.jpg
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There are good arguments that a cultural institution does not
“induce, cause, or materially contribute” to copyright infringement
when a patron uses personal copying equipment on the institution’s
premises. Much would depend on the particular circumstances of the
library and patron use, however, and it is possible that in a specific
fact situation, a court might form a different opinion.

4.6 Remedies for Infringement
This section discusses the remedies available to a copyright owner who
brings a successful court action in relation to an infringement of copyright.
The Copyright Act sets out the remedies that can be awarded to a copyright
owner. These include any or all of the following:

△△△△
△△△△
△△

Grant of an injunction
Impounding and/or destruction of infringing articles
Award of damages and profits
Award of costs and attorney’s fees
Criminal liability
Each of these will be considered in turn.

Injunction [17 U.S.C. § 502]: An injunction is an order directing a person
to refrain from undertaking a particular act, or, less frequently, requiring
them to perform a particular act. For example, a copyright owner may seek
a temporary or permanent injunction restraining a cultural institution from
including certain material on its Web site.
Impounding and disposition of offending articles [17 U.S.C. § 503]: The
Copyright Act allows the court to order the impounding of all infringing
copies as well as any article that is used to reproduce the copies. The court
could, for example, order the seizure of the institution’s Web server if it was
found to be distributing infringing copies. As part of its final judgment, the
court may also order the destruction of such articles.
Damages [17 U.S.C. § 504]: Another way to compensate the plaintiff is
through requiring the defendant to make a payment of money—legally, this
is known as an award of damages. Three types of damages can be awarded:
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△△△△
△△

Actual damages
Profits, and
Statutory damages

Actual damages are intended to compensate a copyright owner for losses
they incurred as a result of the infringement. Profits are the amount that
the infringer realized due to his or her infringement separate from any
actual damages suffered by the copyright owner. The purpose of including
profits is to make sure that infringers cannot benefit from the infringing act.
A copyright owner in some cases can elect to receive statutory damages
instead of actual damages and profits. Statutory damages can range from a
minimum of $750 per infringed work to a maximum of $30,000 per infringement. If the court finds that the infringement was willful, that amount can
increase up to $150,000 per infringed work.
It should be stressed that these merely set the range; the precise calculation of damages is determined according to the circumstances of each case.

Costs and attorney’s fees [17 U.S.C. § 505]:
The court may also, at its discretion, award to
the prevailing party the costs associated with
a settlement and reasonable attorney’s fees.
Bringing a copyright action in a federal court
is an expensive proposition, and an award
of attorney’s fees can easily dwarf the other
damages. For example, in a successful fair-use
defense of his use of Barbie dolls in a series of
artworks entitled “Food Chain Barbie,” Tom
Forsythe was awarded $300,000 in costs and
$1.8 million in attorney’s fees (Mattel Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Productions). And settling
out of court may not protect you. In a recent
decision, a judge ruled that even though a lawsuit against James Joyce’s grandson was settled
out of court, the academic who brought the
suit was the prevailing party and was eligible
to receive reimbursement for her attorney’s
fees (Schloss v. Sweeney).
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Criminal liability [17 U.S.C. § 506]: In addition to the civil penalties outlined above, willful copyright infringement can also be a criminal violation,
punishable by jail time lasting up to ten years (for repeat offenders) and
fines ranging to $250,000 for an individual or $500,000 for an organization [18 U.S.C. § 2319].
DMCA civil and criminal liability [17 U.S.C. § 1203 & 1204]: Courts have
the broad authority to grant injunctive and monetary relief, order the
impounding and destruction of the tools or products involved in the violation, and award actual damages, profits gained through infringement, costs,
and attorney’s fees. Criminal penalties that range up to ten years in jail and
a fine of up to $1 million (for a repeat offense) are possible, but nonprofit
libraries, archives, educational institutions, and public broadcasting entities
are immune from criminal penalties.
Limitations on Remedies
The penalties associated with copyright infringement can be severe. There
are several factors, however, that can mitigate some of the worst effects.
For example, although it is not relevant in determining direct copyright
infringement whether a defendant knew they were infringing copyright,
the “innocence” of the defendant can be considered when determining
remedies. If the court believes that the infringer “was not aware and had
no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright,” the court may reduce the statutory damage amount to not less
than $200 [17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)]. In addition, no statutory damages can be
awarded if the infringer is an employee of a nonprofit educational institution,
library, or archives and had reasonable grounds for believing (and hence
believed) that his or her use was a fair use. This exemption only applies to
infringement by reproduction, however; other infringements (for example,
distributing a copyrighted work from a Web site) fall outside this provision.
Both these limitations—to innocent infringers generally, and for nonprofit
institutions—only apply to statutory damages. All other penalties, including
actual damages, attorney’s fees, and impoundment, could still be enforced.
In addition, in order to be eligible for an award of statutory damages and
attorney’s fees, a work must have been registered with the Copyright Office
prior to commencement of the infringement [17 U.S.C. § 412]. No statutory
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damages or attorney’s fees, for example, can be awarded for any infringement of an unpublished work prior to its registration with the Copyright
Office. Once again, however, all other penalties, including actual damages
and impoundment, could still be enforced.
The importance of the limitations on remedies is considered further in
Chapter 8 on Risk Management.

4.7 Conclusion
As should be evident from this chapter, digitization of copyrighted materials has the potential to infringe the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.
And many of the penalties associated with this behavior can be high (though
there are some special rules that limit the damages that cultural heritage
institutions face).
Fortunately there are exemptions to copyright law that either excuse
actions that would be otherwise infringing or lower the risks associated with
infringement such that an institution might wish to consider actions that
would otherwise be technically infringing. These exemptions are discussed
in the next two chapters.
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Fair Use and Other Exemptions

5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses statutory limitations on the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner, in particular the fair-use exemption.
A statutory exemption allows individuals to exercise one of the exclusive
rights of copyright

△△△△

without obtaining the permission of the copyright owner, and
without the payment of any license fee.

In addition to the statutory exemptions, the Copyright Act also contains
some compulsory licenses. Like the statutory exemptions, these allow individuals to exercise one of the exclusive rights of copyright without obtaining
the permission of the copyright owner. The difference is that users must also
comply with formalities and pay a prescribed fee. An example is the license
that permits the mechanical reproduction of musical works. Compulsory
licenses will be discussed in Chapter 7.
The exemptions and limitations on the exclusive right of the copyright
owner lie at the very heart of the copyright system. They ensure that the
monopoly granted to copyright owners is not so complete that individuals
cannot use existing works nor are unduly hampered in creating new ones.
In this way, exemptions advance the constitutional purpose of copyright:
“the progress of science and useful arts.”
Limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners are found primarily, but not exclusively, in Sections 107 to 122 of the Copyright Act. Table
5.1 sets out some of the major groups of exemptions in the Copyright Act.
These exemptions cover a range of conduct, although many only operate
in limited circumstances.
These guidelines focus on the exemptions of greatest importance to
cultural institutions engaged in digitization. They are:

△△△△
△△

Fair use (Chapter 5)
Exemptions specific to libraries, archives, and nonprofit educational
institutions (Chapter 6)
Educational performances (Chapter 5)
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Other exemptions and limitations are also referred to, where
relevant.

ii	Table 5.1
Some major groups of exemptions in the Copyright Act
Exemption

Application

Fair use

Activities that are “fair” (as assessed using factors 107
in the Copyright Act), for purposes including criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research.

Distribution
of a particular
copy (“First Sale
Doctrine”)

Subsequent lending, public display, or resale of a
legally acquired copy of a work.

109

Educational use of
performances

Includes in-classroom use of any work and the
limited performance of nondramatic literary and
musical works in distance learning.

110(1) and
110(2)

Other performances and
displays of literary,
dramatic, and
musical works

Certain noncommercial and nonprofit charitable
110
performances; some uses in religious services;
rebroadcast in certain businesses, restaurants, and
bars; use in governmental or nonprofit agricultural
fairs; the performance of certain musical works in
retail outlets for the sole purpose of promoting
retail sales; and the transmission of performances
of certain works to disabled persons.

Acts involving
Pictorial representations (including photographs)
architectural works of buildings visible from a public place.
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Section

120

Sound recordings

Examples: compulsory license for making non114–116,
dramatic recordings; broadcasts of certain sound 118, 109,
recordings; copying sound recordings for the pur- 1008
pose of broadcasting or simulcasting; negotiated
licenses for jukeboxes; loans by nonprofit libraries
and educational institutions; noncommercial
consumer use.

Computer
programs

Reproductions made during normal use; backup
117
copies; adaptations made to run programs on new
machines; copies made as part of maintenance
and repair.
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Exemption

Application

Section

Cable and satellite television
broadcasts

Special permissions for secondary transmissions
of television signals originally transmitted by
someone else.

111, 119,
122

Public television
broadcasts

Availability of compulsory license to cover noncommercial broadcast use.

118

Transitory
reproductions

Reproductions made during the transmittal or
routing of material through a network.
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Although it is not technically an exemption, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity can also be used to excuse copyright infringements; it is discussed
at the end of this chapter.

5.2 Fair Use
The fair-use exemption is one of the most important doctrines in copyright
law. It serves as the primary protection for free speech, which might otherwise be constrained if the monopoly rights given to copyright owners were
absolute. It ensures that the balance between the interests of copyright owners and users can be maintained and that copyright law does not stifle the
very creativity it is intended to foster. On a very practical level, it provides
important protections to libraries, archives, and nonprofit educational
institutions. When those organizations have a reasonable belief that their
use of a copyrighted work is a fair use, many of the most stringent remedies
in copyright law cannot be applied (see Chapter 4).
Unfortunately, fair use can also be a difficult to understand and apply.
Fair use is open-ended, which means that it can function as a flexible component of copyright law, responding to changes in technology or institutional
and creative norms. However, this very flexibility can make it difficult to
predict how a court will apply the doctrine in any particular case. Commentators try to extrapolate from the specifics of a particular case to other
cases, but the truth is that each fair-use case stands on its own specific facts
and thus its own merits. That is, although it is possible to analyze existing
case law and industry customs, ultimately, each fair-use case is judged on a
case-by-case basis. Because the fair use of any particular case is determined
by a judge applying an equitable rule of reason, the result is that only five
individuals in the United States can say with certainty whether any particular
use is fair: a majority of the Supreme Court!
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Given the nature of the fair-use privilege, it is not surprising that it is
often misunderstood. Many people, for example, assume that any educational use is automatically a fair use. Others mistakenly believe that fair use
allows 10 percent of a copyrighted work or alternatively an excerpt of 300
words or less to be reproduced for any purpose. This is not the case; there
are no set limits in the statute.
Yet in spite of the inherent uncertainty about what constitutes a fair use
and misunderstandings about its boundaries, fair use remains of fundamental importance to all cultural heritage institutions. There are a number of
examples of institutional digitization activity where the fair use arguments
are strong and even (given institutional norms and the lack of reported disputes or case law) relatively uncontroversial (such as production of record
photographs for internal staff use). Some types of use can reasonably be
predicted to be fair use. Fair use is much more than some of its critics have
charged: “the right to hire a lawyer.”1
This section will consider four aspects of fair use:

△△
△△△△
△△

Its general statutory purposes (e.g., criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research)
The four factors in fair use (purpose, nature, amount, and market impact)
Fair-use guidelines
The relevance of fair use for the digitization projects of cultural
institutions

The starting point for all discussions of fair use is the language of the
statute:

Reference
The Fair Use Exemption, Section 107
Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified in that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
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made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—
The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes
6. The nature of the copyrighted work
7. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole, and
8. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
5.

The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.

We can make three important general observations about fair use based
on a reading of the text of this section. First, although we normally think of
fair use when making reproductions, it can also apply to all of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner. A performance, for example, or a distribution
of a copyrighted work can also be a fair use.
Second, if one’s action is a fair use, it is consequently not an infringement
of copyright. This differs from some of the other exemptions in copyright
law that recognize that someone did something wrong but remove all
liability for the action. If your use is a fair use, you did nothing wrong; no
copyright was infringed.

Key Point
Fair use is not an excuse or justification for infringement; a fair use is
not an infringement of copyright to begin with.

Third, and most important, potentially any use can be found to be a fair
use. Section 107 identifies certain uses that are often a fair use, including
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research.” This list is illustrative, however,
and not exclusive. The courts have found other uses to constitute fair use.
For example, the Supreme Court has determined that “time-shifting” broadcast television programs at home is a fair use—even though the purpose is
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for entertainment (Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios). In another case, it
found that a commercial parody of song also constituted a fair use (Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.).

Key Point
Purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, and research are explicitly identified in the law as possible fair uses, but other activities may also constitute a fair use.

5.3 The four factors
When determining whether a particular use is fair, the Copyright Act lists
four factors that shall be considered. These are:

△△
△△△△
△△

The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes
The nature of the copyrighted work
The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole, and
The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work [17 U.S.C. § 107]

The list is not comprehensive; other factors can, and have, been considered when determining whether a particular use is fair. In general, however,
most cases involving fair use focus on these four factors.
The fair-use calculation is also not mechanical. The relative importance
of each factor can vary according the specifics of a case. It is possible, for
example, for a court to conclude that one factor is fair but that the other three
are not fair, and still find that the overall use is fair.2 In general, however,
the more one can argue that one’s use is fair under each of the four factors,
the more likely it is that one’s overall use is likely to be fair.
Analysis of the fair-use case law reveals the following observations about
the content of each of the factors:

The purpose and character of the use
Acts that have a commercial or “for-profit” basis are more likely to be unfair
than educational or noncommercial acts. However, the commercial purpose
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of a use is not determinative; many commercial reproductions have been
found to be fair (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music). Indeed, the very list of presumptive fair-use activities—such as criticism and news reporting—often
take place in the context of profit-making enterprises. Nor is educational
use similarly determinative. Just because a use is educational does not make
it automatically fair.
Acts that have a “transformative” effect, in that they add value or create
something different, are more likely to be fair than those that do not (Blanch
v. Koons).3 Yet purely reproductive uses are not automatically ruled out, as
the statutory mention of multiple copies for classroom use makes clear.
Productive or socially beneficial uses are more likely to be found to be fair.

Nature of the work
The use of factual works and scholarly works is more likely to be fair than
the use of highly creative or original works, since copyright protects original
expression and not facts (Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises).
The use of published works (as opposed to unpublished works) is more likely
to be fair (though an amendment to the Act in 1992 made it clear that that
the unpublished nature of a work did not automatically exclude it from
fair-use consideration). Some argue that the commercial availability of a
work augurs against a finding of fair use, whereas its unavailability in the
marketplace may argue for a finding of fair use.

Amount and substantiality
The greater the amount taken, the less likely the use is fair. In addition, if
the heart of the work is taken, even if it is a small amount, the use is unlikely
to be fair (Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises).

Market impact
A use is less likely to be fair when it serves as substitute for the original or
supplants the work’s “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets.” Offering a version of the work that can substitute for the purchase of
the original is unlikely to be a fair use. An easy method of licensing the use
of the work may weigh against a finding of fair use (American Geophysical
v. Texaco).
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To repeat, none of these factors is decisive. The four statutory factors should
not “be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the
results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright” (Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose). Reproducing an entire work can be fair, depending on the nature
of the work, the purpose of the use, and so forth. Commercial uses can be
fair, and educational uses can be unfair. Reasonable people can certainly
disagree on what constitutes fair use, as the presence of dissenting opinions
in most Supreme Court decisions involving fair use attest.

Did You Know?
Judge Pierre Leval, one of the foremost theorists on the nature and
role of fair use, and yet who has seen many of his own decisions subsequently overturned by higher courts, had this to say on fair use:
I will tell you that I have found it instructive and exhilarating
to be involved at the cutting edge of the law even though my
presence at the cutting edge was in the role of the salami.4

5.4 Fair-use examples
There have been few cases on fair use involving cultural heritage institutions, but some recent developments involving commercial users may be
instructive.

Visual catalogs
Two recent cases have considered the status of search engines that present
results as thumbnail images, rather than text. At issue was whether the creation of these thumbnails infringed the rights of the copyright owners of the
underlying images. These cases may be instructional for institutions creating online databases, especially (although not exclusively) of visual works.
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft, the plaintiff (Kelly) was a professional photographer whose images were available on his own and other authorized
Web sites. Arriba operated a search engine that crawled the Web looking
for images, copied those images (at small scale) onto its server, and then
made those thumbnails available as part of the results of a search. The
search results linked back to the full-size images on the original Web sites,
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though framed within Arriba’s Web page. Arriba argued that its actions
were permitted as a fair use.
How did the fair-use factors regarding Arriba’s use of thumbnail images
play out in this case?

Purpose: Arriba’s Web site was commercial (it generated revenue from
advertisements), but its creation and use of the thumbnails was transformative. It was not using the images for the same purpose that Kelly created
them (e.g., artistic expression), but rather for something new (a research
tool). Furthermore, the construction of a visual index benefited society.
This factor favored fair use.
Nature: The photographs were highly creative, but were also published and
readily available on the Internet. This factor slightly favored Kelly.
Amount: Arriba copied the entire image, but that amount was necessary in
order to meet the intended purpose—it was necessary to enable users to
identify and select interesting images. The court said this factor was neutral.
Market impact: The thumbnails did not displace the market for Kelly’s
work, but rather led people to it. It therefore did not hurt the value of his
work. This factor favored fair use.
The overall decision: Arriba’s use of thumbnails in its visual search index
was a fair use. Arriba’s practice of linking to and displaying the full-size
images within an Arriba frame was found not to be a fair use.
Many of the issues in this case were revisited in 2007 in Perfect 10 v.
Google. Perfect 10 hosted a Web site that included a “members only” area
containing photographs of naked models. Many individuals would copy
Perfect 10 images without permission and publish them on Web sites. The
images were subsequently indexed by the image search engines run by
Google, Amazon, and others. As part of the indexing process, Google would
create and store thumbnails of the images. A district court initially found
that Google’s use was infringing and granted a preliminary injunction against
Google (Perfect 10 v. Google).
On appeal (Perfect 10 v. Amazon), the injunction was lifted, with the
court concluding that Google’s use was likely to be found fair. The reasoning
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followed that in Arriba, but with one major difference. Perfect 10 argued that
the market impact in this case was much greater than in Arriba because it
had begun to market thumbnails of its images for use on cell phones. The
free availability of the thumbnails from Google could directly impact this
emerging market. The court disagreed, suggesting that until there was some
evidence of real market impact, the factor would continue slightly to favor
Google. It stressed as well the tremendous public benefit derived from the
existence of image search engines.
What can we learn from these cases? It would seem that it is possible
to create image indexes that can qualify as a fair use. Relevant to Kelly v.
Arriba Soft and Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com was the transformative nature of
the defendants’ purpose (in these cases, a tool to assist research and learning), the social benefits of such a use, the size of the images (which divested
them of much of their aesthetic quality), and the lack of demonstrated
market impact. As will be discussed further below, these arguments may
be relevant to some of the image databases created by cultural institutions.
We must emphasize, though, that as with all fair-use cases, the specific
facts of a case will matter tremendously. For instance, the use of full-size
or high-resolution images may sit less comfortably in a fair-use analysis
than use of thumbnails.

Tip
Fair-use decisions are never fixed in stone. As circumstances and
facts change, the fair-use analysis can also change. What is a fair use
today may not be tomorrow—and vice versa. That means that one
needs to monitor developments in this area even after the original
analysis is made.

Textual indexes
The Arriba and Perfect 10 cases addressed visual search engines. At one
point it seemed that the legality of textual search engines would be debated
in Authors Guild v. Google, which challenged whether Google’s Library Book
Search program is a fair use.5 For the program Google scanned, without the
permission of their copyright owners, copyrighted works found in libraries. It then used the scans to make an index of the content of the books.
When users search these books, they were presented with a “snippet” of
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the original—a few lines around the search term—along with links to
library catalogs and book dealers. Google maintained that its use of the
books was fair.
A group of publishers and authors disagreed and filed suit against Google.
The question that faced the court in this case was similar to the questions
raised in Arriba and Perfect 10. Google’s purpose was commercial, but
it was also transformative in constructing an index. The scanned works
are a combination of factual and creative works, but they are also all published. The entire work was reproduced, but that was necessary in order to
construct the index, and only a tiny amount was displayed to users. The
possible market harm to publishers was the loss of licensing revenues that
they could have theoretically charged Google to conduct this indexing or
by providing this sort of service in some other way. Weighing against this
was the impossibility of Google ever being able to identify and locate all of
the copyright owners of the works.
Late in 2008, before the court could consider the arguments, Google and
the plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement.6 Even though it maintained
that its fair-use argument was strong, Google felt that a settlement offered
it more benefits. Under the terms of the settlement, Google’s indexing is
permitted. In addition, it can deliver the full text of books rather than just
snippets—something it could only do with the permission of the copyright
owners. If the settlement is accepted by the court, we will never learn whether
Google’s initial digitization program constituted copyright infringement.

Transformative uses
In Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Limited, the defendants
published a book about the rock group the Grateful Dead. The book
included seven small-scale images of concert posters and tickets, copyright in which was owned by the Archives. The publishers and Archives
had been negotiating for a license but could not agree on an appropriate
fee. The publishers nevertheless published the book with the images and
the Archives instituted legal proceedings. The publishers sought a motion
for summary judgment (on the basis of fair use), which was granted. The
Archives appealed, but the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the lower
court.
Although the Court considered the four factors sequentially, there was
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much repetition of ideas—and the findings in one factor clearly influenced
determinations in others.

Purpose: The Court held that the transformativeness of the work was crucial
to the analysis of the first factor. This factor favored the publishers, due to
the nature of the book (a biographical account of the history of the group),
and the difference between this purpose and that of the original images
(promotion and artistic expression).
Nature: This factor weighed slightly in favor of the copyright owners,
given that the underlying works were creative. However, the Court also
downplayed the importance of this factor, given the transformative use of
the publishers.
Amount: Although the posters and tickets had been reproduced in their
entirety, this was both necessary (given the publisher’s purpose) and performed at low resolution (which meant that the images could not be used
for their original, aesthetic purpose).
Market impact: Much of the argument on the fourth factor related to the
market for images appearing in books. The Archives argued there was an
established market for the licensing of such images. However, the Court
distinguished between a traditional, reasonable market, and a transformative market, concluding that “a copyright holder cannot prevent others from
entering fair use markets merely ‘by developing or licensing a market for
parody, news reporting, educational or other transformative uses of its own
creative work.’”7 Thus, this factor did not favor the Archives.
This case is significant for cultural institutions for a number of reasons.
First, it illustrates the current fascination with the importance of transformativeness in the fair-use analysis. Although the statute cites exact reproduction as a possible fair use (“multiple copies for classroom use”), most
recent court decisions have focused on transformative uses. The result is
that it may be much harder to establish that the digitization program of
a cultural institution that reproduces exactly works in its collection is a
fair use.
On a more positive note, the decision demonstrates the significance of
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resolution or image size in assessing the amount taken; it is not merely a
question the area of the work copied. Finally, the analysis of the fourth factor
suggests that the mere presence of a licensing system is not determinative
on whether fair use applies. Indeed, it was not fatal to the publisher’s fairuse argument that it had originally requested a license.

5.5 Fair-use guidelines
In the absence of statutory certainty regarding the boundaries of fair use, a
number of efforts to establish formal guidelines governing the application
of fair use have been undertaken. Some have been developed by specific
user communities and others by coalitions composed of representatives of
copyright owners and users. None have the force of law, though three have
been at least recognized by Congress:

△△△△
△△

Classroom copying of books and periodicals8
Educational uses of music9
Off-Air Recording of Broadcast Programming for Educational Purposes10

In the 1990s, the Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) was convened to
try to develop fair-use guidelines for the digital age. Draft guidelines were
developed in a number of areas:

△△△△
△△△△

Digital Images
Electronic Reserves
Distance Learning
Multimedia Development

Final agreement on the guidelines could not be reached, however.11
Only the multimedia guidelines, which had been begun prior to the start
of CONFU, have found a life through the endorsement of the Consortium
of College and University Media Centers (CCUMC).12
The failure of the CONFU process highlighted some of the inherent
problems with formal guidelines.13 First, although the guidelines are often
supposed to represent a minimum standard for fair use—what everyone can
agree is fair—they often end up becoming a de facto maximum stipulation;
no one is willing to do more, even though doing more may still be fair. For
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example, the guidelines on classroom photocopying set numerical limits
on the amount that can be photocopied:
(a) Either a complete article, story, or essay of less than 2,500
words, or (b) an excerpt from any prose work of not more than
1,000 words or 10 percent of the work, whichever is less, but in
any event a minimum of 500 words.
[Each of the numerical limits stated in “a” and “b” above may
be expanded to permit the completion of an unfinished line of
a poem or of an unfinished prose paragraph.]

Many institutions have adopted these guidelines as the maximum that
can be photocopied for classroom use, rather than as merely an amount
that all would agree is clearly a fair use. Academic books normally run 400
to 600 words per page, meaning that you can copy entire articles or essays
when they are 5–6 pages in length, or 2–3 pages from a longer work. (Some
academic publishing runs as high as 1,000 words per page, which means
that you could only copy complete articles that were 2½ pages long.) The
inappropriateness of these limitations for classroom teaching is one reason that both the American Association of University Professors and the
Association of American Law Schools strongly opposed the guidelines at
the time they were promulgated. Many institutions, realizing that the recommended limits were not useful, settled on the 10 percent guideline, but
without realizing that it only applies if the total amount copied was less than
1,000 words.
The second problem with guidelines is that they do not necessarily correspond to the use one wants to make. Many of the guidelines, for example,
address situations involving classroom teaching. They cannot be used if one
is hoping to digitize materials for general access via the Internet.
The newest attempts at fair-use guidelines have come from the communities themselves. Groups of documentary filmmakers, working under
the auspices of the Center for Social Media at American University and
without the involvement of commercial rights owners, developed the
“Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use.”14 The
filmmakers thought about what uses others should be able to make of their
films, as well as what uses they wanted to make of the work of others, and
wrote their best-practices statement accordingly. The Center’s “Code of Best
Practices in Fair Use for Online Video” was developed by a panel of experts
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drawn from cultural scholarship, legal scholarship, and legal practice.15
These guidelines may represent a new direction for the future development
of guidelines, which seemed dead after the collapse of the CONFU process.

Tip
Guidelines may only define the minimum level of use that is fair, but
they can still be helpful in at least three ways:

△△
△△
△△

If your proposed use falls within the guidelines, you can rest more
easily that it is not an infringement of copyright.
You can use the guidelines to identify, reassess, and confirm the
reasonableness of your fair-use arguments when your proposed
use exceeds what is found in them.
In a risk assessment (see Chapter 10), any use that far exceeds the
guidelines is more likely to anger copyright owners and hence increase your risk—even if you conclude that your proposed use is fair.

5.6 Fair use and cultural institutions
The fair-use exemption is extremely important to cultural institutions
and their patrons. In spite of the seeming ambiguity in the law, libraries,
archives, and museums use it every day to serve their clientele and fulfill
their missions.
First, fair use is the basis on which much copying for patrons is done.
As we will see in the next chapter, there are provisions that allow libraries
and archives to copy textual work for users. Pictorial, graphic, and photographic works are excluded from those provisions, however. Thus, every
time a repository copies a copyrighted photograph for a patron to support
their study, scholarship, or research, that repository relies on fair use (even
if it does not conduct a formal fair-use analysis).
In addition, fair use is the justification for much of the preservation
activities in cultural heritage institutions. There is no general provision in
copyright law that permits libraries and archives to reproduce and preserve
published material. The House of Representatives, however, in response to
the threat of loss posed by motion pictures on nitrate film stock, concluded
that “the making of duplicate copies for purposes of archival preservation
certainly falls within the scope of ‘fair use.’”16
Fair use can also be used in the copyright management strategies
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developed for certain digitization projects by cultural heritage institutions.
A visual catalog or textual index of material, for example, may be an acceptable fair use (see the discussion of the Arriba Soft and Google cases above).
Supplanting the market for the original by making a full copy available may
be a fair use if the copyright owner cannot be found (see the discussion in
Chapter 8). Fair use can be an important part of the digitization program of
any cultural heritage institution—but only if the program careful assesses
each situation and is willing to assume the risk inherent in using fair use.
More on minimizing risks is found in Chapter 9.

Tip
Document your fair-use analysis
Any time you rely upon fair use as a justification for an action, it is
important to document your analysis. How to do this, and the reasons
for doing so, are discussed further in Chapter 9.

5.7 Educational performances
The Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization (TEACH) Act
of 2002 expanded the ability of educators at nonprofit institutions and at
government agencies to display and perform copyrighted digital works in
their teaching. Specifically, the TEACH Act created new exemptions to copyright that allow educators and government agencies to digitize copyrighted
works in certain narrow, carefully defined, circumstances.
Even prior to the passage of the TEACH Act, Section 110 of the Copyright
Act contained an exemption that allowed educators to display and perform
any copyrighted work during the course of face-to-face teaching in a classroom in a nonprofit educational institution. There was also a provision that
would allow the synchronous transmission of instruction through cable or
satellite television to another classroom.
The TEACH Act amended Section 110(2) of the Copyright Act to permit the use of digital technology for the transmission and to remove the
requirement that the use of the material had to be concurrent with a
classroom lecture. There are a number of requirements that institutions
and government bodies that wish to utilize the TEACH Act exemption
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must meet. For example, use of the material is still restricted to mediated
instructional activities. Schools must take measures to try to protect the
material from downstream reproduction. They must limit access to the
material to students enrolled in a class. And they must also have copyright
education programs in place.17
Assuming that the basic requirements of the TEACH Act are met, educational institutions may make copyrighted work available in digital form.
They may even digitize material that is not already available in digital form
in a format free from technological protection measures [17 U.S.C. § 112(f)].
The type of works, the amount that can be digitized and delivered, and the
amount of time that the institution may keep the work on its servers are
all limited, however.
Works and uses in digital form that are permitted by Section 110(2)
include:

△△
△△
△△

The performance of an entire nondramatic literary or musical work
(such as reading a poem or playing a symphony)
The performance of a limited and reasonable portion of any other work
(such as a film or play)
The display of any work in an amount comparable to what would be
used during the course of a live classroom session.

Any copies made under the TEACH Act can only be retained and used
by the institution or government body solely in support of instruction
authorized by the TEACH Act. One cannot, for example, digitize material for use in a specific course and then later decide to make it generally
available on a Web site. Certain uses, such as creating electronic reserves
or course packets for a course, are not eligible for TEACH Act exemptions
[17 U.S.C. § 110(11)]

Key Point
The exemptions to copyright found in the TEACH Act are not broad
enough to support a general program of digitization. For those nonprofit institutions and government bodies primarily interested in using
digitization to support mediated instruction, however, the TEACH Act
exemptions may be of great value and should be explored.
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5.8 Other exemptions
Given the broad range of activities undertaken by cultural institutions,
it is possible that many of the Copyright Act’s other exemptions to and
limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners may be of interest.
A museum with a café, for example, might want to know about the exemptions for the performance of music in food establishments in Section 110.
Another repository might be interested in using the exemption for mechanical reproductions of musical works to create its own CDs. It is not possible
in these guidelines to cover all of the limitations. Two, however, are worthy
of brief discussion.

Photographs of architectural works

Cesar Pelli, Reagan National Airport,
Washington, D.C.
Photograph: D.B. King
License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.0
Generic for the photograph; no permission
needed for the structure
Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/
bootbearwdc/87386298/

With most copyrighted works, reproduction in photographs or other pictorial representations would be an infringement of copyright. With architectural works, however, it is not an infringement of copyright to photograph
the work if it is visible from a public place [17 U.S.C. § 120]. A cultural
heritage institution would be able, for example, to digitize a photograph
of the Reagan National Airport terminal in Washington, D.C., designed by
Cesar Pelli without worrying about whether doing so would infringe on
the architect’s copyrights. (They would, of course, still have to consider the
photographer’s copyright.)
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Tricky Question
Do photographs of public works of sculpture
infringe copyright?
The law is explicit that one can take photographs of architectural
works when they can be viewed from public spaces, but what about
works of sculpture? This issue was at the heart of a 2006 lawsuit, Di
Modica v. North Fork. Sculptor Arturo Di Modica sued Wal-Mart, North
Fork Bank, and eight other defendants for using pictures of the sculpture of a bull that he created. He placed the sculpture in Wall Street,
where it has become the unofficial symbol of New York’s financial
prowess. The Copyright Act does not have an explicit limitation on
the rights of copyright owners of public statues similar to the limitation on the rights of architects. Many commentators hoped the case
might settle the issue of whether public sculpture was legally similar
to public architecture,18 but the case was voluntarily dismissed in
2008 before a decision was reached.

Arturo Di Modica, Charging Bull.
Photograph: David Prior
License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic for the photograph. Fair use asserted for the reproduction of the sculpture.
Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/davidprior/125263215/

First sale projection rights
The second limitation of possible utility is found in Section 109. This section,
encompassing what is commonly referred to as the “first sale doctrine,” is of
fundamental importance. It makes clear that transferring a legally acquired
copy of a work to another individual by sale or lending is not an infringement of the distribution rights of the copyright owner. Without Section
109, libraries could not lend books and individuals could not give a copy of
a book to a friend because this would amount to distribution.
One little-used provision of the section allows the owner of the work
to display or project the work one image at a time to viewers at the place
where the item is located. “Projection” was used deliberately; Congress
wanted to make sure that only the display, and not the reproduction right,
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was implicated. It was worried about the “the potentialities of the new
communications media, notably television, cable and optical transmission devices, and information storage and retrieval devices, for replacing
printed copies with visual images.”19 Nevertheless, it might be possible to
develop a system that would mimic the right to display a single copy of a
work at the place where it is located, and thus utilizing the protection found
in Section 109(c).

5.9 Sovereign immunity
Most of the exemptions listed above limit the scope of the exclusive rights
granted to copyright owners in such a way that the use of the exemption is
not an infringement of copyright. The doctrine of sovereign immunity can
also protect against the damages associated with copyright infringement,
but via a different method.
Thanks to the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has ruled that
state and tribal governments and their component units such as a state
university are immune from intellectual property suits (Marketing Information Masters Inc. v. The Board of Trustees of the California State University).
The issue of whether an actual infringement has occurred is moot; a state
unit cannot be sued in Federal court for damages for infringement if it does
not want to be sued.
Does this mean that state and tribal agencies and units can engage in
rampant copyright infringement? We would recommend against it, both
on ethical and legal grounds. State entities cannot be sued for monetary
damages, but they are subject to injunctive relief. Furthermore, there is
some case law that suggests that government employees can be sued in their
private capacity for copyright infringement that they oversee or undertake
in their official role, even when their employer is immune. Furthermore,
most state liability regulations will not allow the state to defend an employee
who engages in illegal acts. The whole weight of a copyright-infringement
lawsuit could therefore rest on the personal shoulders of the employee who
made the reproduction.
Sovereign immunity can be important in the assessment of risk (see
Chapter 9). Before deciding to utilize its immunity from prosecution as
a basis for a digitization program, employees of state-owned and operated
cultural institutions would do well to consult with their legal advisers.
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The Libraries and Archives
Exemptions

6.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the operation of the explicit exemptions for libraries and archives found in the Copyright Act. Most of these exemptions are
contained in Section 108: “Limitations on exclusive rights: Reproduction
by libraries and archives.” The Section 108 provisions allow libraries and
archives to reproduce collection items in certain specific circumstances
without payment to or without the permission of the copyright owner. The
provisions also prescribe when these reproductions can be accessed by, or
supplied to, members of the public, and remove any liability libraries and
archives might have for certain acts by users.
Section 108 supplements the fair-use exemption found in Section 107
of the Copyright Act. It does so in two ways:

△△
△△

It provides some “bright line” rules that exempt certain types of reproductions by libraries and archives from infringing copyright (as opposed
to the uncertainty inherent in a fair-use analysis).
In authorizing some reproductions that would likely be found to be
infringing under a fair-use analysis, it goes beyond fair use.

Section 108 also includes explicit limits and requirements intended to
protect the interests of authors and publishers.
As discussed in section 6.2, the definition of libraries and archives in Section 108 is broad and encompasses both nonprofit and for-profit institutions
in some of its provisions. Most of the exemptions apply equally to libraries
and to archives. However, some of the provisions, such as the exemption
for interlibrary loan copying, are most likely to be of interest to libraries.
Although most of the exemptions applicable to libraries and archives are
found in Section 108, there are other exemptions for them in other sections
of the Copyright Act. These are discussed briefly at the end of this chapter.
The law also includes exemptions that apply to specific institutions. For
example, 2 U.S.C. § 170 allows the Library of Congress to reproduce certain
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television and radio programs, and 44 U.S.C. § 2117 exempts the National
Archives and Records Administration from copyright infringement for the
reproduction, display, or use of unregistered unpublished copyrighted works.
These provisions are not discussed as part of these guidelines due to their
limited relevance to other cultural institutions.
Table 6.1 summarizes the major exemptions available to libraries,
archives, and nonprofit educational institutions.

ii	Table 6.1
Major specific exemptions for cultural institutions
Libraries and archives
exemptions

User requests; interlibrary loans;
certain uses of unpublished items;
replacement copies; digitization
during the last 20 years of copyright
term. See Chapter 6.

108

Nonprofit libraries, archives,
and educational institutions

Certain circumventions of accesscontrol mechanisms

1201

Nonprofit libraries and educational institutions

Rental, lease, or lending of
phonorecords

109(b)

Nonprofit libraries

Loan of computer programs

109(b)(2)

Nonprofit scholarly,
e ducational, or religious
organizations

Importation of one copy of an audiovisual work for archival purposes or
up to five copies of other works for
archival or lending purposes

602(a)(3)

The chapter starts by discussing eligibility for the libraries and archives
exemptions. It then discusses in detail provisions of the Copyright Act
relevant to:

△△△△
△△△△
△△
△△

Preservation copying of unpublished works [17 U.S.C. § 108(b)]
Replacement copying of published works [17 U.S.C. § 108(c)]
Reproduction services for patrons [17 U.S.C. § 108(d) and (e)]
Interlibrary loan [17 U.S.C. § 109 and 108(g)(2)]
Acquisition and reproduction of television news programs [17 U.S.C. §
108(f)(3)]
Reproduction equipment in libraries [17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1)]
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Digitization of published works in their last 20 years of copyright [17
U.S.C. § 108(h)]
Libraries and archives privileges found outside Section 108.

There is also a checklist at the end of this chapter to help readers identify
whether digitization falls under an exemption in the libraries and archives
provisions, and the extent to which the public can access digitized content.

Watch This Space
In 2005, the Library of Congress convened the Section 108 Study
Group. The group was charged with reexamining the exemptions and
limitations applicable to libraries and archives under the Copyright
Act in light of the changes wrought by digital media. It was also asked
to make recommendations as to how the law might be changed to
take account more appropriately of the interests of creators, copyright holders, libraries, and archives in a manner that best serves the
national interest. Its final report, issued in 2008, contained recommendations for legislative change that could alter the shape of Section 108.1
This chapter will discuss the law as it exists in 2009, but occasional reference will be made to the recommendations in the report.

Flowchart 6.1 sets out a decision-making chart for the libraries and
archives provisions.

6.2 Eligibility
In order to take advantage of the exemptions in Section 108, libraries and
archives must meet certain ground rules laid out in Section 108(a). The first
is that the library or archives must be either: (1) open to the public; or (2)
accessible to nonaffiliated researchers working in a specialized field, even if
it is not open to the general public. This means, for example, that a library
in a for-profit business would be eligible to participate in the interlibrary
loan system authorized in Section 108—provided that it was open to its
competitors and met the other ground rules discussed below as well.
In addition to being open to the public, there may be the additional
requirement that the organization actually have a physical presence. This is
not expressly required in the words of Section 108, but could be said to arise
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	Flowchart
6.1
m

m

Digitization Under the Libraries and Archives Provisions
Identify the material you wish to
digitize: is the material copyrighted?
(See chapters 2 and 3.)

No

No copyright issues in relation to digitization of works in the public domain.

Is your institution a library or archives
according to the Copyright Act and is
No
the work you propose to digitize part of
the institution’s collection?

Your institution cannot rely on the
libraries and archives provisions of the
Copyright Act.
Options: obtain permission, or rely on
another statutory exception to infringement (e.g., fair use—see Chapter 5).

Yes

Yes

Is the work you wish to digitize
unpublished?

Yes

Are you making the copies for purposes
of preservation or deposit in another
repository?

No

Yes

Are you making the copies for purposes
of replacing a damaged, deteriorating,
lost, or stolen work, or a work in an
obsolete format?
No

You may make up to three copies of the
work. Digital copies must be used on
the premises of the library or archives.

Yes

Can an unused replacement
copy be obtained at a fair price? No
Yes

Is the work in the last 20 years of its
copyright term?

no

No

You cannot digitize under the libraries
and archives provisions of the Copyright Act.
Options: obtain permission, or rely on
another statutory exception to infringement (e.g., fair use—see Chapter 5).

Yes
Yes
Is the work subject to normal commercial exploitation, can a copy be obtained at a reasonable price, or has the copyright owner notified the Copyright Office that either of the first
two applies?
No

You may digitize the work and make it available under the libraries and archives provisions of
the Copyright Act.
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from traditional understandings of the terms “library” and “archives.” For
instance, the Senate report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act noted
that “Although online interactive digital networks have since given birth to
online digital ‘libraries’ and ‘archives’ that exist only in the virtual (rather
than physical) sense on Web sites, bulletin boards and homepages across the
Internet, it is not the Committee’s intent that Section 108 as revised apply
to such collections of information.”2 That said, a purely virtual library that
functioned as a normal library, had a professional staff, and followed the
ethical norms and best practices of librarianship, arguably could be eligible
for 108 protections.

Question
Are museums covered by the libraries and archives
exemptions?
There is no mention of museums in the wording or legislative history
of Section 108, and so one would have to conclude that museums are
not currently eligible to take advantage of these exemptions. Libraries and archives located in museums would, however, be able to use
them—assuming that they are open to the public or to specialized
researchers.
This position can be contrasted with that in Canada and Australia,
in which the equivalent libraries and archives provisions can be relied
upon by museums and galleries.3 One of the recommendations of the
108 Study Group is that at least some museums be added to the law.

There are additional ground rules that must be satisfied before reproductions and distributions can be made under the libraries and archives
exemptions. Unless a provision states otherwise:

△△△△
△△

Only a single copy may be made
The copy must be made “without any purpose of direct or indirect
commercial advantage”
Any copy must include either the copyright notice found on the original
item or, if there is no copyright notice on the item, then a general legend
stating that the work might be protected by copyright [17 U.S.C. § 108(a)]
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Tip
If your institution intends to rely on an exemption in Section 108, it
must not charge more than the actual cost of making a reproduction
of a copyrighted work. Making money on reproductions invalidates
the libraries and archives exemption, and places your institution at
risk for the penalties associated with copyright infringement.

Tip
If a copyright notice (i.e., “Copyright 1965 Jane Doe”) appears in a
work you are copying, make sure you include it on any copies you
make. If there is no copyright notice, use a general statement such as
“This work may be protected by copyright (Title 17, U.S. Code).”
If the work is in the public domain, there is no need to include the
notice.

Question
How useful is the inclusion of for-profit businesses in
the Section 108 exemption?
A court decision from 1994 suggests that the answer might be “not
very.” American Geophysical Union v. Texaco addressed copying
practices at a Texaco research facility where researchers would either
make copies of articles from technical and scientific journals themselves or receive them from Texaco’s corporate library. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit did not address the issue of whether
the actions of the library were exempt under Section 108. Instead it
explored the issue of whether the researchers’ use of the copies was
a fair use. Because the researchers were requesting the copies as part
of their employment, the Court concluded that the copies were made
for indirect commercial advantage and thus the use was not fair. As
a result, many libraries in for-profit businesses now rely upon annual
licenses from the Copyright Clearance Center for permission for much
of the copying done by their firms rather than attempting to rely on
an argument under fair use or Section 108.
Nevertheless, for business archives that are open to the general
public or to specialized researchers, the preservation and copying
provisions of Section 108 are still very important.
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In addition to conforming to the general eligibility requirements found
in Section 108(a), any copying done under 108 must be isolated and unrelated [17 U.S.C. § 108(g)]. The library or archives is not allowed to make
multiple copies of the same material when it is aware or has substantial
reason to believe that it is engaging in the related or concerted reproduction or distribution of those copies. The library or archives could not
fulfill a patron request for one chapter of a book on Monday, the next
chapter on Tuesday, and so on—that copying would not be isolated and
unrelated.

6.3 Preservation copying of unpublished works
The provisions regarding unpublished works in Section 108(b) are among
the broadest exemptions found in the section. A library or archives can
make up to three copies of any unpublished work found in its collections
for either of two purposes:

△△△△

Preservation and security
Deposit in another eligible library or archives for research use

There is no limitation on what format the reproduction may take. It
could be a photocopy, microfilm, or digital reproduction. The three-copy
restriction, found also in the section on replacement copies of published
works, was adopted in recognition of microfilming practice. Best practice in
microfilming stipulates that there should be three copies of a work made:
the camera negative, the print master, and a service copy.
There are a number of important caveats about this provision. First,
the copy must have been made solely for the purpose of preservation or
supply to another repository. Second, any copy made in digital format
must not be “otherwise distributed in that format” or “made available to
the public in that format outside the premises of the library or archives” [17
U.S.C. § 108(b)(2)]. This is discussed in further detail in section 6.5, below.
Finally, recall the general prohibition against direct or indirect commercial
advantage (i.e., the repository cannot try to make money on the sale of
the 108(b) copies) and the requirement that each copy include a copyright
notice.4

113

6.4

i Replacement copying of published works

6.4 Replacement copying of published works
Under Section 108(c), a library or archives can make up to three copies of a
published work. The copies, however, can only be made to replace a work
from the library’s collection. A work can only be replaced when the original
copy is one of the following:

△△△△
△△△△
△△

Damaged
Deteriorating
Lost
Stolen
In an obsolete format

An obsolete format is defined as one for which “the machine or device
necessary to render perceptible a work stored in that format is no longer
manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace” [17 U.S.C. § 108(c)]. An 8″ floppy disk, for example, would likely
be considered to be an obsolete format. At least as late as 2003, however,
the Copyright Office felt that whether a 5¼″ floppy disk was obsolete was
an issue that a library would have to prove in court.5
If the work in question meets one of the criteria above, the library
must also determine that “an unused replacement cannot be obtained at
a fair price.” The House Report of 1976, explaining the content of the new
Copyright Act of that year, had this to say on the search for an unused copy:
The scope and nature of a reasonable investigation to determine that an unused replacement cannot be obtained will vary
according to the circumstances of a particular situation. It will
always require recourse to commonly known trade sources in the
United States, and in the normal situation also to the publisher
or other copyright owner (if such owner can be located at the
address listed in the copyright registration), or an authorized
reproducing service.6

Assuming that a work is damaged, deteriorating, lost, stolen, or in an
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obsolete format and an unused copy cannot be obtained, then the library
or archives can make up to three copies of the original. Any such copies
must be made solely for the purpose of the replacement. Further, the copies
can be made in digital format, provided that they meet the requirements
discussed in section 6.5.

6.5 Digital preservation and replacement copies
The preservation copies of unpublished works made under Section 108(b)
and the replacement copies of published works made under Section 108(c)
can be digital. There are two restrictions on the uses that can be made of
the digital copies, however. They are:

△△△△

There can be no subsequent distribution of the digital format
The digital copy cannot be used “outside the premises of the library
or archives”

This is significant for the manner in which an institution can supply other institutions with copies of unpublished works for research use.
For example, a library that digitizes an unpublished movie for deposit in
another library may not send a digital copy on a DVD to that library. It
must instead generate an analog copy (for example, a VHS tape) and send
that. In another example, if a library made a replacement copy of a textual
work for another library, it would have to print out and send a hard copy
rather than e-mail an electronic version—even if it scanned its original to
produce the replacement copy.
Similarly, if a library made a replacement copy of a published audio CD,
it would not be able to lend that CD to patrons (even though it could have
lent the original). Instead, it would have to make a cassette copy for loan,
since there can be no further distribution of the digital copy.
There is no definition of what constitutes “premises,” but most analysts
assume that this restricts use to a specific library building. Remember, too,
the three-copy limit. If the library has one copy on a server and one copy
on a backup tape, then only one patron at a time would be able to generate
a third copy by copying the server copy to a local machine.
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Question
Can I legally make a backup copy of a movie published
on VHS tape or on a DVD?
Not using Section 108. The replacement copy provision in Section
108(c) only applies if a work is already damaged, deteriorating, lost,
stolen, or on an obsolete format. All media are always to some extent
deteriorating, but the Copyright Office has argued that the law
presumes that the damage must be greater than what is inherent in
the format—otherwise, the exception would swallow the rule and all
works would be considered to meet the standard.7
Some would argue that a different statutory exemption, most
likely fair use, could be used to excuse anticipatory copying. Others
would argue that since Section 117 contains explicit language permitting users to make a backup copy of software, this implies that this
right is not authorized in the other statutory exemptions. If reliance
were placed on fair use, of course the circumstances of the particular
case would be significant.

6.6 Reproductions in response to patron requests
Sections 108(d) and (e) of the Copyright Act are provisions that allow a library
or archives, without infringing copyright, to respond to requests from users
to be provided with reproductions of either all or part of copyrighted works
that are held in the institution’s collection.
Flowchart 6.2 sets out the structure of Sections 108(d) and (e).
There are numerous requirements and exclusions that must be addressed
before a copy can be made for a patron using Sections 108(d) and (e).

Eligible works
Any copyrighted work can be reproduced using the preservation exemption
for unpublished works found in Section 108(b) and the replacement provisions for published works found in Section 108(c). In contrast, only certain
types of works can be reproduced for patrons using the provisions found
in Sections 108(d) and (e). Musical works, pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works are excluded from
eligibility [17 U.S.C. § 108(i)]. (See the discussion of these terms in Chapter 2.)
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	Flowchart
6.2
m

m

Request from user to be supplied with the whole or part of a
copyrighted work in the collection of the institution
Is the request for a copy of a musical work, a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, or a motion
picture or other audiovisual work other than an audiovisual work dealing with news?
No
Is the request for a portion or a substantial part or all of the work?

Yes
SUBSTANTIAL PART
or ALL

Portion
Has the user requested more than one
article from a periodical issue or contribution to a collected work?

Yes

No

No
Is the request for more than a small
part of a copyrighted work other than a
periodical or collected work?

Copy of work available at a
reasonable price?
Yes

Yes

No
Is the required notice posted and included on order
forms?
Will the copy become the property of the user?
Yes

No
No

Will the copy become the property of
the user?
Yes
No
Copies are for private study, scholarship, or research?
Yes
MAKE THE COPY! The institution may
supply the user with a reproduction of
the requested material without infringing copyright

No copy can be made under Section
108. Consider other statutory exceptions or secure permission.
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This means that copies of photographs for users cannot be made using
Sections 108(d) and (e) since they are included within “pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural” works. (An exception is made for illustrations and photographs that are part of textual works. If you are copying an article or chapter
for a patron, you can also make copies of included illustrations.) Copies of
musical sound recordings cannot be made for patrons unless the underlying scores (the musical work) are in the public domain. Copies of spoken
sound recordings such as oral histories could be made under Section 108(d)
and (e) since no musical work would be involved: see Case study 1 on oral
histories. And in a limited exception to the ban on copying audiovisual
works, audiovisual news programs such as television news broadcasts are
eligible under Sections 108(d) and (e).

Tip
The prohibition in 108(i), which excludes some types of works from the
operation of Sections 108(d) and (e) (making copies for users), refers to
musical works, not sound recordings. Thus, you cannot make a copy of
a recording of a copyrighted score or song under these provisions since
that would infringe the copyright of the underlying musical work. You
can make copies of recordings where the underlying musical work is in
the public domain—assuming the other requirements of Section 108
regarding availability, etcetera, are met.

Tip
Just because some works such as photographs cannot be copied for
patrons using Section 108 does not mean that they cannot be copied.
Consider using other statutory exemptions, in particular fair use, to
meet patron requests.

Ground rules
Regardless of whether a copy is made using Section 108(d) or (e), certain
ground rules apply. They include:

△△△△

The copyrighted work must be in the collection of the library or archives.
The copy must become the property of the user. The library or archives
cannot use this provision to make copies to add to its own collection.
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△△
△△
△△

The library or archives must have had no notice that the copy will be
used for any purpose other than “private study, scholarship, or research.”
Warning notices must be displayed on the order form and at the place
where the order is accepted.
If articles or other portions of a work are being reproduced under Section 108(d), the copying done by the libraries and archives must not be
systematic. The library, for example, cannot use Section 108 to establish
a document delivery business that advertises that it will provide copies
of articles from a set of publications.

Question
What constitutes “notice” of a use other than for
private study, scholarship, or research?
There is no clear explanation in the law of what constitutes
“notice”—in particular what forms of “constructive notice” (i.e.,
facts that would put a reasonable institution on notice) are sufficient. The repository, therefore, will have to use its good judgment.
Consider, for example, these two scenarios in which a library or
archives is faced with the question of whether it should make a
copy:

△△

A film producer asks for a copy of an unpublished script.
Later she films a performance of the dramatic work contained
in the script without the permission of the copyright owner.
Just because someone is a film producer does not necessarily mean that she cannot also be engaged in private study or
research. Without some evidence that the producer wished to
use the requested copy for something other than private study
or research, the copying would seem to be permitted under
Section 108.

△△

A scholar asks for a high-resolution scan of a document for
publication in his latest book.
This would seem to constitute notice that the copy was going to
be used for something other than private study, scholarship, or
research. The institution has three options:
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▼▼

Make the copy, but explain that it is only for private study,
scholarship, or research, and that any other use requires the
permission of the copyright owner.
Use an exemption to copyright other than Section 108 to
make the copy for the patron.
Refuse to make the copy until the scholar provides a letter
granting permission.

Which option the repository should follow is dependent on the
level of risk they are willing to assume. Note that charging a publication permission fee would greatly increase one’s risk—it is hard to
argue that one had no notice that the copy was going to be used for
a purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research if one is
charging for publication.

Two different warning notices are specified in the law. First, the library
or archives must display prominently at the place where orders are accepted
a “display warning of copyright.” Second, the institution must include an
“order warning of copyright” on its reproduction order forms. The text to
be used in the two notices is specified in 37 C.F.R. § 201.14:

Notice warning concerning copyright restrictions
The copyright law of the United States (title 17, United States Code)
governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives
are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of
these specific conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not
to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or
research.” If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or
reproduction for purposes in excess of “fair use,” that user may be liable
for copyright infringement.
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying
order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.

120

Reproductions in response to patron requests

i 6.6

The Display Warning of Copyright must be printed on heavy paper or
other durable material in type at least 18 points in size, and must be displayed
prominently, in such manner and location as to be clearly visible, legible,
and comprehensible to a casual observer within the immediate vicinity of
the place where orders are accepted. An Order Warning of Copyright must
be printed within a box located prominently on the order form itself, either
on the front side of the form or immediately adjacent to the space calling
for the name or signature of the person using the form. The notice must be
printed in type size no smaller than that used predominantly throughout the
form, and in no case can the type size be smaller than 8 point. The notice
shall be printed in such manner as to be clearly legible, comprehensible,
and readily apparent to a casual reader of the form.8

Amount
Section 108(d) authorizes the making of a reproduction of a small portion
of a copyrighted work: an article from a journal, a chapter from a collection
of essays, or a similar small portion of any other work.
Section 108(e) authorizes the making of a reproduction of a substantial
portion or all of a work. In order to make such a copy, the library or archives
must first determine, based on a reasonable investigation, that a copy of the
work cannot be obtained at a fair price. Note that there is no requirement
that the copy be unused, as is found in 108(c); if there is a used copy available
on the market at a fair price, the library or archives cannot make the copy.

Tip
We normally think of a single letter or memo in a collection as being a
small part of that collection. In copyright terms, however, each document
is likely to be an entire copyrighted work. Making a copy of a letter for a
patron, therefore, is making a copy of an entire work and would fall under the provisions of Section 108(e). The law requires that the library or archives first conduct a reasonable investigation to determine that a copy
cannot be found at a fair price before making a copy of that letter.
In practice, most archives have assumed that the unpublished
letters found in their collections are unique and that therefore the reasonable investigation can end before it even starts. There are a variety
of materials found in manuscript and archival collections, however.
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Many of the items included in collections may not be unique. Libraries and archives should not automatically assume, therefore, that
they can reproduce anything in a manuscript collection without first
conducting a reasonable search for copies.

Question
Is the reproduction of unpublished works for patrons
authorized by Section 108?
Most archivists would assume that the answer to this question is yes.
In 1983, however, the Register of Copyright issued a report on Section
108 that suggested that the law did not authorize the reproduction
of unpublished works for patrons, in spite of the clear stipulation in
the law that copying could be done by “libraries and archives” (which
presumably consist primarily of unpublished items).9
The archival community strenuously opposed this reading of the
law,10 and it has seldom resurfaced since. Still, it is a valuable reminder
that even acts that seem clearly to be permitted may pose some risk.

Format
Sections 108(d) and (e) are technology neutral. Assuming that all of the
requirements of the sections are met, the reproductions made by the repository for the patron can be in any format, including digital.

Question
Can patrons give copies made for them to other
institutions?
The law stipulates that when a library or archives makes a copy of a
copyrighted work for a patron, it may not keep a copy for itself; the
copy has to become the property of the user. The goal is to ensure
that libraries do not avoid purchasing additional copies of journals
and books by retaining copies of items reproduced for patrons.
A copy made for a patron under Section 108 is a legal copy of the
copyrighted work, however. This means that all of the rights found in
Section 109 that are available to the owner of a legal copy of a work
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are available to the user who requested the copy from the library. This
includes the right to give a copy of the work to another library or
archives. Legally made copies, even in digital form, can be given to
another institution by the patron of the first institution.

Interlibrary Loans
Section 108(d) presupposes that a patron makes a request for a copy directly
to the library or archives holding the original. Many users, however, request
copies through the interlibrary loan (ILL) system in which one library requests
on behalf of one of its users a copy of a portion of a work held by a different
library. Such behavior could be construed as systematic copying, which is
forbidden under this section. Therefore, Section 108(g)(2) was added to the
law to make it clear that ILL activities are permitted so long as the use of ILL
does not substitute for the subscription to or purchase of a work.
The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU), which was created by Congress to explore issues related
to copyright and new technologies, created guidelines that govern ILL activity.11 At the heart of the guidelines is the “rule of 5”: in any calendar year, a
library may request up to 5 articles from the previous 5 years of any journal.
If a sixth article is requested, the library either needs to pay permission or
secure a subscription.
In addition to providing copies of portions of a work to users, ILL systems
also enable the physical loan of a book from one library to another. The loan
of a lawfully acquired copy of a book is authorized under Section 109.

Audiovisual news programs
Section 108(f)(3) permits libraries and archives to record audiovisual news
programs. The legislative history indicates that the exemption was intended
to apply to the daily newscasts of the national television networks. It may
apply to local television newscasts as well. It does not apply to documentaries, magazine-format broadcasts, or other public affairs broadcasts dealing
with subjects of general interest to the viewing public.12
Libraries and archives are allowed to lend copies of the recorded broadcasts to users. There is no mention of format, and so the copies could be
digital or on tape. Unlike copies of textual materials, which must become
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the property of the user, copies of news recordings can only be lent to
users. Performance of the broadcasts, either over the air or by streaming,
is prohibited. So, too, is the sale of copies of the broadcasts.
If copies of audiovisual news programs have been acquired legally by
means other than recording by the library or archives itself, then those copies can be treated the same as any textual item, and copies can be made for
patrons just as if it was an article or entire book (with the same restrictions
on copying described above). Section 108(i) stipulates that audiovisual news
programs are eligible for all 108 exemptions.

Unsupervised reproduction equipment
In Chapter 4’s discussion of indirect copyright infringement, the question
was raised whether the actions of users on institution-provided photocopiers
and other reproduction equipment could place a library or archives at risk.
For instance, in a major Australian case in the 1970s, a library was held to
have authorized copyright infringement by providing self-service photocopiers for use by patrons.13 In the United States, Section 108(f)(1) makes
the issue moot by absolving the institution of any liability arising from the
unsupervised use of equipment “located on its premises,” provided that
“such equipment” displays a warning of copyright. In theory, this exemption would appear to extend to the user’s own equipment, too, since the law
states that the equipment must be “located on the premises,” and not that
the library must own it. Of course, it could be argued that one would have
to place the warning label on the user’s equipment to comply fully with the
requirements of the section.

Digitization of published works in their last 20 years of copyright
There is in Section 108 one provision that allows libraries and archives to
digitize and make freely available on the Internet copyrighted works. Unlike
the rest of the exemptions in 108, it is also available to nonprofit educational
institutions that function like libraries or archives.
Section 108(h) allows libraries and archives to reproduce (including in
digital form), distribute, and perform copyrighted works. The works can be
in any format: textual, pictorial, sound, or audiovisual. There are, however,
many important limitations on this right:
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△△△△

The work must be published.
It must be in its last 20 years of copyright term. If, for example, the work
has a 95-year term, then during years 75 to 95 of that term, a library or
archives could digitize the work and make it available. See Table 6.2.

In addition, the library or archives must conduct a reasonable investigation in order to determine if any of the following apply. If they do, Section
108(h) will not apply:

△△
△△△△

The work is subject to normal commercial exploitation (i.e., that it is
“in print” or being licensed)
A copy can be obtained at a fair price
The copyright owner has informed the Copyright Office that either of
the first two conditions is true

Section 108(h) enables the kind of digitization that is of interest to most
libraries and archives. The limitation concerning the availability of copies is
substantial, however. Unlike Section 108(c), which mandates a reasonable
search for unused copies, Section 108(h) stipulates that the search must
be for a copy, implying that the copy can be new or used. And thanks to
metasearch services such as AddAll.com, Bookfinder.com, and Vialibri.net, it
is possible to find a copy of many books available for purchase. Furthermore,
the question of what constitutes a reasonable investigation and what is a
fair price are matters that could be the subject of litigation. Nevertheless,
108(h) represents the clearest and most generous digitization option for
copyrighted works available to libraries and archives.

ii	Table 6.2
When Works can be Digitized by Libraries and Archives using
Section 108(h)14
Current Date

2009 2010 2011

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Date of Publication
of Eligible Works:
1923–32,
plus these years

1933

1936 1937

1934

1935

1938

1939 1940 1941
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6.7 Libraries and archives privileges found outside

Section 108

Most of the exemptions for libraries and archives are found in Section 108,
but specific exemptions for libraries and archives are found in other places in
the Copyright Act. Most, however, are of limited utility in digitization projects.
The most important exemption has already been mentioned: Section
109, or the “first sale” doctrine, which allows libraries to display and loan
physical items found in their collections. Section 109(b)(1)(a) contains an
exemption specific to libraries and nonprofit educational institutions that
allows them to rent or lend copies of “phonorecords” (meaning any physical
object on which sounds are recorded)—actions that are otherwise forbidden
by law. (This is why one can rent a DVD from a video store but cannot rent
a musical CD from a music store.) Similarly, 109(b)(2)(a) allows nonprofit
libraries to lend computer programs if a warning label is attached to the
packaging containing the program.
Section 602(a)(3) grants an exemption to the general prohibition forbidding the unauthorized importation into the United States of copyrighted
works acquired abroad. For example, if a work has authorized American and
English distributors, it would be illegal to acquire copies from the English
supplier for distribution in the United States. Nonprofit organizations operated for scholarly, educational, or religious purposes, however, are allowed to
import one copy of an audiovisual work such as a movie “solely for its archival
purposes.” They can also import no more than five copies or phonorecords
of any work other than a movie for its library lending or archival purposes.

Key Point
It will come as a surprise to many librarians that the very common
practice of importing from abroad for the lending collection copies of
movies unavailable for purchase in the United States is of questionable legality. It is illustrative of a point made more fully in Chapter 10:
namely, that cultural institutions have often knowingly or unknowingly
skirted the letter of the law in order to serve their patrons and society.
They have done so at little risk to themselves. No library has yet been
prosecuted for lending to a patron a copy of a movie purchased abroad.
The digitization of library collections should be approached in the
same way. Everyone needs to know the letter of the law (something
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these guidelines are intended to convey), but each library also needs
to determine the risks and benefits involved in any planned digitization project. A project may be technically illegal but present no more
risk to the institution than importing a movie from overseas for the
circulating collection.

Section 1201(d) permits nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational
institutions to circumvent access-control measures on a work for the sole
purpose of determining whether it wants to acquire a copy of that work.
In reality, of course, any library interested in evaluating a work with access
controls would arrange a trial with the publisher rather than attempting
to “hack” through the protection measures on its own. Section 1203(c)(5)
(b) requires that courts waive the penalties for anticircumvention when it
finds that a nonprofit library, archives, educational institution, or public
broadcasting entity unknowingly violated the anticircumvention provisions
of Section 1201 or the requirements to maintain copyright management
information found in Section 1202. Section 1204(b) removes all criminal
liability for these actions.

6.8 Checklist for libraries and archives provisions

ɉɉ Is my institution a “library” or “archives”?
No definition of “library.”
ɉɉ Library
Some provisions do not apply to libraries in

108(a)

for-profit entities.

ɉɉArchives

No definition of “archives.”
108(a)
Some provisions do not apply to libraries in
for-profit entities.

libraries
ɉɉ"Virtual”
and archives

More than just a Web site, bulletin board, or S. REP.
online collection of information.
No.
105–19015

ɉɉ Does my institution meet the “ground rules” for eligibility?
to the public;
ɉɉAccessible
single copies made;
ɉɉ Only
contain © notice; and
ɉɉ Copies
No direct or indirect commercial
ɉɉ advantage.

108(a)
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ɉɉ Is digitization permitted by the libraries and archives provisions?
ɉɉ Preservation Unpublished works.
in another Unpublished works for research use. Copy
ɉɉ Deposit
institution
provided cannot be digital.

108(b)
108(b)

ɉɉ Replacement

Any published work that is damaged, deteri- 108 (c)
orating, lost, stolen, or in an obsolete format
when the original was in the collection and
no unused copy can be purchased.

ɉɉ Web site use

Published works in their last 20 years of
copyright that are not commercially available. Musical works; pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works; and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works (other than an
audiovisual news programs) are excluded.

requests and
ɉɉ User
interlibrary loans

Articles from periodicals; essays from books; 108(d),
entire works.
108(e)

ɉɉ Can the public access electronic or digitized content?
copies
Can be made accessible on the Web.
ɉɉ Digital
made during the

108(h),
108(i)

108(h)

last 20 years of
© term

copies
Access in digital form limited to the premises 108(b),
ɉɉ Digital
made for preserva- of the library or archives
108(c)
tion or replacement purposes

requests,
ɉɉ User
interlibrary loans

Can be supplied to a user in hard copy or
electronic form.

and
ɉɉArticles
published works

Usually governed by license terms accompanying the material.

acquired in electronic form

news A digital copy on physical media can be
ɉɉAudiovisual
programs recorded loaned to users.
by the repository
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7

Copyright Permissions
and Licenses

7.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the role of permission as a means of ensuring that
a cultural institution’s activities are copyright compliant. As we have seen,
a cultural institution risks infringing copyright if it digitizes, or makes
available online, material for which it is not the owner of copyright (see
Chapter 4). In Chapters 5 and 6, we noted that there are certain statutory
exemptions to copyright infringement, in particular fair use (Section 107)
and the libraries and archives provisions (Section 108). However, many
activities performed by cultural institutions are not covered by any of these
exemptions. Instead, cultural institutions will need to obtain permission
for the intended use from the owner of copyright.
This chapter will address questions such as:

△△△△
△△△△
△△△△

What is permission? Does permission differ from a license?
What formalities are necessary for permission to be legally effective?
For instance, does it need to be in writing?
What sort of terms is it useful to have in permissions?
What terms would be appropriate in an agreement on outsourced
digitization?
What are the various forms of online licenses?
What are “Creative Commons” licenses, and how might they be relevant
to cultural institutions?

The focus in this chapter is on how one structures an agreement with a
copyright owner and what terms might be included in that agreement. The
issue of how to locate a copyright owner in order to negotiate an agreement
is discussed in Chapter 8.
In addition to securing permissions and licenses to use material in their
own digitization projects, cultural heritage institutions may wish to license
others to use collection material or other institution outputs. Detailed
analysis of the issues associated with such third-party licensing is beyond
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the scope of these guidelines, although some of the general principles
discussed here will be applicable. In addition, there are several excellent
guides to managing the intellectual property of cultural heritage institutions.1

7.2 What is permission? What is a license?
Generally
As we have seen, the Copyright Act grants the copyright owner the exclusive
right to perform certain acts. If someone other than the copyright owner
wishes to exercise one of those rights, they have two options: first, they can
invoke one of the statutory exemptions; and second, they can seek the permission of the copyright owner. Permission allows someone who is not the
copyright owner to do what would otherwise be an infringement of copyright.
Permission is normally given by granting the third party a license to use
the work. A license is merely “a permission, usu[ally] revocable, to commit
some act that would otherwise be unlawful.”2 The person who grants the
license is often called the “licensor,” and the person who is granted the
license the “licensee.” The license may be a formal document (what we
normally think of as a license), but it can also be very informal. For example,
when you give someone permission to forward to another party an e-mail
message you wrote, you are in effect granting them a license to reproduce
and distribute the work.
Licenses can apply to the entire bundle of exclusive rights included in
copyright, or just to some. For example, it is possible for a copyright owner
to license to a third party the right to reproduce a work, but retain the right
to make derivative works.
Licenses come in a variety of forms and flavors:

△△△△
△△△△
△△△△
△△△△

Exclusive versus nonexclusive
Limited versus absolute
Voluntary versus statutory/compulsory
Negotiated individually versus collectively
Paid versus free
Written versus verbal
Express versus implied
Detailed versus cursory
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The different approaches may be combined together in one license. For
example, you can have a voluntary, free, cursory, written license. Each of
the options is discussed briefly below.

Exclusive and nonexclusive licenses
Exclusive licenses are a bit of a misnomer. In the Copyright Act, the granting
of an exclusive license is the equivalent of transferring copyright ownership
of that right.3 Exclusive licenses that grant to the licensee all of the rights of
the copyright owner would in effect transfer ownership of the copyright to
the licensee. Exclusive licenses exclude any other person—including the
author or original copyright owner—from doing the acts granted in the
license. And there are only limited opportunities under the Act to revoke
an exclusive license
In most instances, cultural institutions will negotiate nonexclusive
licenses. In contrast to exclusive licenses, under nonexclusive licenses
copyright owners continue to own all copyright rights in their work. They
can continue to do any of the acts they have permitted their licensees
to do, and they can license others to do those same acts. That is, a copyright owner can negotiate multiple nonexclusive licenses permitting multiple parties to perform the same acts in relation to the same copyright
work.

Question
When is an author-friendly publishing contract not
what it seems?
We recently reviewed a publishing contract from a major scholarly
press. The contract specified that the author would retain copyright
in the work, which seemed author-friendly. The contract also stipulated, however, that the author exclusively licensed to the publisher
for the entire term of copyright two of the most important rights of
copyright: the rights to reproduce and distribute the work. Because
this was an exclusive license, the publisher became the owner of
those rights, and the author could only get them back with difficulty
(unless the publisher voluntarily reassigned them).4
The contract also stipulated that as long as the publisher kept
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the work in print, it had the exclusive right to exercise two more of
the copyright owner’s rights, namely the right to produce derivative
works and the right to perform the work publicly. The only right the
author retained was the right to display the work publicly—a right
granted to her anyway by Section 109.
The result: the author retained copyright, but for all practical
purposes in name only. The most important exclusive rights of the
copyright owner belonged to the publisher.

Limited versus absolute
Both exclusive and nonexclusive licenses may be limited in certain ways. For
example, the license may be of limited duration (e.g., for two years), only
apply in a specific territory (e.g., conduct in the United States) or only permit
certain uses of a work (e.g., one-time reproduction in a specific book of a
fixed print run). Alternatively, the license can be more expansive. It is not
uncommon, for example, to find permission granted in current contracts
“in perpetuity, in all languages, in any and all media, whether now known
or unknown, and throughout the Universe.”5

Did You Know?
For a number of years, an award-winning documentary series on the
history of the civil rights movement, Eyes on the Prize, was unavailable for purchase. When filmmaker Henry Hampton first created the
series, he drew on film and photographs from a plethora of archives as
well as many musical recordings. The owners of the still photos, video
footage, and music used in the documentary granted permission to
use the material for various lengths of time. Once their initial permissions had expired, the film had to be removed from circulation.
Fortunately, with $850,000 in grants in hand, the production
studio was able to go through the onerous process of securing new
permissions for all of the material used in the original film and it was
rebroadcast on PBS.6
When granting or securing licenses to use content, cultural
heritage institutions may want to consider the costs associated with
time-limited grants.
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Voluntary and statutory licenses
A license may be voluntary, meaning that the copyright owner has freely
granted the license to the licensee, or it may be required by copyright legislation. These compulsory licenses are commonly referred to as a “statutory
licenses.” In the case of a voluntary license, the parties are able to exercise
a degree of control over the terms of the license (for example, what acts the
licensee may perform, the duration of the license, the territory to which the
license applies, etc.). In contrast, the terms and conditions of a statutory
license are defined by law.
The Copyright Act provides for a number of statutory licensing arrangements. These include compulsory licenses or government-determined
licensing fees for:

△△
△△
△△△△
△△△△

Making and distributing new sound recordings based on existing recordings of nondramatic musical works [17 U.S.C. § 115]
Performance of nondramatic sound recordings in a jukebox [17 U.S.C.
§ 116]
Broadcast of sound recordings over the Internet [17 U.S.C. § 114]
Retransmission by cable operators of television and radio broadcasts
[17 U.S.C. § 111]
Use of certain works by public broadcasting [17 U.S.C. § 118]
Retransmission of television broadcasts by satellite carriers [17 U.S.C.
§ 119 and § 122]

The guidelines will not discuss statutory licenses in any further detail
as the existing statutory licenses are quite technical and of limited, if any,
relevance to digitization projects.

Individually and collectively negotiated licenses
Licenses can be arranged on an individual basis with copyright owners or
their agents. Agents can include literary executors and organizations that
specialize in negotiating on behalf of creators. Many of them are discussed
in Chapter 8. Certain areas (most notably music) have also endorsed collective licensing. A collective licensing organization establishes fixed fees
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for the use of copyrighted material and collects and distributes those fees
on behalf of the copyright owners. Collective licensing organizations are
discussed further in Chapter 8.

Paid and free licenses
The copyright owner may require a payment for permission to use one of
the exclusive rights, but such a payment is not required for the permission
to be legally effective. If a payment is requested, it can be through an upfront fee, through the form of ongoing fees or royalties, or both. Ongoing
fees can be calculated in a number of ways. For example, a royalty might
be payable on each sale of a product incorporating the licensed copyright
work. Alternatively, a license fee could be calculated on the number of times
a digital file is accessed, downloaded, or used.

Key Point
It is not necessary for a license fee to be paid in order for a valid
license to be created. A simple grant of permission (called a “bare
license” in legal terms) is enough to provide some protection. Many
times, however, permission is granted through the use of a contract.
To be effective and enforceable, contracts require three things: an
offer, acceptance of the offer, and some “consideration” exchanged
between the parties. Consideration is often monetary: for example,
a permission to reproduce a work in return for payment. Contracts
have certain advantages over bare licenses. Their terms, for example, are often clearer and they cannot be arbitrarily revoked (as, in
general, can a bare license that does not require any payment of
consideration).

Written and verbal
Permissions do not have to be in writing in order to be valid, and therefore
may be made verbally. Although a cultural institution may rely on an oral
agreement, this may end up causing difficulties, and written permission
should be sought wherever possible. This is because a written license is a
far better record of the existence of a license and its terms than the recollection of a staff member.
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Tip
Permission does not have to be in writing in order to be valid, but it is
far better to have written evidence. Cultural institutions may choose
to develop standard form license terms to streamline the permission
process and to ensure consistency across departments and collection
items.

Express and implied
Licenses are commonly “express,” in the sense that the terms are reviewed
and agreed to by the parties (either orally or in writing). However, license
terms may also be “implied” by “the kind of license being granted, by the
conduct of the licensor, or by the licensor’s apparent refusal to exercise
its exclusive rights to the licensed property.”7 For example, when a person
writes a letter to the editor of an opinion page in a newspaper, there is an
implied license granted to publish the letter. When viewing a Web page,
a reproduction of the HTML file is stored (at least temporarily) on your
computer; we can assume that the author of the Web page has granted an
implied license for you to make this reproduction.
It is conceivable, though not particularly likely, that a cultural institution
could argue that it has an implied license to digitize certain collection items
and then make them available on the Web. For example, an oral history project that was structured from the start to provide the widest possible access
to generated material might be able to argue that it had an implied license
from the interviewees that would allow transcripts to be made available on
a Web site. In general, however, it is far preferable for an institution to rely
on the terms of an express license rather than invoke an implied license.

Level of detail
The amount of detail in an expressed license can vary greatly. Some may
take the form of a letter. Others may take the formal structure of a contract,
but even here the differences can be great. Some licenses are just one or two
pages long; others are highly detailed and lengthy documents. A license with
very little detail can still be legally effective—as a matter of law, the main
issue is whether the licensor has granted the requisite permission (either
as a bare license, or part of a contract).
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As is discussed below, at a minimum, a license used by a cultural institution should include:

△△△△
△△△△
△△

Identification of the parties to the agreement
A description of the work to which the license applies (including the
creator and title, and any preferred form of attribution of the creator)
The date the license was made
The rights granted by the licensor
The territory and duration of the license

7.3 Negotiating licenses
Structure
As noted earlier, permissions and licenses do not need to be detailed in
order to be legally binding. In some instances, cultural institutions use short,
user-friendly agreements. These may be less than a page long.
Brief licenses often stipulate a standard set of terms, perhaps with
options to cover various situations, in the body of the agreement and then
record information particular to the transaction—such as the name of the
licensor, the title of the work, and so forth—in a schedule attached to the
end of the license.
As in discussed in detail in Part 7.4, licenses can also be highly intricate agreements. The main benefit of using a longer license is clarity and
certainty. However, such a lengthy document may be intimidating and
seem overly legalistic to some potential licensors. In contrast, short-form
licenses may be easier to deal with on a day-to-day basis. But if not properly
drafted, they may be less definitive and possibly less helpful if a dispute
arises about the license.
Cultural institutions may find it beneficial to have a number of different
standard form agreements for use in different circumstances. Which agreement
is used in any given case will depend on the nature of the work, the profession
and interests of the creator, and the proposed uses of the work. For example, a
longer agreement may be appropriate when dealing with a professional photographer selling works to a gallery, but not for a family donating snapshots
to a social history museum. Similarly, where an institution is dealing with a
key work or iconic item, it may be beneficial to use a long-form agreement in
order to gain maximum certainty regarding allowed uses.
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Rights
The clause setting out the permitted uses of the licensed work is at the core
of the license and should be given careful consideration. The permitted acts
may be described narrowly or broadly. Where descriptions are narrower,
licenses may need to be renegotiated should a new use or technology arise
(see below).
The permitted acts should take into account the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner, the proposed uses of the cultural institution, and the
profession and interests of the copyright owner. The license may permit
the licensed work to be reproduced, copied, published, or communicated
for a variety of purposes, such as exhibition, promotion and advertising,
inclusion on a Web site, use in educational materials and programs, inclusion in the institution’s publications or merchandise, and so forth. In some
instances, institutions may request unremunerated licenses for noncommercial activities, and agree to negotiate separately with the copyright
owner for commercial uses.
As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, some uses of works are permitted under
statutory exemptions in the Copyright Act. However, it may be useful to
supplement these with rights under a license—such as a provision allowing
digital content to be migrated to a new format when existing software is
superseded or becomes obsolete or a right to reproduce the licensed work
for the purpose of preservation.
It is important to consider the consequences that flow from the rights
granted. For example, if the cultural institution has the right to alter, adapt,
or modify the licensed work, will it own all of the intellectual property in
the alteration, adaptation, or modification? If so, the license should include
provisions concerning further developments and improvements of the
licensed material. Similarly, does the cultural institution have the ability
to sublicense use of the work (i.e., enter into a license with a third party in
relation to the work)? And will the cultural institution need to take measures to prevent members of the public from reproducing the work (such
as banning or limiting photography)?

Management
As should be obvious by now, cultural institutions can engage in a broad
range of licensing arrangements. Each arrangement carries with it its own
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administrative burden. For example, some institutions seek nonexclusive,
royalty-free, perpetual licenses at the point of acquisition for particular
uses. These licenses commonly permit noncommercial activities and bypass
some of the administrative difficulties involved in retrospectively obtaining
copyright licenses for collection items. At times, however, the institutions
may have to enter into other types of licenses. These may be of fixed duration or only relate to use in a particular project (e.g., a license that permits
a copy of a movie to be used in an exhibition). Should the licensee desire
to extend the duration of the use beyond the term of the license, or should
the licensee wish to use the copyright material for a different purpose, the
license may need to be renegotiated.

Tip
It is important to have a good management system in place in relation
to copyright licenses, particularly those of fixed duration. For example,
if a cultural institution is granted a two-year license to publish a
certain image on a Web site, it is important that the institution knows
when the license expires so that the license can be renegotiated or
the image removed. If this process does not occur, the image on the
Web site may infringe copyright once the license lapses.

7.4 Sample licenses
Permission letters
Perhaps the simplest way to secure permission is via a simple letter to
a copyright owner seeking authorization to use a work. Kenneth Crews
while at the Copyright Management Center at Indiana University–Purdue
University at Indianapolis (IUPUI), developed a number of sample permission letters that can be adapted to any individual project; they have moved
with him to Columbia University.8 These provide a useful starting point for
cultural heritage institutions—bearing in mind that it is also important to
obtain legal advice in relation to the content of any legal documentation
(such advice being beyond the scope of guidelines such as these). Here is
the body from his model for a general permission letter:
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IUPUI Copyright Management Center
General Permissions Letter Model 9
I am in the process of creating [Describe project]. I would like your
permission to include the following material with this [Project]:
[Citation with source information]
The [Project] will be used [Describe how the project and material
will be used]. It will be accessible by [Describe users].
If you do not control the copyright on all of the above mentioned
material, I would appreciate any contact information you can give me
regarding the proper rights holder(s), including current address(es).
Otherwise, your permission confirms that you hold the right to grant
the permission requested here.
Permission includes nonexclusive world rights in all languages to
use the material and will not limit any future publications—including
future editions and revisions—by you or others authorized by you.
I would greatly appreciate your consent to my request. If you
require any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact
me. I can be reached at:
[Your contact information]
A duplicate copy of this request has been provided for your
records. If you agree with the terms as described above, please sign
the release form below and send one copy with the self-addressed
return envelope I have provided.
Sincerely,
[Signature]
[Typed name]
Permission granted for the use of the material as described above:
Name & Title:
Agreed to:
Company/Affiliation:
Date:
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This simple letter addresses most of the key elements of any permission
agreement. It identifies the parties, establishes that they are authorized to
enter into this agreement, describes the work for which permission is being
granted, gives the date permission was granted, and describes the geographic
scope of the permission. It lacks an explicit description of the duration of
the agreement, but this could be added by an institution adapting this letter. Such an institution would also want to spell out in some detail how the
digitized material will be used in order to make it clear what permissions
the licensor is conferring. For instance, if material will be made available
on the Internet, this should be expressly mentioned.
This sort of agreement is often nonthreatening to the licensor and can
usually be negotiated fairly quickly. A downside to such agreements is that
they are often very narrow in the rights they convey. Although they may
allow one to meet an immediate project goal, they are poor at anticipating
future uses of digitized content. For example, a standard permission letter
might allow a cultural institution to digitize content to display on a Web
site. At a later point, however, the cultural institution may want to do more
with that content. For example, it may want to automatically convert text
into sound, or establish a print-on-demand function, or combine the text
with other resources into a new product. Any of these activities may require
another permission letter.

Tip
Model permission letters are helpful, but every digital project manager will need to devise a customized letter based on the nature of the
material, the goals of the project, and the potential concerns of the
licensors. In drafting a letter, try to secure permission for your immediate needs as well as any future uses you may wish to make of the work.
Repeatedly returning to seek additional permissions is time-consuming, expensive, and at some point becomes counterproductive.

Brief Licenses
Many institutions rely on a formal brief license, often accompanied with
a cover letter explaining the purpose of the project, in order to secure permission. The DSpace Non-Exclusive Distribution License used by MIT is a
good example of a brief license:
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The DSpace Non-Exclusive
Distribution License 10
In order for DSpace to reproduce, translate, and distribute your submission worldwide your agreement to the following terms is necessary. Please take a moment to read the terms of this license, fill in the
information requested (and sign and submit this license to DSpace at
).
By signing and submitting this license, you (the author(s) or copyright owner) grants to Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
the non-exclusive right to reproduce, translate (as defined below),
and/or distribute your submission (including the abstract) worldwide
in print and electronic format and in any medium, including but not
limited to audio or video.
You agree that MIT may, without changing the content, translate the submission to any medium or format for the purpose of
preservation.
You also agree that MIT may keep more than one copy of this
submission for purposes of security, back-up and preservation.
You represent that the submission is your original work, and that
you have the right to grant the rights contained in this license. You
also represent that your submission does not, to the best of your
knowledge, infringe upon anyone’s copyright.
If the submission contains material for which you do not hold
copyright, you represent that you have obtained the unrestricted
permission of the copyright owner to grant MIT the rights required
by this license, and that such third-party owned material is clearly
identified and acknowledged within the text or content of the
submission.
If the submission is based upon work that has
been sponsored or supported by an agency or organization other than MIT, you represent that you
have fulfilled any right of review or other obligations required by such contract or agreement.
MIT will clearly identify your name(s) as the author(s) or owner(s)
of the submission, and will not make any alteration, other than as
allowed by this license, to your submission.
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Note that this brief license contains many of the elements found in most
licenses. It identifies the parties to the agreement and specifies the rights
granted to MIT. It does not formally identify the work to which the license
applies nor date the agreement, but identification and dating occurs as part
of the electronic submission process. The agreement also adds provisions
to indemnify MIT against any contributory copyright infringement. This
brief license does not include information on its duration; this would be a
matter for the court in the event that there was a legal action brought on
the terms of the license.

Detailed licenses
Detailed licenses are formal contracts, usually developed on a case-by-case
basis with the support of legal counsel. They are particularly appropriate if
the material at issue is of great economic or cultural importance. They are
also frequently used in conjunction with digitization outsourcing. A good
example is the digitization agreement between Google and the University
of Virginia that governs Google’s digital conversion and use of a portion of
the Virginia library collections.11
In addition to the information found in a permission letter or brief
license, a detailed license might have clauses that allow for future or unanticipated uses. It might spell out who authorized users of the material are,
and what they can do with the material. There may be information on any
fees and royalties to be paid for the use of the content, and specification
of the reporting and auditing requirements. The duration of the license is
likely to be spelled out, along with information on what happens if there
is any breach or default of the agreement. There are likely to be provisions
for the termination of the contract prior to expiration of term. There may
be expanded provisions about warranties and indemnification. What happens, for example, if the licensor claims to have the authority to grant the
permissions found in the license but in reality does not that authority?
Finally, such licenses often specify the choice of law and jurisdiction in
case any action is brought forward.
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Tip
If you are contracting for outsourced digitization services, be sure to
include clauses on the physical ownership of the digital files produced
during digitization as well as any copyright that may have been produced. The contractor should be expected to return or destroy all copies it has made during the digitization project when they are no longer
needed for production purposes. Although outsourced scanning itself
is unlikely to create a new copyrighted work (for the reasons discussed
in Chapter 3), other services provided by a contractor could conceivably generate a copyright that could belong to the contractor. The
agreement should make clear that the contractor transfers all rights it
may have in the digitized content to the institution.

7.5 License terms
This section consists of a table of examples of clauses and elements that
might be included in a license. It focuses on a license between a cultural
institution and the owner of copyright in a collection item. A detailed
license may include many or all of these clauses, whereas a brief license or
permission letter may only contain some of them. We have marked some
clauses as essential; these should be included in all licenses.

ii	Table 7.1
Common terms appearing in copyright licenses

ɉɉGeneral information (essential in any license)
parties to the ɉɉ Full name of individuals, companies, or institutions
ɉɉThe
license.
that are parties to the license.
ɉɉAddress of each party.
work to which ɉɉThe work should be clearly described.
ɉɉTthehe license
applies. ɉɉ Some institutions use a boilerplate license in which
the licensed work is described as the “Work” throughɉɉ

out the license, and a definition of the “Work” is
included in a schedule or definitions section.
A photograph of the work could be attached to the
license for identification purposes.

he date the
his should be inserted when the parties sign the
ɉɉTlicense
ɉɉTlicense.
was made.
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ɉɉ Recitals
background to ɉɉ Recitals tend to be used in longer agreements.
ɉɉTthehe license.
ecitals are not legally binding terms within the
ɉɉ Rlicense—they
merely describe the parties and summarize the reason for entering into the license.

ecitals give a license a legalistic tone, and may be
ɉɉ Rinappropriate
and/or unnecessary for many licenses
used by cultural institutions.

ɉɉThe rights granted (essential in any license)
granted ɉɉ If the license is exclusive, the license actually transɉɉTtohetherights
licensee.
fers ownership of that right to the licensee.
t may be preferable for terminology to be
ɉɉ Itechnology-neutral,
to help reduce the need for
renegotiation.

he use that others ɉɉ If the licensee is required to limit access to a specific
ɉɉTmay
make of the
group, the identification of what constitutes autholicensed work

rized users.

dentification of what users of the work are authoɉɉ Irized
to do with it. For example, is the work made
available under a Creative Commons license?

ɉɉ Extent and duration of the grant of rights
he territory of the ɉɉThe license may specify that it only applies to a
ɉɉTlicense
defined geographic area.
f a cultural institution proposes to make digital
ɉɉ Icontent
available over the Internet, it should seek
worldwide rights.

he duration of the ɉɉThe duration may be perpetual, for the life of the
ɉɉTlicense.
copyright, or for a fixed term.
f the license is of fixed duration, does the proposed
ɉɉ Iuse
of the work extend beyond the term of the

ɉɉ
ɉɉ Delivery
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of materialɉɉ If cultural institutions are licensing the use of mateɉɉ Dtoelivery
the licensee.
rial they do not own, there must be a transfer of
the material to the institution. If the institution is
contracting with someone to perform digitization
services, there must be transfer to the service.
There may be a clause specifying the media, format,
and delivery of the item.

ɉɉ

and indemnities (desirable, but can make the document appear
ɉɉ Warranties
legalistic)
given byɉɉ A warrant that the person granting the license is
ɉɉ Wthearranties
licensor.
legally capable of doing so. (If that person is not the
owner of copyright, or does not have authorization
by the copyright owner to enter into the license,
any license is likely to be invalid and leave the
cultural institution exposed to a claim of copyright
infringement.)
A warrant that the rights granted in the license do
not infringe the rights of any third parties.
These warranties are particularly important where
the licensed work contains underlying rights, such
as most films and sound recordings.

ɉɉ
ɉɉ

ndemnity given by ɉɉ A provision in which the licensor indemnifies the
ɉɉ Ithe
licensor.
licensee against any liability, costs, damages, etcet-

era, if any of the licensor’s warranties turn out to be
false.

ɉɉ Fees and royalties (essential when applicable)
the licensee required to pay an up-front fee?
ɉɉ Up-front fee. ɉɉ IsIf so,
of payment and amount of the fee
ɉɉ shouldthebemanner
stated.
ngoing fees or ɉɉ Are ongoing fees payable?
ɉɉ Oroyalties.
f so, the manner of payment and calculation of the
ɉɉ Ifee
should be stated (e.g., pay-per-use, blanket fee
for specified period, etc).

ɉɉAssignment and sublicensing
is permitted, are there any limitations
ɉɉAssignment.
ɉɉ Ionf assignment
the exercise of the right (for example, the written
consent of the other party)?

ɉɉSub-licensing.

is permitted, are there any conditions
ɉɉ Iforf sublicensing
exercise of that right, or any processes that must
be complied with?
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ɉɉTermination
s termination
ɉɉ Iallowed?

termination provision enables a license to be terɉɉAminated
prior to the expiration of its term.
Depending on the wording of the clause, the licenɉɉ sor,
the licensee, or both may be able to terminate
the license.

s termination without cause permitted (that is,
ɉɉ Iwithout
justification), or only termination upon the

ɉɉ
ɉɉTermination
process.

happening of certain events (e.g., specified breaches,
bankruptcy or insolvency, or a warranty turning out
to be false)?
Under general legal principles, it may be possible
to terminate a license even if there is no express
termination clause.

here termination is allowed without cause, the
ɉɉ Wtypical
process is that a notice must be served on the
other party stating the intention to terminate. The
license will usually set out the minimum period that
must transpire between receipt of the notice and the
date termination comes into effect.

here termination is for a specified breach, the
ɉɉ Wtypical
process is that a notice setting out the breach

ɉɉ

is served on the other party, and that party is given a
time to remedy the breach (this time is usually stipulated in the license). If the breach remains uncured,
the license can be terminated.
Do the parties need to embark on a dispute resolution procedure before the license can be terminated?

rights survive the termination of the license?
ɉɉ Consequences
ɉɉ CDano any
of termination.
the licensor retain copies of the work after
ɉɉ termination
of the license?

ɉɉ Miscellaneous
his clause (sometimes referred to as a choice of
ɉɉ Governing law. ɉɉTlaw
clause) specifies the jurisdiction that governs

interpretation of the license. For example, the clause
may state that the license is governed by the law of a
particular state, such as New York.

ɉɉSeverability.

clause states that if part of the license
ɉɉAis “severance”
found to be legally invalid, this clause can be

“severed” from the license, and the remaining clauses
in the license continue to operate.
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pecifies that the written license constitutes the
ɉɉ Entire agreement. ɉɉSentire
agreement between the parties and super-

sedes any prior arrangements, agreements, or
understandings between them with respect to the
subject matter of the license.

ɉɉ Notices.

ets out the contact details of the licensor and
ɉɉSlicensee
for delivery of any notices that are required
or permitted under the license.

May also specify how a notice may be sent
ɉɉ(e.g.,
hand delivery or certified mail) and when a

notice is deemed to have been received (e.g., upon
successful completion of a facsimile transmission).

7.6 Clickthrough and browse-wrap licenses
The bulk of this chapter has discussed the use of licenses to secure the
permission of a copyright owner in order to digitize and make available on
the Internet copyrighted content. Sometimes the copyright owner will only
allow digitization to occur if there are restrictions placed on the subsequent
use of the files. For example, a copyright owner might allow her works to
be digitized for noncommercial, educational uses, but wish to prohibit any
commercial uses. Similarly, the cultural heritage institution that does the
digitizing may wish to impose its own requirements on downstream use of
the digital files. It may, for example, want to receive proper credit for any
subsequent use of the material.
What is required is a license between the cultural institution and the
user: a document that stipulates the terms by which the user may exploit a
digital work. It is not possible, however, to arrange for individual licenses
with each potential user of a Web site. Instead, a provider must rely on
some combination of a clickthrough license and/or a statement of terms
and conditions that governs the use of a site.
The term “clickthrough license” derives from the “shrink-wrap license”
commonly used with software products. With a shrink-wrap license, since
the license terms are sealed inside shrink-wrapping, they cannot be viewed
until after the product has been purchased and the shrink-wrap broken.
Sometimes there is a notice on the outside the shrink-wrap that warns that
breaking the wrapping shall be deemed acceptance of the license by the
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consumer. Terms are nonnegotiable: you must accept the license or decline
to use the product. One variation often used with software is an end user
license agreement, or EULA. One must agree to the terms of the EULA in
order to install the software.
A clickthrough license (sometimes also called a clickwrap license) is
a nonnegotiable online license. Users must signal their acceptance of the
license terms by clicking their mouse on an “I AGREE” button or similar
icon or link before they are allowed to enter the Web site. An example of a
clickthrough license in action is found at the Johns Hopkins University’s
site devoted to digital surrogates of three manuscripts of the Roman de la
Rose. The page devoted to “Conditions for Use of this Site” begins this way:
Before beginning your research, we ask you to read and agree
to abide by the following conditions. You may enter the site by
clicking on the agreement statement at the end of this page.12

A fairly long list of requirements governing the use of the images follows,
at which point the following directions appear:
To view the images now, please click on the agreement below:
I accept the conditions listed above.13

Browse-wrap licenses are the newest iteration of the nonnegotiated
license. A browse-wrap license stipulates that merely by continuing to view a
Web site, you agree to abide by any terms and conditions governing the use
of that site. Normally such terms are included in a page entitled “Terms and
Conditions,” “Acceptable Use,” or simply “Copyright.” The page of terms is
frequently linked from the bottom of each page on a Web site. Sometimes
it is found on an “About” page describing the purpose of the Web site, and
sometimes it is hidden away and can only be found with a site map.
Critics of clickthrough, shrink-wrap, and browse-wrap licenses argue
that these licenses are unenforceable because they are not the product of
negotiation between parties but represent a one-sided “take it or leave it”
approach to licensing. However, several court cases have upheld the legality
of shrink-wrap, clickthrough, and browse-wrap licenses. In addition, Maryland (where Johns Hopkins University is located) is one of two states (the
other being Virginia) that have passed legislation that make these licenses
expressly enforceable.
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Tip
The legal enforceability of a clickthrough or browse-wrap may not be
of great importance to cultural heritage institutions in their capacity
as licensors of content. Nevertheless, a good statement on “Terms
and Conditions” is imperative for any Web site. If you expect users
to respect your wishes regarding the use of digitized material, it is
incumbent on you to make those wishes explicit, clear, and easily
accessible.

7.7 Alternative licenses
Over the past few years, a number of alternative models have arisen in
relation to copyright management. These include free software licenses,
open-source licenses, copyleft licenses, and Creative Commons licenses.
These licenses have been developed because of perceived problems and
limitations with copyright law and traditional licensing models. Some
institutions have paid considerable attention to the possibility of using
principles from Creative Commons in their licenses.
A Creative Commons license is a license that has been created by Creative
Commons, a nonprofit U.S. corporation.14 Creative Commons is founded
on the idea that some copyright owners may not want to exercise all of the
intellectual property rights available to them under the law because they
want others to know about or build upon their work, because they wish
to contribute to an “intellectual commons,” or because they believe that
Creative Commons licenses can help attract commercial interest in their
work. Creative Commons seeks to promote the creative reuse of intellectual works with a minimum of transactional effort, thereby facilitating the
distribution of content online and making access to that material easier and
cheaper. A Creative Commons license sits somewhere between “all rights
reserved” and the public domain, where no rights are reserved; as their
graphic notes, in Creative Commons licensed materials, “some rights are
reserved.”
Creative Commons licenses do not involve giving up copyright protection; they are, in fact, based on the availability of copyright and the ability
of copyright owners to license selectively some or all of their rights. For
example, some creators might choose to permit wide noncommercial uses
of their work under a Creative Commons license while retaining full rights
in relation to any possible future commercial uses of the work.
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The Creative Commons Web site contains a number of different licenses
that copyright owners can use without charge to enable others to make
certain uses of the copyright material. There are even licenses that can
dedicate the work to the public domain or stipulate that copyright in the
work will only endure for the period of copyright found in the first Copyright Act of 1790 (14 years, renewable for another period of 14 years). They
can be used for any sort of copyright material, but these licenses can very
easily be embedded in digitally published material. Licenses with broadly
equivalent scope exist for many different countries. As noted in the preface and preliminary pages, a Creative Commons license has been used for
these guidelines.
The advantages of Creative Commons licenses to cultural heritage institutions are numerous. For example, if the copyright owners were willing
to license their works with a Creative Commons license, it would obviate
the need to draft and negotiate individual licenses with them, at least for
the uses specified in the license; this may well include many digitization
activities. It would also make clearer the conditions under which users of
the digitized work could access and exploit the work.
Yet the Creative Commons licenses are not the panacea for all licensing
issues found in cultural heritage institutions. First, owners may not wish to
apply Creative Commons licenses to their works, even where they would be
willing to allow similar uses by a cultural institution under an individually
negotiated license. Second, the Creative Commons model does not assist
with retrospective licensing issues: i.e., material already in the collection
for which copyright is problematic. Third, because a Creative Commons
license is based on copyright rights, it is not an option when a work is in
the public domain. A cultural institution that wished to include in a digitization project public-domain material could not use a Creative Commons
license to regulate access since there is no copyright to license; a different
agreement would be needed.15
In spite of these limitations, Creative Commons licenses remain an
important tool for cultural institutions. They are an option for owners and
institutions to consider in their negotiations, as well as a possibility for
institutions when managing their own copyright.
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7.8 Conclusion
Licenses are becoming of ever greater importance to cultural heritage institutions as they both try to secure the rights to use the copyrighted works
of others as well as market and promote their own collections and services.
Familiarity with the rudiments of licensing is becoming a fundamental skill
for many information professionals.
It is important to create or agree to licenses that are legally acceptable.
It is also fundamentally important to be sure that the terms of the license
are understood by, and acceptable to, the licensors. It is equally (if not more)
important to make sure that the terms and conditions in the agreement are
compatible with the fundamental mission and principles of the organization. The release of Google’s contracts with its digitization partners, the
recent controversy over the Smithsonian’s agreement with Showtime, and
the struggle over the license terms (and possible public domain status) of
some digitized Smithsonian images have turned the attention of many to the
proper nature of the terms that should govern such agreements.16 Especially
controversial is the degree of control repositories should seek to assert over
the use of public domain materials in their holdings.17 Some have argued
that freely releasing public domain material to the world is in the best interest of the institution;18 others have argued that it is appropriate to try to
recover some of the costs of preserving and digitizing the material.19 There
are as yet no commonly agreed upon standards of best professional practice,
though some recent reports contain useful recommendations to be followed
when working on digitization contracts.20 Each institution, therefore, will
need to decide on its own how best to ensure that the licenses it agrees to
or grants best serve its mission.
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8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 7, we discussed mechanisms for securing the permission of
copyright owners to digitize works when the statutory exemptions described
in Chapters 5 and 6 are not available. It is of course impossible to negotiate
permission if one cannot first identify the copyright owner or the owner’s
representative. This chapter discusses some of the paths you may wish to
follow when trying to locate a copyright owner in order to seek permission
to use a copyrighted work.
The exact strategy you should follow will depend in part on the nature
of the work. The procedures for locating the copyright owner of a published
text will vary from those required for sound recordings or works of art.
They will also vary according to the circumstances of creation. In general,
more effort should be spent in trying to locate the owner of copyright in
a professional photograph, for example, than in an amateur snapshot in a
photo album since the former author made or makes his or her living from
the exploitation of copyrighted works.
It is important to develop a strategy for locating copyright owners prior
to starting a digitization project. The costs of locating copyright owners can
vary tremendously. In an important study exploring the copyright permission process, Denise Troll Covey reported that depending on the strategy
followed at Carnegie Mellon University, the costs of securing permission to
digitize printed books ranged from $0.69 to $200.00 per title.1 Other users
who have wanted to use copyrighted works have reported being forced to
hire professional genealogists and private investigators in their quest to
locate copyright owners.2 It is easy for a search for copyright owners to
spin out of control; forming a clear strategy in advance can help avoid this
problem.
This chapter will address questions such as:

△△△△

How can I determine whom I need to contact to secure permission?
Whom do I need to contact when there are multiple owners of copyrights in a work?
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△△△△
△△
△△

What procedures should I follow to locate copyright owners?
What tools exist to assist me in my search?
What role can reproduction rights organizations and copyright collectives play in my efforts?
What can I do if the work is an “orphan work”—one whose copyright
owner cannot be identified or cannot be found?

The issues discussed in this chapter are closely related to concerns
discussed in Chapter 10 on risk management. In some cases it is easy to
locate a copyright owner. In many cases, however, it is unclear who owns
the rights in a work. You may locate individuals who claim, either innocently
or fraudulently, to be copyright owners when in reality they have no claims
to copyright. The decision as to whether to accept their claims is part of the
risk-management calculus discussed in Chapter 10.

8.2 Identifying copyright owners
Generally
All efforts to locate copyright owners must begin with the identification of
the original copyright owners. The discussion in Chapter 3 on copyright
ownership is of fundamental importance to this determination. The default
rule is that copyright initially belongs to the author, but there are complexities to this rule (for instance, for works made for hire, where the employer,
rather than the creator, is considered the author), and in any event, copyright
can be transferred or inherited by others. You will need to determine who
initially owned copyright and what has happened to ownership since that
time. Unfortunately there is no requirement that transfers of copyright need
to be recorded, and so your detective skills will be put to the test. Different
types of material will likely require different strategies.
If the work is published, it likely will have a copyright notice (since this
was a requirement to secure copyright permission, at least in the United
States, until 1989). The copyright notice is an important starting point; it is
evidence of who owned the copyright at the time of publication.
The absence of a copyright notice on the copy of a work that you are considering digitizing does not necessarily mean that it was initially distributed
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without one. It may have been distributed with a copyright notice that your
copy lacks or, especially with photographs, your copy might be a reproduction that did not include the original copyright notice. It is therefore useful
to conduct a search on the Internet for the author, title, or portions of the
text in order to discover whether it was ever distributed as a copyrighted
work. Google’s Book Search (http://books.google.com) is especially valuable since it indexes the full text of both in-copyright and out-of-copyright
works. Visual materials, sound recordings, and audiovisuals are harder to
search on the Internet, but portions of lyrics, captions, or general descriptions might help identify copyright owners.
Of course, identifying the copyright owner at the time of publication
does not indicate who owns the particular exclusive right that one may need
for a digitization project. For example, an author might have retained copyright but given her publisher an exclusive license to reproduce and distribute
a work. Since a digitization project involves reproduction and distribution,
in this example a cultural heritage institution should actually negotiate
with the publisher and not with the author. Alternatively, a book might be
published with the publisher identified as the copyright owner, but when
the book went out of print, the copyright reverted to the author. (This was
a fairly common provision in scholarly publishing contracts.) Permission
to digitize the work would therefore need to be secured from the author.

Tip
Given the inability to determine who owns the exclusive rights that
digitization may possibly infringe, it may sometimes be wise to identify and locate all possible copyright owners, including the author and
her heirs as well as the publisher and its successors.

As the duration of copyrights has increased, the likelihood that the
original copyright owner will still own copyright late in the copyright term
has decreased. Authors die, copyrights are inherited, firms go out of business or are sold, and the ownership of copyright passes from hand to hand.
There is no requirement that the details of copyright contracts or transfers
of ownership be centrally recorded. The ownership of copyright from the
date of original publication, therefore, can be a mystery and it can require
great detective skills to identify and locate the current ownership.
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Two resources available through the Copyright Office can provide
important clues in the copyright hunt. The first is information on copyright renewals. Copyright could only be renewed by the author of a work
or by his or her heirs. Many copyright renewals, therefore, are in the name
of the immediate copyright heirs of deceased authors. These renewed
copyrights could also be assigned to a publisher (and in some cases the
original publishing contract might have required that renewed copyrights
be transferred to the publisher upon renewal). Nevertheless, the renewal
record can identify the copyright owner at the moment of renewal and
should take initial precedence over what may appear in the published work
itself.3
Renewal information is not the only valuable source of information
found in the Copyright Office. Although it is not mandatory, it is possible
to record voluntarily with the Copyright Office transfers of ownership,
mortgages, nonexclusive licenses, and other assignments.4 The Copyright
Office’s online database includes an index to assignments and other documents recorded since 1978; earlier index entries can be examined in the
Copyright Office.5 As with the renewal records, the recorded transfers and
other documents can identify who owned the copyright at the time of the
recordation of the document, and so can serve as a starting point for locating the current copyright owner.

False copyright notices
A copyright notice can be an important clue in identifying a copyright owner,
but such notices should not be taken at face value. Including a fraudulent
copyright notice on an item is a federal criminal offense under 17 U.S.C. §
506(c), but the penalties are low in comparison to copyright infringement
(up to $2,500) and the crime has seldom been prosecuted. As a result, many
authors and publishers include copyright notices on material that is either
in the public domain or whose copyright they do not own.
The mere presence of a copyright notice should not be taken as absolute
proof that a valid copyright exists and is owned by the person claiming
it. It can be important evidence for a risk assessment, however. A claim
to copyright in a work, however, even when it is not true, still suggests
that the presumptive owner may take umbrage at the use of that work by
others.
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Did You Know?
On the 4th of July each year, the Boston Globe newspaper prints as an
editorial the full text of the Declaration of Independence. At the bottom of the page in the online version available through boston.com,
one finds a copyright notice: “© Copyright 2008 Globe Newspaper
Company.” Just because they have included the notice does not mean
that one would have to seek the permission of the Globe Newspaper
Company in order to reprint the Declaration of Independence!

Multiple Rights Owners
Sometimes there are a number of people who own one or all of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. This could be because the work was
created as a joint work of authorship, with two or more authors sharing the
copyright. Or it could be because inheritance of other transfers of ownership assigned the exclusive rights to multiple rights holders. Fortunately,
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as was discussed in Chapter 3, it is only necessary to secure permission
from one of the multiple rights holders. Any part owner of a copyright can
exercise any of the exclusive rights in which he or she shares—including
authorizing others to use the work. It is not necessary to track down all of
the copyright owners—finding one will be enough, if all you are seeking
is a nonexclusive license.

Tip
When negotiating copyright transfer agreements with a donor,
consider whether that donor owns all or part of the copyright. If the
donor, for example, had inherited only a partial share in a copyright,
that is all he or she can transfer to the institution. The institution
would then assume the responsibility to account to the other copyright owners for their share of any profits generated from exploiting
the copyright.

Multiple rights in one work
Remember, too, that there can be multiple copyrights included in one work.
As part of the process of identifying the copyright owners, it is also necessary to identify all of the copyrights that may be found in the work under
consideration. A photograph of a sculpture, for example, may require two
different permissions: from the owner of the copyright in the photograph
and from the owner of the copyright in the sculpture. A musical sound
recording is likely to encompass a number of different copyrights: in the
underlying score, in the performance, and perhaps in the recording. A movie
might have different copyrights in the movie itself, the script used in the
movie, and in novel on which the script was based. There can be additional
copyrights in the music used, items depicted in the movie, etc. Permission
from all of these copyright owners would need to be secured unless the
movie studio had secured a blanket license to authorize reproduction and
distribution of the works as part of its initial licensing. If this is the case,
the cultural institution should secure from the publisher or distributor
a warranty that they have secured the necessary permissions from the
owners of any underlying copyrighted works to authorize the permission
they are granting. This warranty should be backed up with an indemnity
protecting the cultural institution from liability if the warranty turns out to
be false.
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Tip
Digital Image Rights Computator
A useful tool for thinking about the multiple rights found in copy
photographs is the Digital Image Rights Computator from the Visual
Resources Association found at http://www.vraweb.org/resources/
ipr/dirc/. The Computator guides you through a series of questions
relating to:

△△△△
△△△△
△△

The copyright status of the underlying work represented in the image
The copyright status of the photographic reproduction
The source from which the image has been obtained
Any contract terms that might govern the uses of the image
The intended use(s) of the image

It then provides guidance on whether and from whom you need
to seek permission.

8.3 Strategies for locating copyright owners
Generally
Once the last known copyright owners have been identified, the process of
locating those copyright owners can begin. In many cases, communication
with the presumed copyright owner will reveal that the copyrights have been
transferred or assigned to a third party and that individual or corporation
will need to be contacted to secure permission.
Locating individual authors is perhaps the most challenging assignment. Publishers are perhaps easier to locate, though they have their own
challenges. Collective Rights Organizations can simplify the search for the
copyright owners of some works, especially in music and fine arts. The issues
associated with locating each type of copyright owner are discussed below.

Locating Authors
A variety of approaches can be followed for locating authors and their
copyright heirs and executors. The best approach to follow is dependent
on a number of factors:
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△△
△△△△

The profession of the author (a professional writer or artist versus an
amateur)
The type of work (whether it is published or unpublished)
The nationality of the author

Tip
The WATCH File
For professional authors and artists, an excellent starting point is
the WATCH File. WATCH, for “Writers, Artists, and their Copyright
Holders,” is a database jointly maintained by the Harry Ransom Center of the University of Texas at Austin and the University of Reading
Library. The database tracks information about the copyright owner
of works from prominent individuals, with an emphasis on American,
British, French, and other European authors and artists. One can find
in the database the contact information for either the current holder
of the copyright or the authorized representative charged with
administering those copyrights. The WATCH file is found at
http://www.watch-file.com or http://tyler.hrc.utexas.edu/.

What if the prominent author you are searching for is not in the WATCH
file? The WATCH file team has provided some excellent suggestions on how
to proceed,6 which we have modified and present in Table 8.1. Although they
were developed with unpublished works in mind, many of the suggestions
are applicable to locating the authors of published works as well.

ii	Table 8.1
Locating Prominent U.S. Copyright Owners
accession files contain ɉɉ Check the accession files for information on the
ɉɉ Do
information on copyright
donor of unpublished works. Were they heirs to
ownership?

ɉɉ
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by the author. They may have obtained material
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cleared a copyright in the past.
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at works by scholars on the author. The
ɉɉ Look
notes may contain acknowledgements or other
information as to copyright ownership.

with societies devoted to the author’s
ɉɉ Check
work. The International James Joyce Foundation,

ɉɉ

for example, maintains an FAQ devoted to copyright issues surrounding James Joyce’s work.7
Check online for copies of works by the author to
see if any carry a credit line indicating copyright status. Be careful, however. Even the most
reputable institutions can make mistakes when it
comes to assessing copyright.8

ɉɉAsk the publisher

recommend asking the publisher to deterɉɉ We
mine whether it has any rights in the work.
publisher may also be paying royalties to the
ɉɉThe
author or her heirs, and could help locate them.

ɉɉAsk the literary agent

it can be determined (perhaps from acknowlɉɉ Ifedgements
in published works), identify and ask
the author’s literary agent.

with membership ɉɉThe Authors Registry will search its author
ɉɉ Check
organizations for writers
records for one or two names for free.9
if an author is not found in the Authors Regɉɉ Even
istry, it may still be helpful to check with some of
the organizations it represents:

Authors Guild, although primarily a writer’s
ɉɉThe
advocacy group, includes literary agents and

estates among its members.10
The American Society of Journalists and Authors
represents professional freelance writers.11
The Dramatists Guild represents over 6,000
playwrights, composers, and lyricists.12

ɉɉ
ɉɉ

with relevant repro-ɉɉThe RROs discussed in this chapter may have
ɉɉ Check
duction rights organizainformation on an author.
tions (RROs)

to the author’s last ɉɉ If the author is recently deceased, a survivor may
ɉɉ Write
known address
still be living at the address.
reference sources
Literary tools such as author directories and Conɉɉ Use
ɉɉ temporary
to locate information on
Authors are especially valuable for
where an author lived
or her family (who may
have information on her
copyrights)

writers.

Other general biographical tools such as Marquis
ɉɉWho’s
Who and the Biography and Genealogy Mas-

ter Index are good sources of general information.

Book Search (and Google in general) may
ɉɉ Google
have leads you can follow.
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genealogical and
resources (including local obituarɉɉ Use
ɉɉ Genealogical
probate investigations
ies) may be good resources for tracking partners
and/or heirs.

you can identify when and where a person died,
ɉɉ Ifcheck
the probate records for the author. They
may indicate who inherited copyrights.

queries in appro- ɉɉ Some publications such as the New York Review
ɉɉ Publish
priate journals
of Books, the New York Times Book Review, and

the Times Literary Supplement will publish author
queries.

Once again, it is important to stress that not all steps are appropriate for
all works. In most cases, for example, there would be little need to publish
a query seeking the author of an undated, unidentified photograph found
in a family scrapbook. If the photograph, however, was going to be at the
heart of a multimillion-dollar advertising campaign, a more thorough search
might be warranted. Balancing the expense of copyright investigations with
potential risk of infringement will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.

Watch This Space
WorldCat Copyright Evidence Registry
The WorldCat Copyright Evidence Registry, currently in its pilot phase,
is a new project that holds the potential of becoming a major source
of information on copyright. The registry hopes to gather information
from libraries about the copyright status of individual works. This
can include information on copyright owners and whether works by
certain authors have entered the public domain. See http://www.oclc.
org/us/en/productworks/cer.htm.

Locating Publishers
Publishers are an important resource for securing permission. In many cases,
it will be the publisher, and not the author, that owns the copyright in the
work, either because copyright was transferred to the publisher or because
the work was created as “work made for hire” and hence the publisher is
considered to be the author. Even if it does not own the full copyright, the
publisher may own the exclusive rights required for digitization. Lastly,
the publisher may be able to provide current contact information for a
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copyright owner—especially if the publisher has to send royalty checks
to that individual.
There are two major advantages to starting a search for copyright owners
with the publisher. First, it may be easier to find an old publishing house
or its successors than it is to find an individual author or her heirs. The
directories of publishers are extensive, and the publishing literature often
records what happens to major publishers. Publishers may also have a greater
willingness than authors to be found—publishers, after all, are interested
in marketing their products. Second, publishers know about copyrights.
Many of them have departments that specialize in permissions; you can
usually find the address for that department on the publisher’s Web site.
The task of locating a publisher may be slightly less daunting than
finding an author, but it is not always easy. The recent report on the efforts
of Carnegie Mellon University to locate publishers to seek permission to
digitize books from the collections makes this clear. The report describes
three different projects to secure permission to digitize works. Each project
consisted of different types of material and followed different methodologies.
Two of the projects were attempts to digitize groups of individual titles. In
the first project, they were unable to contact 21 percent of the publishers.
In the second project, 31 percent of the publishers could not be located.13
Even if the publisher could be located, the publishers’ knowledge about
the copyright status of the works they owned varied widely. In some cases
this might be because the titles were acquired when another publisher was
absorbed into the current firm. In other cases, it may have been due to poor
record keeping. As Denise Troll Covey, the report’s author, noted:
The Posner study also made us aware that many publishers do
not keep good records. Some do not really know what they have
published. On several occasions, we had to photocopy the title
page of a book and fax it to the publisher because it claimed it had
not published the book. Frequently, publishers reported that they
did not know whether they had the right to grant nonexclusive
permission to digitize and provide open access to their books.14

Particularly problematic are the frequent changes in ownership of
publishing houses. Firms are acquired, merge, or go out of business with
increasing rapidity. With the passage of time, it becomes harder and harder
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to locate successor firms. The first project undertaken at Carnegie Mellon
was particularly impacted by changes in publishers:
With rare exceptions, the older the work, the more difficult it was
to locate the publisher. We could not find the publishers of most
of the books published between 1920 and 1930 and of almost
half of the books published between 1940 and 1950. Publishers
of more than a third of the books published from 1950 to 1960
and 1960 to 1970 could not be found. By contrast, few of the
publishers of books published 1980 or later could not be found.15

Tip
Firms Out of Business Database
A new tool may make searching for defunct publishing firms easier. In
2007, the University of Reading and the Harry Ransom Center at the
University of Texas, the groups that created the WATCH file, unveiled
the FOB (Firms Out of Business) file. FOB records information about
printing and publishing firms, magazines, literary agencies, and similar
organizations that have gone out of existence. Whenever possible, it
identifies the successor organizations that might own any surviving
rights. Although FOB is newer and less complete than WATCH, one can
hope that with community input and support it may grow into just as
important a resource. FOB is found at http://www.fob-file.com/.

In spite of the difficulties in identifying and contacting publishers,
Carnegie Mellon’s experience in its three projects as well as similar efforts
at Cornell University in support of CHLA, the Core Historical Literature of
Agriculture project, suggest the effort may be worth it. Depending on the
project, for example, Carnegie Mellon was able to secure permission to
digitize works in 38 percent, 54 percent, and 70 percent of the completed
transactions. They were able to achieve greater degrees of success with
different types of publishers, with more permissions granted by scholarly
associations and university presses than by commercial publishers. The
popularity of the idea of the “long tail”—that previously ignored titles
may become economically viable thanks to the Internet and print on
demand—may change the willingness of commercial publishers to grant
permission, however.16
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Question
Can a copyright be abandoned?
When a firm goes out of business, many people assume that its copyrights are abandoned and the works it created enter the public domain.
This is incorrect. First, most bankruptcy proceedings liquidate the assets
of an organization (including any intellectual property) by selling them
to another party or transferring them to a debtor. Copyrights are an
asset, and hence are normally transferred. Second, as was discussed in
Chapter 3, copyright transfer can only take place via written agreement
or operation of law. Physical property can be abandoned;17 copyright
cannot. If there is no written dedication of copyright to the public, the
copyright still subsists. It may be difficult to locate the current copyright
owner, but the work is not in the public domain.

Reproduction Rights Organizations
A reproduction rights organization (RRO) is a society that acts as an agent
for a large number of copyright owners. Collecting societies administer
copyright owned by their members and collect and distribute income generated from those copyrights. They commonly also collect and distribute
royalties from statutory licensing schemes.
Some copyright owners do not wish to be bothered with permission
requests and authorize a collecting society to manage the entire business.
Therefore, it is possible, and sometimes mandatory, to negotiate permissions and licenses with collecting societies rather than with the individual
owners of copyright. For cultural institutions, one of the key benefits of
collecting societies is that they offer a streamlined procedure for rights
administration, thus reducing the administrative difficulties in locating and
contacting individual owners. All of the previous discussion on locating
authors and publishers can be ignored if their copyrights are managed by
a reproduction rights organization.
Copyright collectives can simplify the permissions process, but they are
not a total panacea. For one, not all organizations are authorized to license
all possible uses. Rights to license electronic and Internet distribution in
particular often remain with the publisher or author. The transaction costs
associated with securing permission can often be high, and the organization
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will usually charge fees even if the use is educational or noncommercial. In
some cases the copyright owner may permit noncommercial, educational
uses at a cost lower than would be charged by the reproduction rights
organization.

Tip
Even though a reproduction rights organization may manage copyrights for an author or publisher, cultural institutions can still attempt
to contact the copyright owner directly for permission to use a work.

There are many reproduction rights organizations in the United States
and abroad. Several Web sites, including those managed by Georgia Harper
and the Copyright Management Center at I.U.P.U.I., provide information on
and links to many of them.18 The following highlights some of the RROs of
greatest utility to cultural heritage institutions:

Textual works
Copyright Clearance Center (CCC): http://www.copyright.com/
CCC manages the copyright for thousands of text-based works including
books, magazines and journals, newspapers, etcetera. Traditionally CCC has
been a clearinghouse for securing permission for commercial course packs,
interlibrary loan uses that exceed the CONTU guidelines, classroom use that
exceeds fair use, commercial document delivery, and the general commercial use of copyrighted material (through its annual business license). More
recently it has moved into the business of granting permission to republish
textual material, first in print and now online. Even if your desired use is not
licensed by the CCC, it can still be a good place to determine who at least
is claiming copyright and the authority to license a work.

Question
Is the CCC Academic License a solution to
securing permission?
In June, 2007, the CCC announced that it would begin to offer an
annual copyright license for academic institutions. The license,
it is promised, will provide “faculty and staff with convenient,
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preapproved permissions to use content in course management systems, paper and electronic course packs, electronic library reserves,
research collaboration and more.”19 Questions have been raised, however, about the cost, breadth, and impact that the license may have on
fair-use analysis.20
For most digitization projects in cultural heritage institutions, the
academic blanket license would not be a viable option. Most of the
permissions that a digitization project would require are excluded
from the license, including:

△△
△△△△

Creation of a database or a repository of works that is available for
multiple people’s use outside the context of a class
“Cover-to-cover copying of whole works”
“Any use of the work that results in manipulation or change of
the original, or that does not result in a reproduction that is
substantially identical visually to the original” (thus limiting the
institution’s ability to link digitized works into new and exciting
products)
Interlibrary loan
Advertising or marketing21

△△△△

Artistic works
There are two primary organizations that serve as the rights agents for
artists. They are:

Artists Rights Society (ARS): http://www.arsny.com/
Founded in 1987, ARS represents the intellectual property rights interests of
many American visual artists (painters, sculptors, photographers, architects,
and others). Through its membership in CISAC (Confédération Internationale des Sociétés d’Auteurs et Compositeurs), the Paris-based umbrella
organization that oversees the activities of international copyright collecting societies in all media, it also represents up to 30,000 foreign artists in
the United States.
Visual Artists and Galleries Association (VAGA): http://vaga.org
Founded in 1976, VAGA is the first U.S. organization to represent visual
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artists’ copyrights on a collective basis. It represents approximately 500
American artists and estates and also thousands of foreign artists and
estates through reciprocal agreements with sister organizations worldwide.

Musical Works
Securing permission for the online reproduction and distribution of musical
works involves the participation of multiple collective rights organizations:22

The performance right in the musical composition is often licensed by
one of three collective rights organizations. The choice of which organization to join is at the option of the composer or publisher of the work. All
three organizations are developing rates and licenses for Webcasting or
Internet use. ASCAP and BMI also have song title databases in which you
can search by title, composer, or publisher.

△△△△
△△

ASCAP: http://www.ascap.com/
BMI: http://www.bmi.com
SESAC: http://www.sesac.com/

The reproduction and distribution right in the composition is often
licensed by the Harry Fox Agency: http://www.harryfox.com/. They maintain
an online database called Songfile that can be used to secure permission to
make 2,500 or fewer recorded copies (CDs, cassettes, LPs, or digital downloads) of a musical work. It is also possible to search the Songfile database
for information on titles, songwriters, and publishers of songs.
The reproduction, distribution, and performance rights in a sound recording are often managed by the Recording Industry Association of America
through its SoundExchange program: http://www.soundexchange.com/. It
collects and distributes digital performance royalties for sound recording
copyright owners (usually a record label) when their sound recordings are
performed on digital cable, satellite television, Internet radio, and satellite
radio. For other Internet uses, you will normally have to contact the individual
copyright owners of the sound recordings.
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Example
Digitizing Early Recordings23
Let’s say that you are interested digitizing Fred Waring’s recording for Decca
of Jerome Kern’s 1943 song “And Russia
Is her Name,” with lyrics by E. Y. “Yip”
Harburg. You determine that the Kern’s
and Harburg’s composition was registered and renewed; it is still protected
by copyright. In the ASCAP database on
the Internet, you see that the Publisher
and Administrators of the song are the
Glocca Morra Music Corporation and
Universal Polygram International. You
And Russia is Her Name
determine which ASCAP license would Music by Jerome Kern, Lyrics by E. Y.
Warburg
best meet your needs.
© 1943 by Chappell & Co., renewed 1970.
Source of the image: http://www.tias.
Remember that this license only
com/7042/PictPage/1922871671.html,
covers the public performance of Kern’s which (incorrectly) maintains that
Ladybugs Antiques & Collecticbles has a
copyright in the scan.
and Harburg’s work. You therefore go
License: Included under an assertion of
to the Songfile database managed by
fair use.
the Harry Fox Agency and discover
that they manage the mechanical reproduction rights for the music
publisher. You select the appropriate license from them.
Lastly, you need to think about the rights in the recording of Fred
Waring’s performance of the song. You aren’t interested in limiting
yourself to the uses allowed under a statutory license and administered by SoundExchange, and so you need to contact the permission department at Decca, the original record label, which owns the
rights in the recording itself. From Decca (or any successor company
that may have acquired the rights), you need to obtain permission
to reproduce, distribute, and perform Decca’s sound recording. They
should also be able to tell you if the Fred Waring estate itself has any
copyright interest in the sound recording in case you need to secure
permission from them as well.
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International Reproduction Rights Organizations
The equivalent of many of these U.S.-based collective rights societies can
be found in other countries. They can be an important resource in locating copyright owners for foreign works. Many of them are members of the
International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organizations (IFRRO),
found at http://www.ifrro.org/. Others belong to CISAC (Confédération
Internationale des Sociétés d’Auteurs et Compositeurs), the Paris-based
umbrella organization that oversees the activities of more than 200 international author copyright collecting societies. Directories of members of
both organizations are available on their Web sites.
Among the most important international text licensing agencies are
Access Copyright: the Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (http://www.
accesscopyright.ca/); CLA: the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd., representing publishers in the United Kingdom (http://www.cla.co.uk/); and ALCS:
Authors’ Licensing & Collecting Society, UK, created to provide collective
administration for writers (http://www.alcs.co.uk/).

New Initiatives
The explosion of the Internet as a publication and distribution medium has
led to the development of many new initiatives to license collectively online
content. Whether these initiatives attract enough content to become viable
licensing options remains to be seen. Two deserve mention:

iCopyright: http://info.icopyright.com/
iCopyright was created in 1998 to be an automated copyright licensing system for digital content. It licenses permission to users to e-mail, print, and
save content—but not to republish or redistribute the content. Associated
Press articles are one of the items that can be licensed through iCopyright.
PLUS Coalition: http://www.useplus.com/
The PLUS (Picture Licensing Universal Coalition) is not a collective rights
organization itself, but is developing tools to assist in the licensing of visual
images. The system is based around the idea of embedding standardized
rights metadata into digital images that identify the rights owner, describe
the license terms, and make it easy to track future licensed and unlicensed
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uses of the images. As part of the project, PLUS has been developing an
online registry of artists and licensors that is expected to be released in 2009.

Other licensing agencies
In addition to the reproduction rights organizations, many other professional organizations and commercial businesses license the reproduction
and distribution of copyrighted works. In some cases, they are able to
license works for online distribution; in other cases, they may only be able
to provide limited licenses (for example, for the performance of a work in
a church or the showing of a movie in a school). Licensing organizations
include publishers of dramatic works, photo stock houses, and cartoon
and comics syndicates. The online resources referenced in note 18 contain
many links to major sources of content.

8.4 Orphan works
In spite of one’s best efforts, it may be difficult or impossible to locate the
owner of copyright in a work. This may be because the work is anonymous,
the company that owned copyright is defunct, it is impossible to trace copyright through multiple bequests and transmissions, or because the copyright
owner’s identity is known but the owner or the owner’s representative cannot be located. These items are commonly referred to as “orphan works.”
When current creators and users cannot locate a copyright owner, they
cannot negotiate over the use of the older work. Potential users, therefore,
can be extremely reluctant to incorporate orphan works in new creative
efforts or in projects (such as library digitization efforts) that would make
the older works available to the public. Users, publishers, libraries, archives,
museums, and other institutions worry that reproducing and/or distributing copyrighted works without the permission of the current copyright
owner may leave them open to the draconian monetary, statutory, and
criminal penalties found in current copyright law. The result is that orphan
works often are not used—even when there is no one who would object to
the use.
Recognizing that there might be a problem associated with orphan works,
the Copyright Office undertook a study of the orphan works issue. Public
comments were solicited, and many of them documented how concerns
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over the orphan status of copyrighted works led cultural institutions to
exclude them from digitization projects.24
After considering a wide range of possible solutions to the problem, the
Copyright Office chose to recommend a fairly simple solution:

△△
△△
△△

Users would be expected to conduct a reasonably diligent investigation
to locate the copyright owner before they could exploit an orphan work.
If such an investigation is done, and a copyright owner later surfaces,
the user would only have to pay reasonable compensation for the use of
the work—not the high penalties that can be associated with copyright
infringement.
Libraries, museums, and other noncommercial users could avoid even
those fees if they stopped using the item immediately.

Some had hoped for more specific guidance on what constitutes a “reasonably diligent” search for the owner of an orphan work, but the report
echoed the argument made in this chapter: namely that it will vary according to the nature of the material, the age of the item, and the expected use.
Different communities will have to establish what they consider to be best
practice.
The Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, included the heart of the
recommendations. It met strident opposition from photographers, who were
worried that because their work can easily lose all identifying markings, it
would be easy for users to label them “orphans” and widely distribute them
on the Internet. As a consequence, the bill failed to pass before Congress
adjourned. New, compromise bills that supposedly addressed the concerns
of all parties were reintroduced into the House and Senate in 2008, but
they, too, encountered opposition from critics who fear the impact of the
legislation on their businesses, and only the House Bill passed. The solutions that have been proposed would make it too costly for any large-scale
digitization program to avail themselves of the protections in the law. It
is likely, therefore, that the digitization of orphan works will continue to
entail some risks.
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Other Types of Intellectual
Property, Contracts,
and Jurisdictional Issues

9.1 Introduction
Up to now the guidelines have primarily addressed issues associated with
copyright. Copyright is the most common form of intellectual property
found in the holdings of cultural heritage institutions, and therefore copyright issues will be of particular concern in their digitization projects. Yet
copyright infringement is not the only way that a digitization project could
put a cultural institution at risk.
This chapter will consider some of the non-copyright related legal issues
of importance to digitization projects. An obvious place to start such analysis
is with forms of intellectual property other than copyright. They include:

△△△△
△△△△

Trademark
Patents
Trade secrets
Industrial design rights

Of these four types of intellectual property, only trademark is likely to be at
issue in most digitization projects, and hence is the only type discussed in
this chapter: see section 9.2. These guidelines do not address trade secrets,
on the basis that most collection items being digitized would not contain
such information, but there are three points about sensitive and restricted
information that are worth emphasizing more generally.
First, there are a number of areas of tort law that pertain to the distribution of information that identifies an individual, reproduces their personal
information or likeness, or impacts on their reputation. The following three
will be discussed in these guidelines in sections 9.3 and 9.4:
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△△△△
△△

The right of publicity
The right of privacy
Defamation (which includes libel and slander)

Second, some collection items have restrictions on access and use by
virtue of the terms in donation and loan documentation (and, as well shall
see, institution-imposed terms of access). The capacity to impose such
restrictions typically arises from ownership or control of the physical item,
not ownership of copyright (indeed, the work could be in the public domain).
Thus, regardless of whether there are any copyright issues surrounding the
digitization of restricted items, there may be legal consequences for acting
contrary to donation or loan conditions. These issues are discussed further
in the text on contracts in section 9.5.
Thirdly, care should be taken where proposed content contains potentially sensitive information—for instance, where cultural heritage material
or items from indigenous collections are being digitized. There is a long
history of research conducted with such populations without true informed
consent or benefit sharing, meaning that items now held by cultural institutions may have been created or removed without the agreement of indigenous owners. Although not necessarily implicating legal issues, there
are strong ethical and cultural aspects associated with the management
of these items, as reflected by domestic and international developments
in indigenous rights in cultural heritage and intellectual property. This is
discussed further in section 9.7.
A final point: so far, the guidelines have focused on American law
and have assumed that digitization, access, and use takes place in America. The Internet, however, is international in scope. It is appropriate
to inquire, therefore, what obligation, if any, does a cultural institution
have with regard to the laws of other countries. This is considered in
section 9.6.
This chapter will address questions including:

△△△△
△△

When can an institution digitize trademarked works?
Can I digitize and distribute a photograph of a famous individual?
What responsibility do I have to protect the privacy and reputation of
individuals named in records I may wish to digitize?
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How can we use contracts with users to maintain control over our
digitized materials?
Do I need to worry about copyright and other laws in every other country
in the world?

9.2 Trademarks
Imagine the following scenario: Your institution has a world-class collection
of Coca-Cola bottles. You decide that you want to digitize and make available
on the Internet photographs of the bottles. Your staff photographers take
the photographs, so you know you don’t have to worry about copyright: it is
work for hire, and your institution owns the copyrights. (Fortunately none
were taken by contract photographers!) But you know that the Coca-Cola
Company owns trademarks in its name, logo, and bottle shape. Do you have
to worry about their rights in your digitization project?
To answer that question, we need to look more closely at the nature and
purpose of the intellectual property known as trademarks.1 Trademarks
are used in commerce to do two things. First, they identify and distinguish
the goods of one manufacturer or seller from goods manufactured or sold
by others. In addition, trademarks indicate the source of the goods. In
short, trademarks are brand names or similar indications of origin. Thanks
to trademarks, you know that the cola you are drinking was made by an
authorized Coca-Cola bottler and not by Pepsi.
Trademarks are often distinctive symbols, pictures, or words, but they
can also be distinctive and unique packaging, color combinations, product styles, and even building designs. The TransAmerica Pyramid in San
Francisco, for example, is a trademark as well as being a building; so is the
Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum in Cleveland. Even sounds can be
trademarked: for example, the roar of the MGM lion or the three chime
tones used by NBC.
Closely related to trademarks are service marks. Trademarks distinguish
different goods from each other, and service marks identify and distinguish
the services of one provider from the services offered by others. As with
trademarks, they also identify the source of the services. In this chapter,
we will use the term trademark to refer to service marks as well.
There is no requirement that trademarks be registered with the federal
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U.S. Patents and Trademark Office (USPTO). Even without registration, a
trademark owner can acquire state statutory or common law rights in a mark
simply by using the mark in commerce.2 Trademark owners can also use the
trademark symbol “TM” or the service mark symbol “SM” any time they
wish to alert the public that they feel they have a trademark, regardless of
whether they have filed an application with the USPTO (though such use is
not required in order to have an enforceable trademark). Trademarks owners
who register their marks with the USPTO may use the federal registration
symbol “®.” Unlike copyrights, trademarks never expire as long as they are
continuously used in commerce.

Did You Know?
The “devil” on Underwood canned ham is reputedly
the oldest existing food trademark still in use in the
United States. It has been recognized as a trademark
since 1870 (Trademark no. 82).

The owner of a trademark has the exclusive right to use the trademark
on the product it is intended to identify and often on related products. The
owner may bring an infringement suit against anyone who uses a trademark
in a manner likely to cause confusion in the marketplace. In addition, the
trademark owner may bring action against users that dilute the mark, either
by blurring its distinctiveness or by tarnishing the reputation of the product.
In order to retain its mark, it is normally required that trademark owners
bring infringement actions against widespread use of their trademarks by
third parties. Failure to stop misuse of a trademark may lead to the annulment of the original trademark grant. (This differs from copyright, where
there is no requirement that copyright owners pursue copyright infringers
in order to maintain their copyrights.)
Could digitization and distribution of works containing trademarks place
a cultural institution at risk of being charged with direct or contributory
trademark infringement? For example, could digitizing and distributing a
photograph of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame result in court action, even
if the institution possessing the photograph owned the copyright in the
work? In theory, the answer is yes. It is quite common for movie studios,
for example, to worry that the inclusion of trademarked objects in their
films might suggest endorsement of the film by the trademark owner. As
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a result, they (or more likely their insurance companies) will frequently
require that trademarked objects be removed from a scene. In one example,
a studio removed the TransAmerica Pyramid from the skyline of San
Francisco.3
Fortunately, as with copyright, there are exceptions to the exclusive
rights of the trademark owner that make a lawsuit against a cultural heritage
institution highly unlikely.
Most important is the fair use exception to trademark. It is not an
infringement of trademark to use a mark simply to describe a good or
service [15 U.S.C. § 1115(4)]. Nor is it an infringement to use a mark outside
commerce (so long as the use does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement).
Trademark is primarily a consumer-protection statute: it is intended to
ensure that potential customers are not confused by a competing product.
So long as the use is noncommercial and does not imply sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark owner, the use would likely be fair.
As for dilution, there are similar exemptions. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) stipulates that no dilution action can be brought for the following uses:

△△
△△△△

Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services
of the owner of the famous mark.
Noncommercial use of a mark.
All forms of news reporting and news commentary

Again, noncommercial use is a statutory shelter against a charge of
dilution.
In sum, a noncommercial digitization project should be immune from
most dangers of trademark infringement. So long as the hypothetical digital
collection of photographs of Coca-Cola bottles mentioned at the start of
this section is a noncommercial product and there is no suggestion that the
Coca-Cola Company has sponsored or endorsed the project, trademarks are
unlikely to have been infringed. Commercial use of trademarks is a more
complicated issue. Any cultural heritage institution that wishes to sell access
to digitized collections containing trademarked items should consult with
a trademark attorney in advance. Similarly, legal advice should be sought if
the institution’s use of commercial marks might reflect badly on a product
or the company behind it.4
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Imagine the following scenario: Instead of wanting to digitize photographs
of cola bottles, your institution wanted to digitize photographs of early
baseball players. All of the photographs were published before 1923 and so
there is no fear of copyright infringement. But do the subjects of the photographs have any non-copyright interest in their use? Do you need their
permission before you can reproduce and distribute the works through
digitization?
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the right of publicity.5 Publicity rights are a relatively new concept in intellectual property
law, emerging in the United States as a separate subject from the right of
privacy (discussed in the next section) in the 1950s. The right of publicity
prevents the unauthorized commercial use of an individual’s name, likeness,
or other recognizable aspects of one’s public image. It gives an individual
the exclusive right to control the commercial use of his or her identity, and
permits individuals to bring action to recover damages from unauthorized
use of one’s public persona.
The right of publicity is largely protected by state common and/or
statutory law. Currently 29 states recognize some form of personality rights.
Eighteen have explicit statutes recognizing a right of publicity: California,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin.6 Other states rely on common law or sometimes
privacy law to protect publicity rights. In some states the right of publicity
is protected through the law of unfair competition.
To the surprise of many people, Indiana, and not California or New York,
the traditional homes of public figures, has the strongest right of publicity.
It protects the right of publicity for 100 years after a person’s death, and
protects not only an individual’s name, image, and likeness but also signature, photographs, gestures, distinctive appearances, and mannerisms. The
reason for Indiana’s interest in publicity law is simple: it is home to CMG
Worldwide, one of the first and largest publicity rights management firms.
Its client list includes Babe Ruth, Marilyn Monroe, Mark Twain, and Amelia
Earhart.7 The statute in Tennessee (home to the estate of Elvis Presley) is also
notable: it protects publicity rights “as long as the right holder continually
exploits the commercial value of the identity.”8
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The economic value of publicity rights has been increasing dramatically. In 2006 Muhammad Ali sold 80 percent of his publicity rights to the
entertainment rights firm CKX for $50 million.9 Earlier the same company
spent $100 million to acquire an 85 percent share in the publicity rights of
Elvis Presley, the perennial top-earning deceased celebrity.10

Did You Know?
Publicity rights do not just apply to world-famous celebrities. For
example, Nan Wood Graham has registered her publicity rights with
California’s Secretary of State’s office. Graham is “famous” for being
the sister of artist Grant Wood—and the model for the wife (or
daughter) in Wood’s most famous painting, American Gothic. Anyone
who wishes to use American Gothic must consider whether their use
would impinge on her estate’s ability to market her image.

Grant Wood, American Gothic, 1930,
License: © claimed by the Art Institute of Chicago in the art
and reproduction, but publication without notice or renewal
placed the work in the public domain.
Source: http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/6565

The right of publicity could be a nightmare for cultural institutions: a
right that varies from state to state, with no central registry of rights and
incredibly long periods of compliance. Fortunately there is an important limitation on the right of publicity: it is primarily an economic right, restricted
to the commercial use of an individual’s persona.11 It is intended to prevent
third parties from exploiting for financial gain an individual’s image or
personality. Publicity rights, therefore, should not apply to noncommercial,
educational use of a person’s image. This is an area that is developing and
changing rapidly, however, and should be monitored.
Commercial use of the likeness of others is a different matter, and
would require the institution to consult with an attorney specializing in
the right of publicity.
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Tricky Area
Commercial Use of Public Domain Materials
The most requested reproduction at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA) has long been a photograph of a
meeting between Richard Nixon and Elvis Presley on 21 December
1970. The topic is so popular, in fact, that NARA has created an online
exhibition dedicated to the meeting entitled “When Nixon met
Elvis.”12
The photographs of the meeting
were taken by Ollie Atkins, Nixon’s
chief photographer and a member of
the White House Photographic Office.
As with other works by government
employees, the photographs are in the
public domain. Because NARA’s use in
the exhibit is for noncommercial purPhotograph of Richard M. Nixon and Elvis
Presley at the White House, 12/21/1970
poses, there should not be a problem
(cropped).
Photographer: Ollie Atkins
with publicity rights.
License: Public domain
The Richard Nixon Library and
Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, http://arcweb.
Birthplace Foundation also offers
archives.gov/arc/action/ExternalId
Search?id=1634221
versions of the White House photos
through its Museum Store. They have fifteen items for sale that carry
the photograph, including coffee mugs, mouse pads, playing cards,
magnets, and of course T-shirts.13
Nixon and Elvis Pen
Uncredited photograph
Source: The Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace Foundation Museum
Store, http://www.nixonlibraryfoundation.org/index.php?src=directory
&view=products&category=The%20Day%20Nixon%20Met%20Elvis
License: Used under an assertion of fair use.

These commercial products may impinge on publicity rights and
might require the authorization of the respective estates. As the
NARA site notes, although the photographs are in the public domain,
. . . the estates of Richard Nixon and Elvis Presley may claim
rights in their likenesses and images, and further use of these
photographs may be subject to those claims. Anyone who
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intends to download these images and use them commercially should first contact the appropriate representatives of
former President Nixon or Mr. Presley or consult with his own
legal counsel.14

9.4 Right of privacy and defamation
Imagine the following scenario: You have in your collections the papers of a
local member of Congress. You would like to digitize the papers and make
them available on the Internet. Among the papers are communications from
staff at various government agencies (including the Social Security Administration and the Department of Veterans Affairs) in response to requests
for assistance that the member of Congress sent on behalf of individual
constituents who were having financial, medical, and other problems. The
memos from the government officials are in the public domain because of
Section 105 of the Copyright Act (which does not allow copyright in works
of the Federal government). But should you digitize the memos?
The preceding scenario introduces us to the concept of the right of privacy. Many archivists are familiar with explicit statutory privacy regulations
including FERPA, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, which
protects student information; HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, which protects certain medical records; and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which protects some financial information. There
is also a general right of privacy found in tort law. Unlike the right of publicity, which is generally thought to be a property right, the right of privacy
is a personal right. Damages in a publicity case are based on the economic
harm suffered; damages in a privacy case are assigned based on emotional
distress. Privacy actions attempt to assess the harm to one’s dignity.
The standard authority on privacy torts recognizes four types of invasions of privacy:15

△△△△
△△△△

“Intrusion upon seclusion”
Public disclosure of private facts
False light
Appropriation of name or likeness
Let’s consider each in turn:
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Intrusion upon seclusion
In order to have an action based on “intrusion upon seclusion,” three factors
need to be present. First, there must be an intrusion, physical or otherwise.
There is no requirement that the results of the intrusion must be publicized
(that is covered by the second type of privacy tort listed above: public disclosure
of private facts); merely intruding is enough. Second, that intrusion must be
into an area where a person is entitled to privacy. Third, the intrusion must
be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Looking into an upstairs window
with binoculars would be intrusive; so would opening someone’s mail.

Public disclosure of private facts
An action for invasion of privacy can be brought when someone makes
known to the public matters that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person and which are not of legitimate concern to the public. The method
used for publicizing the fact is immaterial: it could be in writing, orally,
or via a Web site. The important thing is that a fact concerning a person’s
private life is communicated other than in private conversation or in such
a way as that is likely that it will become public.

False light and defamation
An action for placing someone in a false light is similar to the public disclosure of private facts, but in this case the private “facts” that are revealed to
the public are false. Alternatively, the facts could be true, but presented in
such a way as to misrepresent the person’s character, history, or beliefs. The
false light must be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and normally
the person who revealed them must act with reckless disregard or actual
malice for an infringement to have occurred.
Closely related to false light is defamation. With defamation, a false claim
that is likely to hurt the reputation of an individual or corporate entity is
communicated orally (constituting the tort of slander) or in print or other
fixed medium (known as libel). Truth is a defense to a charge of defamation:
if the publicly revealed information is true, no defamation occurred. In addition, where the defamation concerns a “public figure” or “public official,” it
must be proven that the publisher acted with actual malice, that is, acted
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with knowledge that the fact was untrue or with serious doubts about its
truth. However, even if an offensive fact is true, it might still be presented
in such as way as to constitute an invasion of privacy—either through the
public disclosure of private facts or by using them in a way so as to present
a third party in a false light.

Tricky Area
Republishing Defamatory Works
The risk of invading privacy is greatest when digitizing unpublished
or private communications. A digitization project conceivably could,
however, republish defamatory accusations.
This may have happened in California. Rabbi Lipner sued the
Regional Oral History Office in the Bancroft Library at the University
of California. He claimed that program had defamed him by recording, printing, and distributing an interview with Richard Goldman in
which Goldman made a number of allegedly false and defamatory
statements about Lipner. A court found the statue of limitations (one
year in California) had expired and dismissed the case.
But when does publication occur? This was an issue in another
case involving Rabbi Lipner and the oral histories. The appeals court
in that case concluded that the limited distribution of an oral history
prior to the commencement of the suit did not constitute publication for the purposes of California law. Late in 2007, the California
Supreme Court reversed this opinion. The court ruled that the Bancroft did indeed “publish” the oral histories many years ago when it
distributed a few copies to other repositories.16 In addition, the court
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the clock to file an action should
only commence when an alleged defamation is discovered, and not
when it was published. (Hebrew Academy v. Goldman)

Appropriation of name or likeness
The appropriation of someone’s name or likeness sounds very much like
the right of publicity. The right of publicity, however, is an economic right.
Privacy law protects against unauthorized use of someone’s name or likeness even when there is no commercial use.
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Defenses
There are generally three defenses to charges of invasion of privacy: death,
newsworthiness, and permission. Traditionally (and in contrast with some
versions of the right of publicity), all rights of privacy expire when you expire.
If the subjects in the documents are deceased, they can be digitized. If the
private facts that are revealed are of legitimate public interest or concern,
then an invasion of privacy action should fail. Repositories can always seek
the permission, preferably in writing, of the individual whose privacy might
be hurt by a digitization project.
Curators in cultural heritage institutions have long been sensitive to
privacy issues when administering their collections. Digitization doesn’t
change the problem, only exacerbates it. It is one thing to “disclose” private
facts to an occasional researcher in a reading room. It is quite another to
make those items universally available on the Internet. The staff in cultural
heritage institutions must stay alert to possible privacy issues when selecting material for digitization to ensure that they are not unintentionally
making available online material that ordinary people would find to be
offensive.

Tricky Area
Correcting the Historical Record
One of the great appeals of digitization is that it can make material
that previously was difficult to discover and retrieve easily accessible
to a broader audience. In doing so, however, it may make factual
errors more broadly known.
The New York Times has faced this issue because of the easy
searchability of its digital edition. Here are examples of the complaints that they have received about the online version of the paper:

△△
△△

A person arrested years ago on charges of fondling a child said the
accusation was false and the charges were dropped. The Times
reported the arrest but not the disposition of the case.
A woman said her wedding announcement 20 years ago gave the
incorrect university from which she graduated. She is afraid prospective employers who Google her will suspect résumé inflation.
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△△
△△

A woman quoted years ago in an article about weight loss said,
tearfully, that she never was a size 16, as the article stated.
The husband of a school administrator in the Midwest complained that a news brief reporting her suspension was published
after officials had already publicly said she did nothing wrong.17

No cultural institution wants to alter the historical record, but it
would be wise to establish a policy outlining what the institution will
do in response to a request prior to its receipt. One digital repository
reports that although it will not remove an offending article from
page images, it will remove the text of the article from the metadata
provided to search engines, making the item much harder to find.
Other solutions include:

△△
△△

Inserting in the item errata or cross-references to explanatory
essays
Encouraging the aggrieved party to create their own explanatory
Web site that could be indexed by search engines and retrieved at
the same time

9.5 Contracts
These guidelines have been primarily about the impact of copyright on
digitization projects. However, laws relevant to the physical embodiment of
the collection item can also be important, most notably personal property
law and contract. For example, it is common for material held by an institution to have been acquired according to a deed of gift, loan agreement, or
other transfer document. Such documentation may include restrictions on
how the repository may use the material. There are a number of implications of this:

△△

Failure to comply with such conditions may have significant legal consequences for the institution, for instance as a result of breach of contract.
In some cases, it could even result in property in an item returning to
the donor. This is not to mention the relationship management issues
that may arise if an institution agrees to donor conditions, only to ignore
or override them at a later stage.
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△△

By and large, restrictions specified in contract take precedence over any
rights specified in copyright. This is particularly true for the Section 108
libraries and archives exemptions; Section 108(f)(4) states explicitly that
nothing in the section overrides any “contractual obligations assumed
at any time by the library or archives when it obtained a copy . . . of a
work in its collections.”

The upshot is that institutions should be careful when accepting gifts
subject to conditions, and when reviewing loan contracts, to ensure that
any such obligations and restrictions are reasonable and consistent with
institutional missions. Where a condition or contractual provision is no
longer workable, it may be necessary to obtain legal advice on the best
way to proceed.18
Of course, many cultural institutions themselves use contract law when
licensing copyright or to mimic the exclusive rights found in copyright when
they are not the copyright owner or if the work is in the public domain.
For example, a repository may create “terms of use” on a Web site, or have
recipients of copies of collection items sign a user agreement (in effect a
contract) that stipulates that they may not further reproduce that work, or
give the copy to others, or publicly display the work, without first getting
permission of the cultural institution. Reproduction, distribution, and
public display are normally the exclusive rights reserved to the copyright
owner, but here the cultural institution is using contract law to mimic those
rights in order to create what has been called a kind of “quasi-copyright.”19
We should emphasize, again, that the cultural institution’s ability to
restrict subsequent use of reproductions provided from its collections is
based not on copyright but on the institution’s physical ownership of the
material. The cultural institution tells users that they may have access to the
physical item, and may receive copies of that item, but only if the users agree
to abide to the terms specified by the institution. In a physical repository,
this contract is usually established by providing to the user a copy of the
institution’s rules and regulations regarding use of the material. For digital
collections, such agreements are often established by means of the clickthrough and browse-wrap licenses discussed in Chapter 7. As noted in that
chapter, measures that regulate or restrict public access to collection items
can be highly controversial, in particular where the underlying material is
in the public domain.
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Despite this controversy, quasi-copyright contractual agreements are
likely legal.20 The key issue is the scope of the limitations on use in the
contractual agreement. Thus, a contract agreement that attempted to
mirror perfectly all copyright rights would not be acceptable. Section 301
makes it clear that the Copyright Act preempts all state laws, including
contract laws, that are “the equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright.” Most commentators, however, feel that the
typical agreement with a user is not the equivalent of the exclusive rights in
copyright. An exclusive right, for example, is the right to stop anyone from
reproducing a copyrighted work. The typical user agreement stipulates that
the user, and not the general public, is prohibited from reproducing a work.
What does this mean in practice? Assuming that a cultural institution
specified in its agreements that there could be no subsequent reuse of
reproductions provided by the institution to users, the institution could
bring legal action against any user who reproduced and distributed copies
provided to that user. The institution could not, however, bring legal action
against any third party who may have gotten a copy of the reproduction
and further reproduced it: there is no binding legal agreement between the
institution and the third party.
Concerns about the limited legal options available to them regarding control of public domain material have led some cultural institutions to restrict
the amount of material that they place online. In some respects, this fear is
misdirected. With online resources, it is possible to use server logs and other
tools to determine if a possibly infringing user secured the material from
the institution’s Web site. If they did, a legal action is theoretically possible.
It is impossible, however, to identify the source of digital copies made from
analog originals provided to users by the cultural institution. A photographic
reproduction provided to the user by the institution can be easily digitized
and distributed on the Web by a third party. It would be almost impossible
to determine that the third party got the copy of the digitized image from the
known user. Analog reproductions, and not digital copies, perhaps present
the greatest threat to an institution’s control over its collection.
That said, cultural institutions can use contracts and technological
measures to attempt to control subsequent use of public-domain collection
material, but in the end it is likely to be a losing struggle. Once a reproduction is made available, whether to an individual user or to the public more
generally, the possibility of “leakage” (i.e., distribution or reuse contrary
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to terms of use) is open. At a practical level, perhaps the most useful thing
institutions can do is release content in a form or resolution that would be
unsuitable for commercial reuses—though this may greatly limit the utility
of the resource for educational and scholarly uses.

Tip
When formulating use agreements, be sure to make it clear whether you
are asserting rights based on copyright ownership or physical ownership of the material. The scope of the agreement will differ depending on
the basis for the agreement. For example, a cultural institution asserting
copyright ownership can license use of material under a Creative Commons license (discussed in Chapter 7), whereas such licenses would not
be applicable if the agreement is based on physical ownership.

9.6 International issues
These guidelines discuss copyright and digitization in terms of U.S. law. The
Internet, however, is international. As noted in Chapter 4, both copyright
law and the protection of moral rights can be qiute different outside of the
U.S. Are cultural heritage institutions expected to follow the copyright laws
of other countries?
The question is becoming less and less theoretical. At least one digitization project in the United States has received requests that it remove from
its Web site works that are in the public domain in the United States but
are protected overseas. Recently, a Canadian Web site that made copies of
public-domain digitized sheet music available on the Internet was threatened with a lawsuit by an Austrian sheet music publisher; the works were
still protected by copyright in Austria. Unable in that instance to restrict
access to the material just to Canadians, the student managing the site
removed it from the Internet.21
The issues of concern in these cases relate to “governing law” (i.e., under
which country’s law should a claim be assessed) and jurisdiction of courts
(i.e., does a particular court have the capacity to hear a claim). For instance,
if digital content is created in the United States and is stored on a U.S. server
but can be accessed overseas, can a foreign court hear an action in relation
to that content? And if so, should it apply its own law, or that of the U.S.?
Few questions are currently more unsettled in “cyberlaw” than the
area of Internet jurisdiction. From the perspective of a cultural institution,
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having to adhere to international as well as American copyright laws could
be thought to be a disaster. The institution might be forced to identify the
most restrictive copyright and privacy laws in place anywhere in the world
and then limit its digitization efforts to materials outside that restrictive
boundary.
There are two factors that limit the “chilling effect” that might be feared
to arise from potential infringement of foreign laws. First, for many types
of lawsuits to proceed in a foreign country, often the courts in that country
would have to agree that the cultural institution has a real and substantial
connection to that country (a common standard for jurisdiction). A digitization project involving material from the country and targeted at users there
could establish such a connection.
Second, even if a foreign court concluded that it had jurisdiction and
then ruled that the cultural institution infringed copyright or some other law,
the foreign plaintiff would still have to apply to an American court to have
that foreign judgment enforced—an action that is costly and not without
difficulties. In any event, it is unlikely that a U.S. court would enforce such
a judgment if the foreign law was markedly different from U.S. civil law.
These issues about U.S. enforcement will not arise, of course, if the cultural
institution has a substantial presence in the other country, as many do. The
Guggenheim Museum, for example, has a branch in Bilbao, Spain; many
universities maintain campuses overseas. If an infringement suit occurred
in a country where a cultural institution had substantial assets, those assets
could be seized as part of a judgment; there would be no need to approach
a U.S. court to enforce the ruling.
There are two things that cultural institutions can do to minimize the
risk they face:

△△
△△

First, on any Web site of digitized materials, when describing the rights
status of the material (as recommended in Chapter 10), specify that
all actions are taken in accordance with American laws. Foreign users
should be encouraged to understand the copyright laws in their own
countries before they download the material.
Second, before proceeding with a digitization project involving materials
from another country where your institution has a presence, confirm
that your project is compatible with the laws of that country. Consult
with your institution’s legal advisers to ensure that they concur with
your assessment.
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It is also possible that cultural heritage institutions will adopt “zoning”
or geolocation techniques that restrict access to their digital collections for
users in some jurisdictions. The use of geolocation is developing rapidly
across many aspects of Internet communication, and is becoming ubiquitous in advertising and common in many major audiovisual sites (such as
the BBC’s iPlayer service in the UK).

9.7 Traditional knowledge
As noted in the introduction, care should be taken when digitization efforts
include certain items from cultural heritage and indigenous collections.
There is a long history of research on indigenous populations being conducted without true informed consent or benefit sharing. Indigenous
peoples commonly lack access to information about the types and location
of information that may have been collected about them and is now held
by cultural institutions. Further, the history of acquisition of cultural heritage items is replete with examples of such items being removed without
the agreement of the country of origin and/or indigenous owners. These
items may contain secret or spiritual information or information that is
otherwise regulated under indigenous knowledge systems. Digitization of
any of this material may deeply offend the communities that are the source
of the material.
At the same time, digitization can offer a means to bring to the attention
of indigenous peoples elements of their past. Such digitization projects
may be able to proceed effectively through consultation, cultural consents,
repatriation of copy documentation in addition to original artifacts, collaborative projects, and so on.22
Note that these practices are not required by law. The Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), the governing federal
legislation, requires the return of Native American cultural items and human
remains to their respective peoples, but does not impact representations of
artifacts. There are movements both domestically and at the international
level to afford new rights in cultural heritage to indigenous peoples. At the
2007 International Council of Museums (ICOM) meeting, a general resolution was passed to “to support the efforts of WIPO and other relevant
organizations to develop and implement a new WIPO Convention and other
Conventions aiming to ensure the protection of the collective moral rights
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of the originators, inheritors, transmitters, and performers of the world’s
traditional cultural expressions, and traditional knowledge.”23 It remains to
be seen whether any of these efforts will result in legally binding obligations;
cultural institutions should stay abreast of developments.
Yet regardless of the legal requirements, there is much that institutions
can do to adopt more culturally sensitive practices. Institutions that desire
to digitize the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples should be aware
of the issues raised in the relevant literature, such as the proposed “Protocols for Native American Archival Materials.”24 Through consultation and
dialogue, it should be possible to bring the benefits of digitization without
offending or causing harm.
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10 Risk Management
How to Digitize Safely

10.1 Introduction
As should be apparent by now, many digitization projects are likely to entail
some risk to the cultural heritage institutions undertaking them. The reasons for this risk are many, and include:

△△△△
△△△△
△△

The copyright status of the work may be unclear
It may not be possible to identify all of the subsisting copyrights incorporated into one work
It may not be possible to locate copyright owners and secure permission
Works that are in the public domain in the United States may be protected by copyright in other countries
Individuals and groups may believe they have more rights in material
than the law allows, and take umbrage when an institution digitizes
the material

In the face of such uncertainty, some cultural institutions might become
“spooked” and conclude that they should avoid digitization projects. This
would be an unfortunate overreaction.
A better alternative is to identify the possible risks associated with a
digitization project prior to its commencement and identify strategies to
mitigate some of those risks. Research might also lead one to conclude that
although the contemplated action might technically infringe copyright, the
likelihood that anyone would complain is small. After assessing and mitigating risks, each cultural institution can determine whether it is comfortable
with the level of risk associated with each project before proceeding.
How an institution assesses risk will vary with the institution and the
particular project under consideration. Relevant factors might include the
nature of material being digitized, the accessibility of digital content, the
likely remedies in the event of legal proceedings, the availability of sovereign
immunity arguments (for state institutions, see Chapter 5), the arguable
existence of an implied license, the likelihood of a complaint being made, the
potential impact of the project on the institution’s reputation or relationship
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with current and future donors, the institution’s level of comfort with risk,
the availability of legal advice, and the perceived social utility of proceeding
with the project. Furthermore, there may be steps that the institution can
take to minimize its risk profile.
This chapter discusses the risk analysis calculus with which institutions
must engage. It addresses questions such as:

△△△△
△△△△
△△

What factors increase the risk my institution faces?
How likely is it that I might be sued?
What are the potential damages?
What strategies can my institution follow to minimize risk?
What role do disclaimers and other notices play?

The risk-analysis calculus must be institution- and project-specific.
For example, a state institution, because of the availability of a sovereign
immunity argument (see Chapter 5), might conclude that it is at a lower risk
than a private institution and be more willing to undertake a project. An
institution with in-house legal counsel and copyright insurance might be
more willing to accept risk than would a small organization that would have
to rely on outside pro bono assistance in the event of a lawsuit. No general
rules, therefore, on what is an acceptable level of risk can be formulated;
each institution must decide on its own.

10.2 Recap of potential risks
Table 10.1 below summarizes some of the ways that a digitization project
can place an institution at risk:

ii	Table 10.1
Factors that indicate your institution is at risk of
infringing copyright
subsists in
item is protected, having
ɉɉ Copyright
ɉɉThe
the collection item.
regard to its originality, place of

ɉɉ
194

authorship or publication, and
so forth.
Copyright has not yet expired.

See Chapters
2 and 3

Elements working to minimize risk: the litigation calculus

cultural institution ɉɉ General rule is that the “author” is
ɉɉThe
does not own copyright.
the copyright owner. Note special
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See Chapter 3

rules, e.g., for works made for hire.

has been no assignment
ɉɉThere
of copyright to the cultural
institution.

cultural institution ɉɉThe exclusive rights vary with the
ɉɉThe
engages in one of the
material under consideration.
exclusive rights of the ɉɉ Exclusive rights include digitizacopyright owner.
tion and online distribution.

See Chapter 4

act does not fall
ɉɉThe
within an exemption

Examples of exemptions include:

See Chapters

ɉɉ Options:

Do not proceed with the use (or
ɉɉ select
other material which raises

5 and 6
ɉɉ Fair use
under the Copyright Act ɉɉ Libraries and archives provisions
has not
Express permission has not been See Chapter 7
ɉɉ Permission
ɉɉ obtained
been secured from the
from the copyright owner
copyright owner
No implied permission can be
ɉɉ discerned

no copyright issues); or

with use under a risk
ɉɉ Proceed
management strategy.

10.3 Elements working to minimize risk: the litigation calculus
The risk of litigation against cultural institutions varies, but historically has
been very low. There have been very few court decisions that address the
reproduction and distribution activities of cultural institutions.1

Did You Know?
Court cases involving copyright infringement by cultural heritage
institutions are rare. When they occur, there is often an unusual twist
to them: either the institution itself is unusual or the contested activity is not part of normal services. Some of the most prominent recent
cases include:

△△

Hotaling v. LDS: The court concluded that the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints illegally distributed a copyrighted work (a
microfiche) by including in its catalog a record for an unauthorized
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copy. Most copyright-infringement cases involve reproduction; this
is one of the few to address the distribution right.
Sundeman v. Seajay Society: The Seajay Society, a private foundation associated with the University of South Carolina, copied
all of its copy of Marjorie Rawling’s unpublished first novel for
a researcher (who was also an officer of the Society). The court
found the foundation’s copying of the entire manuscript for the
researcher to be a fair use based on the researcher’s use of the
material, in effect equating the researcher and the foundation of
which she was an officer.
Internet Archive v. Suzanne Shell: Shell, the proprietor of a Web site
at www.profane-justice.org, sued the Internet Archive, which is
sometimes considered to be a library, for copyright infringement
and breach of contract for violating the site’s terms of use when
the Archive’s robotic spiders copied Shell’s site for display in the
Archive’s WayBack Machine. The case was settled out of court.
Few cultural institutions currently harvest third-party Web sites
without permission, but they may face similar challenges if the
practice becomes more common.
Hoepker v. Kruger: Barbara Kruger, an artist specializing in collages
and other composite works, used a photograph by German photographer Thomas Hoepker in one of her works. Kruger gave permission to the Museum of Contemporary Art LA and the Whitney
Museum to use the image on newsletters and brochures publicizing an exhibit as well as on postcards, note cubes, magnets, and
T-shirts. Hoepker and his model sued Kruger and the museums

△△

△△

△△

Barbara Kruger.
Untitled (It's a small world but not if you have to clean it),
1990. The Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles,
License: No copyright information provided, but presumably copyright is owned by Kruger. Kruger added the text to
the photograph taken by Thomas Hoepker. Used here under
an assertion of fair use.
Source: http://www.moca-la.org/museum/pc_artwork_
detail.php?acsnum=90.4
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for copyright infringement and invasion of privacy. The court
dismissed the copyright charge, concluding that Hoepker’s work
was in the public domain in the United States. The privacy action
was also dismissed because the products depicting the work were
sold to disseminate Kruger’s artistic expression.2

There are a number of reasons for this dearth of case law, but one of
the most important is what we might call the “litigation calculus” that the
copyright owner engages in. That is, in deciding whether or not to bring a
court action, a copyright owner will usually weigh the costs of litigation (e.g.,
the time and expense of bringing court proceedings) against the potential
benefits (e.g., the size and nature of potential remedies). This analysis will
vary according to the type of material under consideration, the profession of
the copyright owner, the nature of the allegedly infringing use, and so forth.
For example, where copyright is very financially valuable to the copyright
owner (examples might include architectural plans and contemporary art
and design), owners might be concerned when an institution reproduces
their works without permission or without paying remuneration, particularly in commercial products. In contrast, authors of private diaries or
letters and the takers of family photographs may have less concern about
enforcing copyright—although privacy concerns may arise for some of
them, others may be excited that their works are being preserved and
accessed.
As indicated above, the costs of copyright litigation can be high. All
copyright actions must be brought in federal (as opposed to state or small
claims) courts, and they are usually litigated by highly specialized (and
hence well-compensated) intellectual property lawyers who typically charge
hundreds of dollars an hour. There are many steps to complete before trial
takes place (such as drafting pleadings, making discovery of documents,
filing and responding to motions, etc), and even after a decision has been
handed down, appeal may be possible. Costs in the vicinity of tens of thousands of dollars are not uncommon.3 The decision to begin an infringement
action, therefore, should not be made lightly. (Of course, although the high
cost of copyright litigation may work to limit the number of actual lawsuits
filed, it also is one reason why cultural institutions should act responsibly
in avoiding such lawsuits.)
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Did You Know?
Because some copyright decisions include the award of attorneys’
fees to the prevailing side, we can see the actual costs for one side of
these high-profile instances of copyright litigation:

△△△△
△△△△

$813,724.25 (Matthew Bender v. West)
$1,825,886.09 (Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions)
$1,347,519.15 (Fantasy Inc. v. Fogerty)
$2.9 million (Religious Technology Center v. Scott)

Most judgments for attorneys’ fees are for much less than the
above amounts. These figures, however, give an indication of how
expensive some litigation can become!

Balanced against the potentially high cost of bringing proceedings are
the low returns that are likely to come from a successful action against
many cultural heritage institutions. As was discussed in Chapters 4 and
5, three provisions of the Copyright Act limit the remedies available to a
copyright owner:

△△

Section 504(c)(3) stipulates that nonprofit educational institutions,
libraries, and archives are not subject to statutory damages for copyright
infringement when they have reasonable grounds for believing that
their use is a fair use.
Section 412 states that there can be no award of statutory damages
or attorneys fees for infringement of unpublished works prior to
registration.
The 11th Amendment to the Constitution makes it possible for libraries, archives, and museums that are part of state governments to raise
a sovereign immunity argument in relation to copyright claims for
monetary damages (see Chapter 5).

△△
△△

From a monetary viewpoint, these provisions make it financially risky
to bring legal action against a library or archives. (Museums may make for
slightly better targets unless they are also nonprofit educational institutions.) It may be possible to stop infringing conduct through a court-ordered
injunction, but the amount of money that a successful plaintiff can recover
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by way of damages may be limited. In many cases, it will only be the actual
monetary loss that the copyright owner has suffered—usually the license
fee that would have been required had permission been secured in advance.
Given that in many cases the material that a cultural institution is likely
to want to digitize is going to have low commercial value, any damages
that a repository would be forced to pay would not warrant the expense of
a suit.
A final note should be added. As a general rule, most legal disputes,
regardless of the subject, settle well before trial or final judgment; indeed,
many are resolved before the institution of proceedings. The reported
decisions of the courts only reflect a very small percentage of the total
number of disputes. On the positive side, this demonstrates that there are
many opportunities to reach a resolution with the copyright owner prior
to litigation or judgment. This may be through payment of a retrospective
licensing fee, removing content from a Web site, supplying the copyright
owner with copies of the publication in which their material is reproduced,
and/or adding an attribution indicating the owner of copyright: see section 10.4. However, this also means that the cost of dispute resolution
(leaving aside any litigation) should be factored into an institution’s risk
analysis. Indeed, it is also wise to have considered how the institution
might respond to claims from copyright owners early in a project, and
certainly before it publicly releases content. This is discussed further in
section 10.6.

10.4 Cease-and-desist notices
Very rarely will the first notification of an aggrieved copyright owner arrive
in the form of a filed lawsuit. It is much more common for a cultural institution first to receive a letter complaining of a perceived violation, and steps
the institution can take to rectify the alleged harm (such as payment of
money, destruction of infringing copies, and/or removal of material from
the Internet).
Such a “letter of demand” or “cease and desist” notice may take the form
of a letter or an e-mail directed to someone in authority at the cultural institution. It might also take the form of a DMCA “takedown” notice (sometimes
called a DMCA 512 notice, after the section of the Copyright Act where its
provisions are spelled out). Section 512 allows copyright owners to ask an
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Internet Service Provider (ISP) to remove from its servers material that is
allegedly infringing. If the ISP responds expeditiously, it is immune from
any claim of contributory infringement.
This raises an initial question—is a cultural institution an ISP for the
purposes of this provision? As discussed in the Tip below, the answer
would generally be no. That said, many copyright owners are familiar with
the DMCA takedown notice provisions and use them for all infringement
complaints. It is therefore useful to be aware of their existence and designated content.
The component parts of a DMCA takedown notice as found in 17 U.S.C.
512(c)(3) are:

△△△△
△△△△
△△

The name, address, and electronic signature of the complaining party
The infringing materials and their Internet location
Sufficient information to identify the copyrighted works
A statement by the owner that it has a good faith belief that use of the
material has not been authorized by the copyright owner
A statement that the information in the notice is accurate and, under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on
the behalf of the copyright owner

Tip
A cultural institution that mounts digitized material on its own
servers would not generally be eligible for Section 512 safe-harbor
protections. This is because Section 512 is directed to entities that
maintain servers on which third parties can place content. It gives the
hosting entity some protection from liability for contributory infringement. This is very different from most digitization projects, where the
institution selects and publishes the material online.
There is no harm, however, in registering a DMCA designated
agent with the Copyright Office. You are protected in the event
that any third-party material should ever be added to your servers.
Furthermore, including the name of a “DMCA designated agent”
somewhere on your Web site makes it clear who on your staff should
receive copyright complaints.
Instructions on how to register a designated agent are found at
http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/.
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If a cultural institution receives a complaint about an alleged infringement of copyright or a DMCA takedown notice, there are a number of
options for settling the dispute. These include offering to:

△△△△
△△△△
△△

Take down infringing content from the Internet
Pay a retrospective license fee
Pay monetary compensation
Provide free copies of books or other items in which the copyright
owner’s material appears
Insert an attribution line indicating the copyright owner’s rights

It may be possible to negotiate an acceptable outcome for the institution and copyright holder without involving lawyers. However, it may be
useful to brief a lawyer on difficult cases or if you are have questions about
how to draft settlement terms. For instance, it may be important that the
agreed terms expressly state they comprise the full and final settlement of
the dispute, to ensure that the copyright owner does not later commence
proceedings in relation to the same complaint. It is also common for parties
to sign terms of settlement on the basis that they do not admit liability. A
lawyer can advise on the terms most appropriate for your institution.
Litigation is most likely to follow a cease-and-desist letter when the
legal issues are uncertain, the stakes in bringing the litigation are high, or
the plaintiff has noneconomic concerns and wants to use its copyright to
address them. A classic example of the latter is when someone uses control
of a copyright to enforce his or her sense of privacy. A copyright owner may
also commence litigation when the alleged infringer delays in responding
to a complaint. It is therefore advisable to deal with disputes in a timely
manner (even if you believe that you are not at fault or that the dispute
can be resolved easily).

Did You Know?
Just because someone complains about an alleged infringement or
forwards a DMCA takedown notice to the institution does not mean
that the cultural institution is automatically at fault. Sometimes the
aggrieved party complains about uses that are arguably excused.
The Web site “Chilling Effects” (at http://www.chillingeffects.org)
has been collecting cease-and-desist letters and DMCA takedown
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notices that have been sent to Web sites. In 2005, the Free Expression Policy Project at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of
Law conducted a study of 320 letters on the site. They concluded that
“more than 20% either stated weak copyright or trademark claims, or
involved speech with a strong or at least reasonable free expression
or fair use defense. Another 27% attacked material with possible free
expression or fair use defenses.”4

10.5 Workflow for minimizing risk
Flowchart 10.1 depicts a workflow designed to minimize the possibility of
violating copyright.
The amount of risk involved at each stage increases (perhaps with the
exception of digitization under a license, which tends to promote certainty,
but has other logistical issues), as the following brief discussion of each of
the eight steps indicates.

You own all the copyrights
If you are the copyright owner of a work, you are free to digitize it. The
key issue is making sure that you actually are the copyright owner; that
any copyright transfers are valid; and that you have not inadvertently
transferred copyright to someone else. For instance, if the work is from
employees of your organization, make sure that separate employment
agreements do not change the normal work-made-for-hire arrangements.
In many environments, authors believe that work belongs to them when
it actually belongs to their employers. Remember, too, that there can be
layers of copyright in a work, and it is necessary to have the permission of
the owners of the copyrights in all of the layers before proceeding. Lastly,
make sure that there are no privacy, publicity, or other non-copyright rights
that may pose a challenge.

The copyrights are in the public domain
A work may be in the public domain either because it was never protected
by copyright in the first place or because all of the copyrights have expired.
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	Flowchart
10.1
m

m

Safe Digitization Workflow
Digitize when…

You are
the © owner
of all the copyrights
in the work
[Chapter 2]

You have
secured permission
from the © owner
[Chapters 7 and 3]

If no…

If no…

All the
copyrights in the work are
in the public domain
[Chapter 3]

Permission
can’t be secured
because the © owner
can’t be found
[Chapter 8]

If no…

A Section 108,
Libraries and Archives,
exemption applies
[Chapter 6]

Reassess
Section 107
Fair Use Analysis
[Chapter 5]

If no…

A Section 107,
Fair Use,
exemption applies
[Chapter 5]

Explain, Solicit, Document,
and Avoid Commercial Use
[Chapter 10]
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The biggest risk when digitizing public domain works is that you have miscalculated the copyright status of the work. When thinking about copyright
term, keep the distinctions between published and unpublished in mind.
Many works that we might think are published (such as a radio broadcast or
a play) can actually be unpublished for purposes of copyright. Remember,
too, that works first published abroad may have had their copyright restored
(even if the American edition of the work you are examining appears to be
in the public domain). Again, be sure to consider all of the copyrights when
dealing with a work with multiple layers.

One of the Section 108 exemptions apply
Most digitization projects seek to provide public access via the Internet
to digitized materials. Using Section 108, you may be able to do this for
published material in its last 20 years of copyright term. For other digitization projects, you are restricted to on-premises use (if relying solely on
Section 108).

You conclude that digitization is a fair use
As discussed in Chapter 6, it is difficult to employ fair use as a justification
for the digitization and general public distribution of entire copyrighted
works. Nevertheless, by carefully tailoring a project in accordance with the
fair-use factors found in Section 107, it may be possible to decrease the risk
of infringement in other types of projects. For instance, limiting access to
a small defined community for a specific research purpose might help, as
might limiting the amount of material that can be retrieved (Google’s “snippets” argument) or only making content available in a low-resolution format.
Developing new products such as visual indexes and catalogs that are more
than substitutes for the original works could also potentially qualify as a
fair use. If you decide to adopt a fair-use rationale for digitization, be sure
to work closely with your legal advisers in advance.
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You secure the permission of the copyright owner
The safest, but also potentially the most expensive, way to minimize risk
is to digitize with the permission of the copyright owner. The primary
risk associated with this approach is that someone may claim to own a
copyright when in reality it belongs to someone else. Requiring warranties
and indemnification with any grant of permission can decrease risk, but
indemnities are not infallible, and they may decrease the likelihood of
securing permission if documentation looks too legalistic.
Perhaps the bigger issue associated with securing permission from the
copyright owner is logistical: the impact on your budget. Identifying and
locating copyright owners can be expensive. It may make little sense to
spend $100 to locate an owner of a work if you would only spend $0.05 in
a license fee or if the penalties for an infringing use are similarly low. There
are a number of internal mechanisms that institutions can implement to
help reduce transactions costs of licensing (such as information management
tools and obtaining licenses for some activities at acquisition). Collective
management by copyright owners can also help streamline the process.

The work you want to digitize is an orphan work
Orphan works are materials for which the copyright owner is difficult or
impossible to identify or locate. Two key questions arise for management of
orphan works: (1) what level of search must be undertaken before a work is
designated as orphaned; and (2) what are the consequences of such a designation (for instance, what sort of digitization efforts might be undertaken
for orphaned material)?
In relation to the first question, some investigation of the copyright
status of a work is always in order. Almost all discussions of orphan works
start with the assumption that the user conducts at a minimum a “reasonable” search for a copyright owner. It would be wise to document in writing
the rationale for the approach you have taken, and to keep a paper trail of
individual searches.
In relation to the second question, this will come down to the usual riskmanagement factors: the nature of the orphaned material, the purpose of
the use, the level of public accessibility, and so on. It may also depend on
how viable a fair-use argument is, as discussed next.
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Reassess fair use and the overall risk
If, after conducting a reasonable search for the copyright owner of a work,
the owner still cannot be found, conduct a fresh fair-use analysis. If an owner
cannot be found, it suggests that the market impact of your proposed use
is low, perhaps lower than you initially assumed. This is highly relevant to
analysis of the fourth fair-use factor, and may alter your conclusion about
the likely determination of a fair-use defense.5 A digitization project that may
have initially seemed to be unfair may now be judged to be fair. As already
discussed, there may also be ways of structuring your project to tailor it to
the fair-use factors—it may be worthwhile to revisit these.

Question
When is it permissible knowingly to infringe copyright?
These guidelines have assumed that cultural heritage institutions
do not wish to knowingly violate copyright. There are situations,
however, when it is conceivable that an institution may wish to
infringe. As an example, imagine a collection that has a large number
of artworks created by African craftspeople during the first half of
the twentieth century. There is no documentation extant to indicate
whether the works were “published” for copyright purposes. The
institution wishes to digitize the works and then make the images
accessible via a Web site that requires a subscription for access. It
also intends to market the images individually. In recognition that
the works are part of the cultural heritage of Africa, the institution
intends to provide free access to the database to African
institutions.
Because the works are anonymous and may be unpublished, it is
likely that they are still protected by copyright in the United States.
A fair-use analysis of the institution’s plans would suggest that the
proposed use is infringing. The purpose is commercial rather than
educational; the works are creative and unpublished; the entire work
is being duplicated; and the market impact would be great since a
copyright owner would be affected in his or her ability to market or
license the work once it was broadly available. All four factors would
appear to weigh against a finding of fair use.
The likelihood is extremely small, however, that the heirs of
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the Africans who created the works will realize that they own the
copyright in the works under U.S. law, learn that the works have been
digitized and are available electronically, and proceed to bring a copyright-infringement suit in a U.S. court. In addition, African institutions
would have free access, and through them African users would also
be more likely to gain access. Thus, there would be an arguable public
benefit to the wider communities from which the works came. In this
situation, given the extremely low risk present and the wider perceived benefits, the institution may decide to proceed.

10.6 Explain, solicit, document, and contribute
Regardless of which of the approaches listed above an institution prefers for
any given project, there are certain general recommendations that should
be followed in all instances. The recommended actions may lower the risks
associated with digitization. In addition, they suggest that you are a “good
actor.” There is no general exemption for “good intentions” or “innocent
infringement” in copyright (remember the discussion in Chapter 2 of the
strict liability provisions of copyright), but judges tend to look more favorably on litigants who have acted responsibly. The suggestions also represent
general good practice in digitization.
The four key elements are:

△△△△
△△△△

Explain what you are doing
Solicit information from copyright owners
Document your copyright investigations
If you don’t have clear copyright title, avoid commercial use

Explain what you are doing
Regardless of the justification that you use for your digitization project, be
sure to explain what you have done on your Web site. If you believe that
there are no known copyright restrictions on the work, say so. If you are
using Section 108(h) to make materials available during their last 20 years
of copyright, say so. At a minimum, you should make information on the
general copyright status of the project available to potential users. It is a
service to your patrons to provide them with information on your copyright
investigations of individual items.6
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Tip
Here is an excellent explanation of why works were digitized, from
the Web site for the Prosperity and Thrift collection at the Library of
Congress’s American Memory project. Note that they have determined that some items are in the public domain; others are made
available with the permission of the copyright owner; and still others,
after an extensive search for the copyright owners, are made available
under an assertion of fair use:
The Library of Congress has exhaustively researched the
contents of this collection to ascertain any possible legal
rights embodied in the materials. Items included here with
the permission of rights holders are listed below. Many of the
items in this collection are in the public domain, that is, not
subject to copyright protection such as the works of employees of the federal government of the United States.
Despite extensive research, the Library has been unable to
identify all possible rights holders in the materials in this collection. Thus, some of the materials provided here online are
made available under an assertion of fair use [17 U.S.C. § 107].
Therefore, we stress that this collection and the materials
contained therein are provided strictly for noncommercial
educational and research purposes. Again, responsibility for
making an independent legal assessment and independently
securing any necessary permissions ultimately rests with
persons desiring to use particular items in the context of the
intended use.7

Leave the door open to orphaned copyright owners
You never want your first contact with an aggrieved copyright owner to be
via a lawsuit, so make other avenues available. Announce on your Web site
that you would like to hear from unidentified copyright owners. Information they can provide will increase your knowledge about objects in your
collections. The dialogue may also begin a mutually beneficial discussion
of permission, licensing, or takedown.
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Tip
The Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation and
Archives at Cornell University has a good example of this approach on
its Web page for labor photographs, most of which are orphan works:
The Kheel Center would like to learn more about these images
and hear from any copyright owners who are not properly
identified on this Web site so that we may make the necessary
corrections. If you have any additional information about the
images or would like to suggest a correction, please contact
Barb Morley at kheel_center@cornell.edu. Please include the
photo identification number (e.g., 5780pb32f14a).8

Document your investigations
Many of the existing and proposed protections for libraries, archives, and
nonprofit educational institutions require that either an institution has a
“reasonable belief” that its use is fair or has first conducted a “reasonable
investigation.” It is fundamentally important to document any copyright
investigations you conduct as part of the digitization process.
Documentation can vary according to the nature of the project. If, for
example, you are making material available during its last 20 years of
copyright under Section 108(h), a memo to the file explaining why and how
you concluded the selected works were in their last 20 years of copyright
would be sufficient.
For a fair-use analysis, you will want to document your assessment of the
four factors found in the statute, along with any other applicable factors. The
Copyright Management Center at IUPUI has developed a “Fair Use Checklist”
which is very helpful in documenting fair use analyses. A copy is found in
Table 10.2; an online version is available from Columbia University.9 The
University of Minnesota has constructed a similar online fair-use-analysis
tool: see http://www.lib.umn.edu/copyright/checklist.phtml.
It is certainly permissible to adapt the sample checklists for specific
projects. For example, it may not be necessary to complete a form for every
letter in a manuscript collection, but rather complete one form for a group
of items that have identical copyrights and will be used in the same way.
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Remember, too, that not all elements have to weigh in favor of fair use—the
important thing is that the preponderance of the elements favors fair use.
Most of all, remember that the analysis does not have ultimately to be correct,
but merely reasonable. The important thing is that you conduct a serious
analysis of each fair-use factor that you document and retain.

Avoid Commercial Use
Perhaps the most fundamental step you can take to minimize risk is to
avoid making commercial use of reproductions of copyrighted works. With
works in the public domain or works whose copyright you clearly own, you
can of course charge whatever you want for their use. And when you have
secured permission from a copyright owner to digitize a work, you can also
negotiate the right to commercialize the work.
Generally, no commercial use should be made of copyrighted works
without the permission of the rights holder. Commercial use eliminates
any 108 defense, and makes it much harder to claim that a use is a fair use.
A hefty check from a motion picture company or commercial publisher may
look appealing at the time it is received, but the amount of the check is likely
to pale in comparison to the damages that could be assessed in a successful
copyright-infringement suit. If you want to generate revenue through the
digitization, reproduction, and distribution of copyrighted works found in
your collections, then your obligation to search for the copyright owners
will be much stronger.

Question
Is it possible to avoid all risk?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. In spite of your best efforts to determine copyright status, identify copyright owners, and follow the most
rigorous practices, someone may nevertheless commence an action
against you.
A recent lawsuit against Cornell University demonstrates this. In
1983, two sentences appeared in the university’s newspaper stating
that a student had been arrested for burglary. In 2007, the Cornell
University Library digitized that paper and made it available online.
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ii	Table 10.2
IUPUI Checklist for Fair Use

CHECKLIST FOR FAIR USE
Please complete and retain a copy of this form in connection with each possible "fair use" of a copyrighted work for your project

Name:_________________________________

Date:____________

Institution:______________________________

Favoring Fair Use
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

Prepared by:_________________________________

PURPOSE

Teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use)
Research
Scholarship
Nonprofit Educational Institution
Criticism
Comment
News reporting
Transformative or Productive use (changes the work for new utility)
Restricted access (to students or other appropriate group)
Parody

Favoring Fair Use
R Published work
R Factual or nonfiction based
R Important to favored educational objectives

Favoring Fair Use
R Small quantity
R Portion used is not central
or significant to entire work
R Amount is appropriate for favored educational purpose

Favoring Fair Use
R User owns lawfully acquired
or purchased copy of original work
R One or few copies made
R No significant effect on the market or
potential market for copyrighted work
R No similar product marketed by the copyright holder
R Lack of licensing mechanism

Project:_________________________________

R
R
R
R
R

NATURE

Opposing Fair Use
Commercial activity
Profiting from the use
Entertainment
Bad-faith behavior
Denying credit to original author

Opposing Fair Use

R Unpublished work
R Highly creative work (art, music, novels, films, plays)
R Fiction

AMOUNT

Opposing Fair Use

R Large portion or whole work used
R Portion used is central to work
or "heart of the work"

EFFECT

Opposing Fair Use

R Could replace sale of copyrighted work
R Significantly impairs market or potential
market for copyrighted work or derivative
R Reasonably available licensing mechanism
for use of the copyrighted work
R Affordable permission available for using work
R Numerous copies made
R You made it accessible on Web or in other public forum
R Repeated or long-term use

This document is provided as a courtesy of the Copyright Management Center, IUPUI, 530 W. New York St., Indianapolis, IN 46202.
For further information and updates please visit http://www.copyright.iupui.edu/. This document last updated March 10, 2003.
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There were no copyright issues; the paper had been produced by
employees of the university.
The student, now a practicing California attorney, discovered the
article through Google and filed two suits against the University, one
for $1 million and the second for $10 million.10 In the suits, the former
student asserted libel and public disclosure of private facts through
the alleged “republication” of the article. (These torts are discussed in
more detail in Chapter 9.) The judge dismissed both suits on a number
of grounds, not the least of which was that the plaintiff had pled
guilty to a lesser charge of burglary in conjunction with the thefts.11
The judge also ordered the plaintiff to pay Cornell’s legal fees for both
cases.12
The absence of any apparent substantial legal basis for proceeding in the two suits did not stop them from occurring. Any digitization
project runs the same sorts of risks. One can hope that a judge will
quickly dismiss frivolous charges, but there is no panacea that can
protect against all actions.

“Blotter Barton,” Cornell Chronicle,
3/17/1983, p. 6.
License: published without a © notice,
so presumed to be in the public
domain.
Source: http://ecommons.
library.cornell.edu/bitstream/1813/5350/14/014_24.pdf

10.7 Conclusion
The approach to risk assessment outlined in this chapter is intended to
reduce the risk associated with digitization projects, but the danger of a
lawsuit can never be eliminated. Cultural heritage institutions have long
existed in an environment of risk—often, however they just may not have
been aware of it. For years, for example, the best practice for preservation
microfilming in libraries stipulated that the library make three copies of a
work: the camera negative, the print master, and the service copy. It was
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not until 1998, however, that the permission to do this was made explicit in
copyright law. Prior to this, each library that followed the standard accepted
the risk that this might not be considered to be a fair use.
It is important that cultural institutions respect the rights of copyright
owners. We should never forget, however, that first, copyright exists to
benefit the public good, and second, cultural institutions have long occupied
a special place in copyright law, due to their missions of preserving and
facilitating access to intellectual and creative works. It would be unfortunate
if, in their desire to avoid all risk, those same institutions failed in their
fundamental missions.
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Case Study 1

Interviews and Oral Histories
11.1 Introduction
Many cultural institutions have documents in which people are interviewed
to establish a body of information about particular cultures, events, subjects,
or geographical areas. These interviews are commonly recorded, often
on audiotape and sometimes on video. The interviews are often, though
not always, transcribed. In some instances, the interviewee speaks without interruption. In others, an interviewer may guide and encourage the
development of the story being told. Often the interviews are conducted
as part of a structured oral history project; in other cases, they may have
been interviews conducted by a reporter or author as part of background
research.
The following issues arise in relation to copyright:

△△
△△

In what expression does copyright subsist? The transcription, the
recording, the words on the recording, or all three?
Who is the author of each copyright work? The interviewee (whose
story is being recorded), the interviewer (who is providing the prompts
for the story), the person recording the interview (often, but not always,
the interviewer) or the transcriber (who is taking the spoken words of
the interviewee and interviewer and reducing them to a written form)?
Who is the owner of copyright in each work? Does the cultural institution ever own copyright?

△△

Having discussed these legal issues, this case study concludes with a
copyright checklist for digitizing oral history recordings.

11.2 Identification of potentially protected material
The first step in analyzing whether digitization of oral history interviews
raises a copyright issue is to identify all possible copyrighted works (see
Chapter 2). There are three potential copyright works in this scenario:
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△△△△
△△

The words of the interview (a literary work)
The recording itself (a sound recording or audiovisual work)
The transcript (a literary work)

Recall that the copyright in a sound or audiovisual recording is separate from any literary, dramatic, or musical work that was recorded. That
is, it is possible that one person owns copyright in the recording (either
the audio recording or the video recording), but another owns copyright
in the recorded material. This is relevant to cultural institutions because
digitization reproduces both works. It may therefore be necessary to obtain
consents from multiple parties.

11.3 Does copyright subsist in any of these items?
Copyright will only subsist in an item if the following conditions are met:

△△△△
△△

For all works—the work is fixed in some tangible form
For all works—the work is original
For sound recordings or audiovisual items—the process of “fixing” the
recording requires some creative choices (i.e., it is more than purely
“mechanical” recording)

In light of these conditions, does copyright subsist in each of the three
works identified above?

The interview
For the purpose of this case study, it will be assumed that the words of the
interview are original; an exception might arise where, for example, the
interview includes readings from a text written by another person.
There is nothing in the definition of “literary work” to suggest that it
does not apply to a speech or interview merely because the words are spoken
extempore; oral expression can be original. Furthermore, when recorded
on tape or subsequently transcribed, that expression becomes fixed. Since
original expression is fixed, federal copyright protection is afforded to the
interview itself.
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The recording
A recording is obviously fixed, so it would meet one of the requirements to
be afforded copyright protection. But what of originality?
The act of talking can be a form of performance. One need only think
of the difference between a good and bad audiobook to know how much
the performance of the speaker matters. It is likely, therefore, that the
speakers in an interview would have a copyright in their performance as
recorded. If sound or video engineers record the interview, and if they make
judgments on how best to capture the interview or subsequently alter, edit,
or remix the interview, then they might be an author of a copyright in the
recording as well.

The transcript
We have suggested above that the words spoken in an oral history interview when fixed by recording are copyrighted. But can a transcript of that
interview have its own copyright, separate from the words themselves?
Transcripts clearly exist in material form, and so meet one of the two
requirements for copyright protection. It is much harder to conceive of a
transcript that contains the requisite originality. If a transcript is a mere
factual expression of the words spoken on the tape, then there would be
no separate copyright in it; the only copyright would exist in the words
spoken in the interview. With most oral history transcriptions, it would
seem unlikely that a separate copyright could exist in the transcript.
If, however, the transcriber expends significant skill and effort to create
the transcript, a court might conclude that an original literary work had
been created.1 For example, deleting irrelevant text, editing the expression
(e.g., removing “ums” and correcting grammar and syntax), and in particular changing the order in which text appears in order to produce the final
work might create a work that is different from the original interview, and
hence copyrightable in its own right. It might be bad oral history practice,
but good for copyright ownership.
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11.4 Who is the author of the work?
Copyright can conceivably subsist in the interview itself, the recording of
that interview, and in an edited transcript of the interview. Who would be
the owner of the copyright in each instance?

The interview
In most interviews, the most important contribution comes from the
interviewee, and it is almost certain that he or she owns at least a part of
the copyright in the interview. As John Neuenschwander notes, when the
tape stops rolling, “the interviewee is usually deemed to be the sole author
of the tape and the singular copyright holder.”2
Interviews involve an interviewer as well. Whether the interviewer’s
own contributions are original enough to warrant copyright becomes a
question of fact. When the interviewer merely gives a general framework
for the interview and the interviewee essentially speaks uninterrupted, then
the interviewer’s contribution may not be original enough for him or her
to be considered an author. But if the interviewer is an important figure in
his or her right and the interview is as much about his or her contributions
as it is about the interviewee, or if the questions the interviewer poses are
creative and original, then it is possible that the interviewer would own a
copyright in his or her own words.3
It is also theoretically possible that the work of the interviewer and the
interviewee could be considered to be a “joint work,” which is defined in
copyright law as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole” [17 U.S.C. § 101]. If a joint work, copyright would
be shared equally between the interviewer and the interviewee, and either
of them could exercise any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.
The interviewer, if a joint copyright owner, could assign his or her copyright
to the repository—or authorize a repository to digitize the work and make
it available online.
Some recent oral history theory has stressed the collaborative nature
of authorship in the oral history process—and in the process, laid the
groundwork for at least a theoretical argument for joint authorship. Kathryn
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Marie Dudley, for example, has argued that authorship is a tenuous concept
in oral histories:
. . . the production of oral testimony is always a collaborative,
dialogic, jointly orchestrated affair. Out of this social interaction
emerges a document of which it can rightly be said that the author
function is up for grabs . . . What gives the author function its
critical edge in oral history and ethnography is the fact that no
one ‘authors’ the texts we produce, yet the truth conditions of our
discourse require that someone step forward to claim that authorship, with all the legal, political and moral ramifications it entails.4

Eliot Mazé notes that “If the interview is most productively understood
as a dialogic event, formed by the narrative strategies of both the interviewer
and interviewee, then any archived representation of that event must
somehow grant equal authorship to those on all sides of the microphone.”5
Recent court cases on joint authorship have identified the intent of the
parties as being the key element. In the oral history context, this would boil
down to one key fact: did the interviewer and interviewee intend to create a
joint work with each as a joint author? Intent is especially important when
“one person . . . is indisputably the dominant author of the work and the
only issue is whether that person is the sole author or she and another . . .
are joint authors.”6 For example, an editor and a writer may intend their
contributions to be merged into an inseparable whole, “yet very few editors and even fewer writers would expect the editor to be accorded the
status of joint author, enjoying an undivided half interest in the copyright
in the published work.”7 Intent can be established by examining the facts
surrounding authorship and ownership, including who had final decisionmaking authority, the agreed-upon credits for the work, the description of
authorship in written agreements with third parties, and other additional
evidence.8 In a rare case, it may be possible to argue that the intent of the
parties in an oral history interview was to create a joint work.
Remember, too, that if the interviewer is an employee of an oral history
organization and the interview is conducted as part of his or her employment, the “author” of the copyright would be the oral history program, not
the interviewer.
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The recording
The ownership of copyright in a recording of an interview is complex. It
should at a minimum include the contributions of the “performers” (the
interviewee and possibly the interviewer) who are captured on tape.
It may include as well the contribution of the recording engineers and/
or producers responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and
processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final
sound recording. If a video recording, it could include the director and video
engineers who oversee the shoot. If the sound or video engineers recording
the interview engage in any creative work eligible for copyright protection,
it is likely that it would merge with the interviewee and potentially interviewer in a joint work of copyright.
Although in theory a recording engineer (or his or her employer) could
own the copyright in the recording, what they can do with that recording
is very limited. Since there is an underlying copyright in interview, in order
to reproduce or distribute the recording, the permission of the copyright
owner of the interview (most likely the interviewee) would be needed. CBS
Television, for example, could not use the video it had shot of Martin Luther
King, Jr., delivering the “I have a dream” speech without first securing permission from the Martin Luther King, Jr., estate, which owns the copyright
in the text captured on the film (Estate of Martin L. King v. CBS).

The transcript
Again, there are two possible copyright authors for the transcript. The
work could be considered to be a joint work between the interviewer, the
interviewee, and the transcriber—assuming that all intended to create
a joint work in which they shared equally. Alternatively, each individual
could own the copyright in his or her contribution, but not have an interest
in the others’ work. That would mean, for example, that the interviewer
could not authorize the reproduction of the transcript that could contain
copyrightable contributions from the transcriber. On the other hand, the
transcriber could not solely authorize the reproduction of the transcript,
since it would contain the interviewer’s original contributions as well as
those of the transcriber.
Transcriptions are frequently conducted by outside contractors. It is
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unlikely that they would contribute enough original content to warrant a
copyright of their own, but it would be wise to stipulate as part of the contract
that they transfer to the organization commissioning the transcription any
copyright they may have in the material

11.5 Has copyright in the work expired?
The interview
The duration of copyright in a literary work varies depending on when and
where it was created and whether it has ever been published. If considered
a joint work, the longest possible duration for each contributor determines
the last possible date of copyright protection.

△△
△△
△△

If unpublished, copyright in the interview would expire 70 years after
the death of the interviewee.
If unpublished, copyright could also expire 70 years after the death
of the interviewer, assuming his or her contributions were enough to
warrant a copyright interest.
If either the interviewee or interviewer were acting as an employee, their
employer would own any copyright they created, and it would expire
120 years after creation.

What constitutes publication of an oral history interview is a very
difficult question to answer. Certainly selling copies of transcripts would
constitute publication. Distribution does not have to be extensive. In Hebrew
Academy v. Goldman, the court found that the nationwide distribution of
ten copies of an oral history (nine of which went to other libraries) constituted publication. Offering to sell or loan the tapes of the interviews may
constitute publication of the underlying literary work as well (La Cienega
Music Co. v. ZZ Top).9
If the interview was published, either as transcripts or via distribution of
the recordings, then for much of the twentieth century the various copyright
formalities would have had to have been followed. Copyright notice would
have had to appear on the copies distributed, and the interviews would
have had to have been registered and renewed. The duration of works can
be determined by following the principles set forth in Chapter 3.
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The recording
Where duration is concerned, it is necessary to distinguish between sound
recordings and audiovisual recordings.
Sound recordings only received federal copyright protection starting
in 1972. Few if any of the pre-1972 recordings will enter the public domain
prior to 2067. Unpublished sound recordings made since 1972 are protected
for 70 years after the death of the author or 120 years after creation if the
work was done by an employee.
Sound recordings published between 1972 and 1989 had to follow the
requirements for notice. If the proper copyright notice did not appear on
the piece, the sound recording entered the public domain. (Note, however,
that this did not automatically also place the underlying work in the public
domain. It could have been registered separately.) If published with the
copyright notice, none of these published sound records will enter the
public domain until 2049 at the earliest.
Audiovisual recordings have received copyright protection since 1912.
The rules governing copyright duration of a filmed interview are the same
as those for the interview itself. If the work is unpublished, copyright would
endure for either the life of the author plus 70 years or for 120 years (if a
work of corporate authorship). If published, the recording would have had
to follow the notice requirements required of all published items (unless
the recording was published after 1 March 1989).

The transcript
If there is a separate copyright in the transcript, it would follow the same
rules governing copyright duration as those for the interview itself.

11.6 Does the institution wish to perform one of the “exclusive

acts” of the copyright owner?

For the purpose of this case study, we will concentrate on the digitization
of oral history sound recordings, as this appears to be a topical issue for
cultural institutions.
The exclusive rights of the copyright owner include making a “reproduction” of a literary work and making a “copy” of a sound recording or
audiovisual. This encompasses making a digital version of an item held in
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analog form. Digitization clearly makes a copy of the sound recording or
film, meaning that a cultural institution risks infringing copyright unless
it is the owner of copyright, has the permission of the copyright owner, or
the digitization falls within an exemption in the Copyright Act. Digitization
also reproduces the underlying literary work (that is, the interview), raising the possibility of infringing copyright in that work. If digitized copies
are made available from a publicly accessible server, digitization may also
impinge on the distribution and public performance rights of the copyright
owner.

11.7 Does digitization fall within any exemptions to

infringement in the Copyright Act?

There are a number of scenarios under which a cultural institution could
use the exemptions available in the Copyright Act to digitize an oral history
interview, either as a transcript or in recorded form (audio or film).

△△

If a library or archives owns an unpublished transcript or recorded
interview, that interview may be digitized for purposes of preservation.
Access to a digital copy can be provided on the premises of the library
or archives [17 U.S.C. § 108(b)]
A library or archives may also digitize an unpublished interview in
order to make an analog copy for deposit in another library or archives
[17 U.S.C. § 108(b)]
In response to a request from a user, a library or archives can provide a
digital copy of an entire oral history transcript if it has first determined,
on the basis of a reasonable investigation, that a copy of the interview
cannot be obtained at a fair price. The library or archives is not allowed
to retain a copy of the digital file [17 U.S.C. § 108(e)]
Similarly, a library or archives can provide to a user upon request a
digital copy of an entire sound recording of an oral history interview.
Again, it must determine that a copy of the recording is not available in
the market. Note that this only applies to sound recordings; it does not
apply to video interviews [17 U.S.C. § 108(b) and 108(i)]
During the last 20 years of a work’s copyright term, a library or archives
may post on its Web site a digitized copy of a published oral history
transcript, sound recording, or film, provided that certain requirements
are met [17 U.S.C. § 108(h)]

△△
△△
△△
△△
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This analysis suggests that an oral history can be digitized without the
consent of the copyright owners for some purposes, but that other uses
will require permission from the owners of copyright in the recording and
the interview.

11.8 Are there other considerations than just copyright to

consider?

As discussed in Chapter 9 of these guidelines, there are rights other than
copyright that should be considered when undertaking a digitization program. Certainly the privacy issues associated with oral history interviews
leap to mind.
An oral history program may have letters of release from the interviewees
and interviewers that would legally authorize them to digitize and post to
the Web oral history interviews. The “Principles and Standards of the Oral
History Association,” however, stipulate that programs should make good
faith efforts “to ensure that the uses of recordings and transcripts comply
with both the letter and spirit of the interviewee’s agreement” (emphasis
ours).10
Before commencing an oral history digitization project, cultural institutions should consider whether the interviewees anticipated this level of
general access to their remarks. It is one thing to add an oral history to a
scholarly institution where it is likely to be used in a restricted setting. It is
quite another to find one’s remarks readily accessible via Internet search
engines. A repository may have the legal right to make something available,
but it would still not be ethical.
In addition to privacy issues, cultural heritage institutions would also
need to consider whether anything in a digitized interview could be considered to be defamatory. If the interview had been previously published, the
statute of limitation on defamation suits might protect the institution (as
was the case with Hebrew Academy v. Goldman, discussed in Chapter 9).11
If digitization constitutes first publication of the oral history, however, the
digitizing institution could be liable.
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ɉɉ Obtain copyright permissions (or, where appropriate, assignments) from
ɉɉ
ɉɉ
ɉɉ

participants in oral history interviews at the time of the interview. This
should include the interviewer, the interviewee(s), and any individuals
who recorded the interview.
Obtain copyright permissions (or, where appropriate, assignments)
from people involved in transcribing interviews when the transcripts
are made.
Fragile unpublished recordings can be digitized immediately under the
preservation copying provisions in the Copyright Act. However, there are
limits on the uses of materials produced under exemptions in the Act.
If you have a collection of oral history recordings for which the copyright information is missing or incomplete, you may need to consider
a copyright risk management strategy for certain acts of digitization or
making digitized content available to the public. For example, a person’s
participation in an interview project designed to copy and make accessible to the public the recorded work might constitute an “implied license”
to perform certain copyright acts (see Chapter 7). In any event, the risk
of a copyright infringement action may be low. That said, copyright
owners may become concerned when personal or culturally sensitive
material is made available to the public or where transcripts are used
in commercially successful products.
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Case Study 2

Dissertations, Theses, and Student Papers
12.1 Introduction1
Most academic institutions have collections of doctoral dissertations, master’s theses, and/or honors papers from students. Thanks to over two decades
of work by groups such as Virginia Tech University2 and the Networked
Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations,3 many institutions now routinely ask students to deposit theses and dissertations with their schools
in electronic form. The availability of dissertations in electronic form
dramatically increases their accessibility and is consistent with the general
academic assumption that doctoral scholarship should be published and
shared. Dissertations also reflect the intellectual heritage of the institution.
They document the type and quality of research that has been done at the
university over time. It is little wonder, therefore, that many schools, in addition to encouraging current students to add their writings to an electronic
repository, are also exploring digitizing the historical collections housed
in the library or archives.
The following issues arise in relation to the digitization of dissertations,
theses, and student papers:

△△
△△
△△
△△

Who owns the copyright in the work: the student, the funding agency
that supported them, or the school?
What is the copyright status of the work? Are dissertations unpublished
or published? If published, have they entered the public domain?
Do laws designed to protect student privacy, most notably FERPA, affect
whether a school can digitize?
Do commercial efforts to digitize dissertations provide any guidance to
the schools themselves?

Having discussed these legal issues, this case study concludes with
a copyright checklist of items to consider when digitizing dissertations,
theses, and student papers.
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12.2 Definitions
For the purpose of this chapter, we will distinguish between dissertations,
theses, and student papers (DTSPs) as follows:

△△

Dissertations will refer to written work documenting the research
conducted as part of the requirements for the completion of a doctoral
degree. Dissertations are normally prepared with the expectation that
their results will be shared with the larger community of scholars.
Theses will refer to written research prepared as part of the requirements
for the award of a master’s degree. Many master’s theses are eventually
published, but there is not the same general assumption that master’s
work needs to become part of the scholarly commons as there is with
dissertations.
Student papers refer to the written work created by undergraduate and
K–12 students. Many cultural institutions have collections of honors
papers, award-winning papers, or even undergraduate theses that they
may wish to digitize and make available. Occasionally faculty members
will seek the help of a library or archives to digitize current student
papers in order to build an online library of student work for the benefit
of subsequent classes.

△△
△△

12.3 Can copyright subsist in DTSPs?
Copyright will only subsist in an item if the following conditions are met:

△△△△

The work is fixed in some tangible form
The work is original

Clearly both conditions would apply to DTSPs: they must be written (or
at least be tangible), and the research and writing presented in them must
be original. DTSPs are therefore subject to copyright protection.

12.4 Who owns the initial copyright in a DTSP?
As was discussed in Chapter 2, normally the author is the initial owner of
copyright. In the case of DTSPs, therefore, the default assumption must
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be that the author of the dissertation, thesis, or student paper owns the
copyright in the work.
Several factors, however, could alter that default assumption. Foremost
among these is the “work made for hire” doctrine. Remember that for copyright purposes the author of works written by employees is the employer. It
is possible that a PhD or master’s candidate might be both a student and an
employee of either the university or an outside firm. In that case, there is
the remote possibility that his or her employer would be considered to be
the author of the dissertation or thesis. MIT, for example, asserts ownership in student theses if the thesis research is supported in whole or in part
by “wages, salary, stipend, or grant funds administered by the Institute.”4
Most graduate students at MIT receive research stipends, and so most of
the MIT theses are owned by the University.
It is less likely that undergraduate students would ever be considered
employees of their school merely because they have matriculated. If the
research and writing for an undergraduate honors paper was conducted as
part of paid university employment, however, the copyright in the paper
might belong to the school and not the student.
It is slightly more likely that rather than claiming full copyright ownership of student work, a university or school might insist as a condition of
enrollment or completion of a degree that the school be given a license to use
and exploit any copyrighted work created by the student during his or her
tenure. For example, it is quite common for graduate schools to require that
doctoral students grant to the school the right to house in a library, reproduce,
and distribute their dissertations.5 Regulations on the submission of certain
honors papers or the granting of awards may carry similar stipulations of
license terms. It is best to check the regulations of the individual school.
At many schools, financial support for study may carry with it license
requirements as well. Most undergraduate schools seem to exclude general financial aid from creating any sort of special arrangement with students. The University of California Copyright Policy, for example, stipulates
that registered students own the copyright in their work when it is produced “without the use of University funds (other than Student Financial
Aid).”6
With graduate students, it is much more likely that their education, and
in particular their dissertation research, would be supported with funds
from the university or external sources. The terms of those grants may affect
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the scope of rights that the students have in their theses or dissertations.
For example, federal grant regulations require that research supported
with federal funds grant to the government “a royalty-free, nonexclusive
and irrevocable right to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use the work for
federal purposes, and to authorize others to do so.”7 Grants from other
sources can carry their own stipulations, and thus potentially alter the
default position that students own the entirety of the copyright in their
work.
One would hope that any variation from the normal assumption that
authors own the copyright in their DTSPs would be reflected in the DTSP
itself. We will therefore continue this chapter working on the assumption
that the students are the initial authors and copyright owners of their work.

12.5 Is the work published or unpublished?
The publication status of a DTSP has great implications for the duration of
copyright (discussed in the next section). As was discussed in Chapter 3, for
most of the last century published works had to comply with the strenuous
requirements for notice, registration, and renewal. Failure to follow these
requirements put published items in the public domain. Formal publication
of a dissertation may also alter who owns the copyright in the manuscript
version. The publication status of DTSPs, therefore, is of prime importance.

Formal publication
There are two mechanisms by which a DTSP could become published. The
first is if the author of the DTSP arranged with a publisher to reproduce
and issue the work either in its entirety or as journal articles. Publication
as a book or journal articles publishes the underlying manuscript as well.
A typescript dissertation or thesis sitting on an archives shelf may appear
to be unpublished, for copyright and digitization purposes, but it should
be treated the same as any other volume sitting in the library if it has been
subsequently published.

Tip
Do not be misled by the physical format of the item in front of you. It
may look as if you have a manuscript letter or unpublished dissertation,
but if that work has ever been published with the authorization of the
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copyright owner, a different set of rules regarding copyright duration,
preservation copying, fair use, and possibly copyright ownership, apply.

Subsequent formal publication of a DTSP complicates the use that can
be made of the typescript version usually found in libraries and archives.
Book and journal publishers often require the transfer of copyright in the
manuscript to the publisher or the grant of extensive licenses. This means
that the publisher could also own the copyright in the underlying typescript
DTSP housed in the archives. Unless the archives had secured an irrevocable license to reproduce and distribute the typescript version, digitizing
a published dissertation and making it available on a Web site would be
an infringement of the publisher’s reproduction, distribution, and display
rights.
What happens to ownership when, as is especially common in the
humanities, graduate authors extensively rework and rewrite their dissertations before publication and transfer copyright ownership of this
new version to the publisher? If the dissertation and the published version
were entirely distinct and separate, with no common expression between
them, the author could still own the copyright in the dissertation while the
publisher owned the copyright in the book.
Usually, however, there is something of the original manuscript included
in what is published. In that case, the publisher could be given copyright
ownership in all of the new material as well as in that portion of the dissertation that carries over to the published edition. Duplicating or digitizing the
typescript original could in theory infringe on the publisher’s ownership of
part of the dissertation—even though the author may still own the rights
to that portion of the manuscript that was not included in the publisher’s
version. In this scenario, one needs to think of the original dissertation as
consisting of two copyrighted works, one of which is owned by the author
and the other which is owned by the publisher.

Tip
Subsequent publication as a book or article is most likely to be an
issue with dissertations and some master's theses, but it can apply
to student papers as well. Michael Beschloss’s Kennedy and Roosevelt:
The Uneasy Alliance, for example, started as a senior honors thesis at
Williams College; Melanie Thernstrom’s book The Dead Girl began as
her senior honors thesis at Harvard.
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Informal publication
In addition to formal publication, an argument could be made that most
DTSPs are published almost immediately upon completion. How could
a typescript dissertation or thesis in an archives or library be considered
published? The answer is dependent on the peculiar concept of “publication” embraced by the 1909 Copyright Act.
As was discussed in Chapter 2, publication for copyright purposes
consists of making copies of a work available to the general public through
sale or loan. Publication could occur by formal publication—but it could
also occur if copies were provided to an authorized distributor, and it could
arguably occur just by listing an item in a library catalog.8
Dissertations in particular seem to live in a netherworld between informal publication and unpublished status. On one hand, dissertation requirements almost always stipulate that copies of dissertations should be provided
to the library in order that they can be made available to interested researchers. In addition, publication of dissertations—as a means of becoming part
of the community of scholars—has long been viewed as a requirement for
the degree. The Graduate Division at the University of California, Berkeley, in its guidance on “Publishing your Dissertation,” for example, states
that:
Your doctoral dissertation is a published work that announces
the results of your research. The University of California holds to
the tradition that you have an obligation to make your research
available to other scholars. This obligation is met when the
Graduate Division submits your dissertation to the University
Library to be bound and shelved for public use.9

They add that “Legal opinion is divided on whether common law copyright is lost only upon actual printing of a manuscript or upon making it
publicly available, e.g., by shelving it in a library. The Attorney for the Regents
has advised that shelving the dissertation or thesis voids the common law
copyright (emphasis added).10 For Berkeley, at least, it would appear that
including the dissertation in the library is publication.
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Publication could occur as well via microfilm publication with UMI
(now ProQuest). For 70 years, UMI/ProQuest has been “publishing” dissertations on microfilm as part of a program that was expressly intended to
address the difficulties accompanying letterpress publication; it now uses
digital delivery mechanisms (discussed below). In addition to publishing
dissertations, UMI /ProQuest offers to register the author’s copyright with
the Copyright Office.11 It is unclear, however, when UMI first began this
practice. Dissertations that were submitted to UMI but did not have the
proper copyright notices or were never registered or renewed may have
entered the public domain.
On the other hand, many commentators suggest that dissertations
remain unpublished, even when microfilmed or made available on library
shelves. UCLA’s library, for example, says “UCLA masters theses and doctoral dissertations are to be treated in the same manner as unpublished,
copyrighted works” (emphasis added).12
The electronic theses and dissertations (ETD) movement has also had to
address the issue of whether their electronic distribution might constitute
publication—not because it would inject the dissertations into the public
domain, but rather because “prior publication” might interfere with the
ability of dissertation authors to formally publish their work. Surveys of
authors and publishers reveal that few of them consider electronic distribution of a dissertation to constitute “prior publication.”13
Given this uncertain legal arena, it is safest to assume that in the absence
of formal publication, most dissertations are unpublished. Mere availability
on a library shelf should not be seen as constituting publication (Wright
v. Warner Books).
Special consideration should be given to dissertations submitted to
UMI. Each dissertation found at UMI should be accompanied by a license
that allows UMI to reproduce and distribute the dissertation, regardless
of its copyright status. It may be also possible to consider dissertations
submitted by the authors to UMI to be published for copyright purposes;
UMI distribution would seem to comply with the definition of publication
under both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts. If the authors did not follow
the requirements for notice, registration, or especially renewal, their work
could have entered the public domain.
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12.6 Is the work within the copyright term?
Whether a DTSP is still protected by copyright would depend in part on
its publication status:

△△
△△

If it is an unpublished (i.e., never subsequently published as a book or
never submitted to UMI) work that was never registered with the Copyright Office, copyright endures for the life of the author plus 70 years.
If it was first published through deposit with UMI or registered with
the Copyright Office, copyright would endure as if for a published work.
At a minimum, this would be for a period of 28 years, though renewal
terms can allow copyright to endure for as long as 95 years after publication—or for life of the author plus 70 years (if published after 1977
(see Chapter 3).
If it was first published prior to 1964 through deposit and distribution via
UMI but there was no copyright notice or no renewal of the copyright,
the work is in the public domain.
If it was first published as a book or series of journal articles, copyright
would endure for a period determined by the date of publication of
the book or article (and not the date of the dissertation). Details of
terms for works published at various historical dates are provided in
Chapter 3.

△△
△△

12.7 Does the institution wish to perform one of the “exclusive

acts” of the copyright owner?

For the purpose of this case study, we will concentrate on the digitization of
DTSPs, as this appears to be a topical issue for cultural institutions.
The exclusive rights of the copyright owner include the reproduction
and distribution of copyrighted works. This encompasses making a digital
version of an item held in analog form and mounting it on a server where
others can download. Digitization of copyrighted DTSPs, therefore, means
that a cultural institution clearly risks infringing copyright unless it is the
owner of copyright, has the permission of the copyright owner, or the
digitization falls within an exemption in the Copyright Act.
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12.8 Does digitization fall within any exemptions to

infringement in the Copyright Act?

There are several scenarios in which a cultural institution might be able to
digitize a DTSP using the exemptions available in the Copyright Act.

△△
△△
△△

If a library or archives owns an unpublished DTSP, that DTSP may be
digitized for purposes of preservation. Access to a digital copy can be
provided on the premises of the library or archives [17 U.S.C. § 108(b)].
A library or archives may also digitize an unpublished DTSP in order
to make an analog copy for deposit in another library or archives [17
U.S.C. § 108(b)].
In response to a request from a user, a library or archives can provide
that user with a copy (including a digital copy) of an entire published or
unpublished DTSP if it has first determined, on the basis of a reasonable investigation, that a copy of the interview cannot be obtained at a
fair price. The library or archives is not allowed to retain a copy of the
digital file [17 U.S.C. § 108(e)].
During their last 20 years of its copyright term, a library or archives may
post on its Web site a digitized copy of a published DTSP, provided that
certain requirements are met [17 U.S.C. § 108(h)].

△△

This analysis suggests that DTSPs can be digitized without the consent
of the copyright owners for some purposes, but that other uses will require
consents from the owners of copyright.

12.9 Do laws designed to protect student privacy affect

digitization?

The primary legislation protecting student privacy in the United States is
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, or FERPA.16 FERPA,
which applies to K–12 and postsecondary students, guarantees to students:

△△△△
△△

Access to their education records
An opportunity to seek to have the records amended
Some control over the disclosure of information from their education
records.
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The concept of “education record” is key to FERPA.17 An education
record must be directly related to a student and maintained by an educational agency or institution. It can include personal information, enrollment
records, grades, and schedules. It also covers student term papers that have
been collected and maintained by teachers or other school officials. Except
for a few narrow exemptions, the bulk of the student’s education record is
considered privileged. Personally identifiable information from the education record can only be released with the permission of the student.
In order to digitize and distribute papers from its students, therefore,
the cultural heritage institution will need to secure the student’s permission. If all identifying marks that could identify the student are removed
from a paper, the demands of FERPA would be met—only permission of
the copyright owner would be needed.

Did You Know?
Access to senior theses became an issue
during the 2008 presidential campaign. The
media sought to read both Hillary Clinton’s
senior thesis on Saul Alinsky housed in the
Wellesley College archives and Michelle
Obama’s senior thesis on “Princeton-
Educated Blacks and the Black Community,”
housed in the Princeton University archives.
The policy at both schools is that senior
theses are routinely made available to interested researchers on site
and via microfilm. Because the authors’ explicit permissions had been
secured, FERPA is not an issue. Digitizing and distributing the theses,
however, requires the permission of the copyright owner. In Obama’s
case, she (as the copyright owner) authorized the provision of a digital copy to the
Web site http://www.politico.com.14
Clinton did not authorize the digitization
of her thesis, but that did not stop
http://GOPublius.com from securing
a copy and posting it—and thus risking a copyright-infringement lawsuit
for their unauthorized reproduction and
distribution.15
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12.10 Risk assessment
The preceding analysis demonstrates that there is a considerable likelihood that digitizing an institution’s historical collection of dissertations,
theses, and/or student papers is often a technical violation of the law. The
default position we have established is that DTSPs are unpublished, and
hence protected by copyright until 70 years after the death of the author.
It is the student, and not the institution, that in most cases owns the copyright in the work. In some cases, copyright in the thesis may have passed
to a publisher (if the thesis is later published). Lastly, making a copy of
student work available could violate the privacy requirements embedded
in FERPA if the identity of the student author could be determined or
inferred.
As discussed above, there are ways to eliminate some of the risks. The
safest course would be to identify DTSPs that had been registered with the
Copyright Office and whose copyright had not been renewed prior to 1964.
These works would have entered the public domain. In addition, publication
of DTSPs, most often through assignment to UMI, without proper notice or
renewal would also have injected the manuscripts into the public domain.
Lastly, institutional policies at certain times may have required students to
grant authorization to the institution to reproduce and distribute the work;
this prior permission would also reduce the risk.
For those works that are still protected by copyright, the safest course
is to secure the permission of the authors of the DTSP. The permission of
the copyright owner removes all legal liability. It also addresses any ethical
issues (discussed in more detail below) that may arise. Peter Hirtle recently
queried a number of library legal experts about digitization of theses; all
concluded that the safest course would be to secure the permission of the
copyright owner to digitize and distribute their works.
Nevertheless, it is likely that a DTSP digitization program will encounter
works that are clearly still copyrighted or whose copyright owner either cannot be identified or located. Other programs may be reluctant to undertake
the expense of trying to locate copyright owners. What can a program do
at this point?
Here is where risk assessment must be taken into account. Each institution must weigh the possible risks and benefits associated with moving
ahead with the digitization program in spite of the legal uncertainty and
decide if it is comfortable with the answer.18
237

12.10

i Risk assessment
In some ways, the risk associated with a DTSP digitization project can
be extreme:

△△
△△
△△
△△

If there is a current valid copyright registration for the DTSP, theoretical statutory damages of up to $150,000 (for willful infringement), plus
attorney’s fees, court costs, and the impounding of the distribution
servers are possible.
If an unregistered DTSP has subsequently been published and all
copyrights transferred to the publisher, the publisher could sue for up
to $150,000.
If releasing student papers was determined to be an uncorrected FERPA
violation, the penalties against the institution can range up to the loss
of all federal funds.
If the digitized DTSPs are included as part of a commercial product,
many copyright exemptions are not applicable.

On the other hand, there are factors that work to lessen the risk posed
in digitizing DTSPs:

△△
△△
△△
△△

If the DTSPs are truly unpublished and unregistered, then only actual
monetary damages and legal fees are available as recourse to aggrieved
copyright owners.
In theory publishers can sue for statutory damages for reproducing and
distributing copies of DTSPs, but we know of no such cases in practice.
Graduate dissertations and theses and undergraduate honors theses
traditionally include the written permission of the student allowing
the release of the work.
In some cases, a fair-use analysis could be used as a justification for
digitization. We assume, for example, that GOPublius.com would defend
its reproduction of Hillary Rodham’s thesis (discussed in the box above)
on the basis of its newsworthiness.
FERPA violations can be avoided by securing the written permission
of the student.
An “opt-out” notification system as is used in at least one dissertation
digital project may be enough to address any lingering concerns. (See
the discussion of the ProQuest approach below.)

△△
△△
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The ethical imperative
More important than the legal issues in this case study are the ethical and
moral issues. Each institution must determine its obligation to its former
students and to scholarship at large. Will its students welcome the widespread and general availability of their work? Or will they feel that something
important has been stolen from them and that the institution should have
secured their permission in advance?

Did You Know?
The University of Iowa discovered the sensitivities that can be associated with providing online access to student work. In March, 2008,
former students of the famous Iowa Writers Workshop discovered
the university’s plans to require that master’s theses be posted to an
open-access Web server. The reaction was immediate and negative,
and the University withdrew its plans later that spring.19

Almost all DTSPs are produced with the expectation that there would
be some level of public access to the results. At a minimum, copies of
the works are available in physical form in a library or archives. Limited
copying—and sometimes copying of the entire work—is permitted. Some
DTSPs are allowed to circulate via interlibrary loan or as microfilm copies.
And most dissertations have been “published” by UMI—though there has
been a widespread consensus that a microfilm or print copy of a dissertation secured from UMI is not the equivalent of a published volume sold
through conventional channels.
Digital technologies have the ability to upset the public access assumptions of the past. Digital delivery of dissertations can suddenly seem less like
the provision of microfilm and more like formal publishing—and hence less
acceptable to authors. UMI found this out the hard way late in 2005 when it
started selling its print-on-demand copies of dissertations through Amazon.
Although the new practice was clearly permitted by the broad license that
authors sign when depositing dissertations with UMI and arguably to the
authors’ benefit, it met with some disapproval. Out of respect for the wishes
of authors, UMI quickly ended the program and removed all dissertations
from Amazon.20 However, dissertations can still be purchased in digital
form through ProQuest, discussed below.
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Each institution must decide whether the general distribution possible
via the Internet is a natural extension of their previous access practices or
an unacceptable intrusion on the rights of their students.

Another Point of View
ProQuest Dissertation Digitization
Different organizations take different views of risk. A good example of
this is ProQuest’s “Digital Archiving and Access Program” (DAAP).
Since 1938, ProQuest has preserved and distributed doctoral and
master’s dissertations via microfilm. They could do this because they
secured permission from the author of the dissertation or thesis at
the time of submission.
DAAP is aimed not at authors but at libraries and archives holding
dissertations and theses. Under contract to a library, DAAP will microfilm and digitize “your” dissertations (meaning the library’s) and then
make them available in print, microfilm, and online form (including
through ProQuest’s subscription database). “The Digital Archiving
& Access Program,” according to ProQuest, “makes your university’s
distinctive scholarly research available to anyone, anytime, anywhere
on the Internet.”21
The problem, of course, is that copyright in “your university’s distinctive scholarly research” actually belongs to the authors who wrote
it. A large number of the dissertations in any institution were likely
submitted to UMI and hence ProQuest now has a license to distribute
the works.22 Dissertations that are not already part of the UMI collection, however, are likely never to have been registered for copyright
nor published and would still be protected as unpublished works.
Under Section 108, libraries or archives may preserve the material
by microfilming it or digitizing it, but it is far from certain that those
protections extend to the actions of contractors such as DAAP. And
nothing in Section 108 would allow DAAP to keep a copy of digitized
unpublished theses, nor allow DAAP or the University to make the
material available online outside the library premises.
An institution that participates in DAAP might be able to argue
that they were making a fair use of the material and hence avoid the
worst penalties if the matter ever came to trial. ProQuest, however,
because it is engaged in commercial conversion and delivery, would
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have a much harder time justifying its actions under fair use. In particular, it appears to be vulnerable to a potential lawsuit from a publisher
who subsequently published a dissertation for which ProQuest does
not have a distribution license.
For this reason, ProQuest works with universities to alert alumni
about the existence of the program and advertise methods for opting
out. They apparently recognize that the likelihood that they will be
sued is small and that the damages associated with reproducing an
unpublished work are limited. Although reproducing and distributing
unpublished dissertations without the prior permission of the author
may be a technical violation of copyright, the provision of “opt-out”
mechanisms may be sufficient to allay author concerns. ProQuest very
well could be right. Nevertheless, institutions that participate in the
ProQuest program could be wise to insist on indemnification against
any copyright actions brought forward because of ProQuest’s use.

12.11 Practical suggestions arising from this chapter

ɉɉ Investigate the institution’s policy with regard to copyright ownership

of student work:
Look to see if there are different rules for students, undergraduates,
and advanced degree students.
Check whether individual schools or departments within an institution have their own policies.
Determine whether these policies have changed over time.
Look in the DTSP for evidence of outside support (such as research
grants or fellowships) that may have their own requirements regarding
reproduction and distribution of the DTSP.
Look for evidence of a license from the students that could authorize
the reproduction and general distribution of DTSPs.
Investigate whether the DTSPs are unpublished, and hence still copyrighted, works, or if any of them have been registered with the Copyright Office.
Consider whether you have ethical responsibilities to former students
that may outweigh the purely legal concerns.
If using an outside conversion and delivery service such as ProQuest’s
Digital Archiving & Access Program, consider securing indemnification
against any us by the vendor of the material that is infringing.

ɉɉ
ɉɉ

ɉɉ
ɉɉ
ɉɉ
ɉɉ
ɉɉ

ɉɉ
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(1973), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (libraries attached to the
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1 An example might be Merle Miller’s Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman

(New York: Berkley Pub. Co., 1974). While based on transcripts of oral history interviews
with Harry S. Truman, the transcripts have been edited in such a way as to create a separate
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but were fabricated. See Robert H. Ferrell and Francis H. Heller, “Plain Faking?” American
Heritage Magazine 46:3 (May/June 1995), http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/
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2 John A. Neuenschwander, Oral History and the Law (Carlisle, PA: Oral History Association,

2002, 3rd edition.)
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Oral History, ed. by Thomas Lee Charlton, Lois E. Myers, and Rebecca Sharpless (Lanham,
MD: Altamira, 2006): 247.
6 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991): 508.
7 Ibid., 507.
8 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (on whether the contributions of the dramaturge

for Rent constituted joint authorship)
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9 17 U.S.C § 303(b), which was added to the law to overturn La Cienega v. ZZ Top, only applies
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publication of that work.
10 Oral History Association, “Principles and Standards,” in Oral History Evaluation Guidelines.

Pamphlet no. 3. Adopted 1989, Revised Sept. 2000 (Carlisle, PA: Oral History Association,
2001), http://alpha.dickinson.edu/oha/pub_eg.html.
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1 Special thanks go to Kenneth Crews, Lolly Gasaway, Georgia Harper, Austin McClean, Mary
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(undated), http://graduate.ucsf.edu/system/files/TDGuidelines.pdf.
6 University of California Office of the President, “Copyright Policy,” 19 August 1992, found
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9 Graduate Division, University Of California, Berkeley, “Publishing your Dissertation,” avail-

able at http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/policies/dissertation_publish.shtml.
10 Graduate Division, University Of California, Berkeley, “Library Permission Form,” available

at http://www.grad.berkeley.edu/policies/pdf/LibrPermForm.pdf.
11 ProQuest, Publishing Your Graduate Work with UMI® Dissertation Publishing (undated),

available at http://www.uab.edu/graduate/dissertation_publishing_agreement.pdf.
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13 Gail McMillan, “Publishers,” in The UNESCO Guide for Electronic Theses and Dissertations,

available at http://www.etdguide.org/.
14 http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa.
15 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g).
16 Jeffrey Ressner, “Michelle Obama thesis was on racial divide,” Politico Web site, posted

Feb. 22, 2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0208/8642.html.
17 See the blog posting “Hillary Clinton’s Wellesley Thesis,” posted Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.

gopublius.com/?p=175.
18 This discussion about the importance of risk assessment when considering the digitization

is mirrored in a study based on British law. Theo Andrew writes:
If no contact can be made with a copyright owner, then depending on the library’s
assessment of the risk, it may wish to proceed without having gained the permission to
host the material. If this action is taken then it is imperative to show that enough steps
have been taken to show reasonable efforts towards locating the copyright holder, and
that the material is for an educational, noncommercial, purpose. This option, taken at
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Theo Andrew, “Intellectual Property and Electronic Theses,” JISC Legal Information
Service, Nov., 2004, available at http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/publications/ethesesandrew.htm.
19 Andrea L. Foster, “U. of Iowa Writing Students Quash Planned Open Access,” Chronicle of

Higher Education, March 28, 2008.
20 Austin McLean, e-mail message to Peter Hirtle, May 23, 2008.
21 “The Digital Archiving & Access Program for your dissertations and master’s theses,”

(undated), available at http://www.proquest.com/products_pq/literature/umi/daa_overview.
pdf. More information on the program is available at http://www.umi.com/products_umi/
dissertations/archivinggrad.shtml.
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its exact language. In Random House v. RosettaBooks, the court found that the standard
language in some author contracts with Random House (“print, publish and sell the work(s)
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v. Rosetta Books, 150 F.Supp.2d 613 (S.D.N.Y., 2001).
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